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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF ARAB AND SOUTH ASIAN AMERICAN MEN WITH IMMIGRANTFAMILY ORIGINS IN NEW-IMMIGRANT DESTINATIONS
Jack “Trey” Allen
July 29, 2021
This dissertation is an examination of Arab and South Asian American men’s (1)
experiences and perceptions of discrimination and belonging in two non-traditional
immigrant destinations in the United States (U.S.) south, and (2) their performance of
masculinities in response to Muslim women’s experiences with Islamophobia. I use
intersectional theory, theories of race and racism, theories of gender, theories on
belonging, and grounded theory to analyze 23 qualitative semi-structured interviews with
Arab and South Asian men who live in one large city and one rural town in the U.S.
south.
I find that upper-, middle-, and working-class Arab and South Asian men dismiss
and downplay personal experiences with Islamophobia, despite reporting a wide-range of
these experiences. Social-class position shaped how these men downplayed these
experiences. I argue that these patterns have important implications for how scholars
studying racism in America should address the position of intermediary racial
categories—which include Arab and South Asian Americans.
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I also find that Arab and South Asian men performed hegemonic masculinities
when women were the subjects of Islamophobic encounters or when discussing their
potential experiences with Islamophobia. Interviewees reported a desire to control
women in their lives to protect them from potential Islamophobic perpetrators and
celebrated times when they or people that they knew physically confronted Islamophobic
perpetrators who were targeting their women family members. This flatly contrasts their
dismissive responses to Islamophobia committed against themselves or other men and
has implications for emerging scholarship on complicit masculinities and intersectional
studies of Islamophobia.
Lastly, I find that upper class Arab and South Asian men reported a strong sense
of belonging and connection to the community in the rural town when compared to men
from the larger city and middle- and working-class men from the rural town. I found that
these men had an easier time drawing on their relationships as mostly medical providers
to the surrounding community as compared to other respondents without an occupational
status representing privilege and status in the community.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Demographic data demonstrate that both Arab and South Asian American
populations in the U.S. have grown substantially in overall size and in their share of the
U.S. population during the late-20th and early-21st centuries (Arab American Institute
2018, López et al. 2017). By some measures one could argue that these groups may
experience relative privilege (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Garner and Selod 2015). For instance,
the Arab American Institute (2018) uses 2017 American Community Survey data to
report the average education, income, and occupation of Arab Americans. They report
that: “49% of Americans of Arab descent have a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared
to 32% of Americans at large” (Arab American Institute 2018). Or, the “[m]edian income
for Arab American households in 2017 was $60,398, almost mirroring the national
median income for all households which was $60,422. [Though] [m]ean individual
income is 26% higher than the national average” (Arab American Institute 2018). Some
South Asian groups are similarly situated. For example, López et al. (2017) report that in
2015, 53% of Pakistani Americans had a bachelor’s degree or higher. And in 2015, the
median annual household income for Pakistani households in the U.S. was $66,000
(López et al. 2017). Despite these measurable advantages, Arabs and South Asians face
barriers to enjoying the full benefits of this economic standing due to the threat of racial
stereotypes and Islamophobia against Muslims.
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Islamophobia is a term that is popularly used to refer to a fear or animosity
towards religious Muslims or those presumed to be Muslim, e.g., Arab or Pakistani
Americans. This concept has gained popular explanatory traction in the aftermath of
international terror attributed to ‘radical Islamic groups’ such as al Qaeda and the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant [Syria] [ISIS]. Following such events, religious Muslims
have been the targets of backlash, discrimination, and violence. Scholars and groups that
study Muslim groups (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009, Akram and Johnson 2002, Allen 2018,
Cainkar 2002, Council on American-Islamic Relations 2009, Garner and Selod 2015,
Kishi 2017, Meer 2008, Rana 2011; Selod 2016 and 2019, Southern Poverty Law Center
2019) have verified these experiences and their effects. For instance, the Council on
American-Islamic Relations [CAIR] (2009) tracks a steady and increasing growth in the
number of civil rights complaints reported to them annually, ranging from 80 in 1995 to
2,728 in 2008. After September 11th, 2001 [9/11]1 many Western nations saw an uptick in
the number of hate-crimes committed against people presumed to be Muslim. Singh
(2002) writes: “[t]he hate crimes that followed the September 11th attacks…were unique
in their severity and extent” (3).
Though 9/11 is a pivotal point for understanding Islamophobia in contemporary
history, scholars (Garner and Selod 2015, Lean 2012, Love 2017, Mastnak 2010, Said
1978, Selod 2016) generally agree that animosity from the West toward the “MiddleEast,” the presumed ‘Muslim world”, or the “Orient” is not new. The social construction
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9/11 is popularly understood as the date of a series of international terrorist attacks
attributed to al Qaeda. During which, four commercial airliners were hijacked by alQaeda operatives. Two of these airliners were flown into the World Trade Center in New
York City and a third struck the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed
into a field outside of Pennsylvania.
2

of Islam as a threat to the West dates back at least to the 9th century AD and the Crusades.
In recent history Muslim’s ethnic and religious identities have come to take on nationalist
meanings and stand in contradiction to dominant White-Christian imperial powers
(Mastnak, 2010; Rana, 2011; Selod, 2015; Werbner, 2005; Zopf, 2018). Finally, some
scholars (Lean 2012, Mastnak, 2010, Rana 2011) have linked Islamophobia in the West
to the fall of the Soviet Union, arguing that Islam became the new conceptual opponent to
democracy, around which financial and military resources and support could be
mobilized. According to FBI reports, Anti-Muslim assaults in the U.S. increased from 12
in 2000 to 93 in 2001 (Kishi 2017). Per Kishi (2017) FBI reported anti-Muslim assaults
would reach a high of 127 in 2016. Scholars have none-the-less argued that the academy
must move past a post-9/11 terminology (Cainkar and Selod 2018, Love 2013, Rana
2011) that ties anti-Muslim discrimination, sentiment, and violence to temporary
backlash, rather than to more broadly, historically constituted regimes.
In 2017 President Donald Trump issued The Executive Order Protecting the
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States [EO 13769]. This order
intended to temporarily restrict travel from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen, with the stated purpose of combatting radical Islamic terror (Trump 2017). This
order was implemented despite that from 1975 through 2015 only two Americans were
killed by Nationals from those countries listed in the U.S. (Golash-Boza 2018). While EO
13769 was delayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in January 2017, it
was reissued as EO 13780 and upheld by the Supreme Court of the U.S. with the
redaction of Iraq and addition of North Korea and Venezuela as nations of reduced and
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scrutinized admissions to the U.S. This act would also restrict the admittance of refugees
without valid travel documents (Carter 2018; Trump 2017).
Emerging scholarship (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009, Allen 2018, Selod 2015 and
2019) has demonstrated that gender impacts the ways that groups racialized as Muslim
experience and perceive Islamophobic experiences and racism. However, little
scholarship addresses the ways that class shapes these experiences and perceptions. And
some studies (Selod 2015) have demonstrated that the citizenship of groups racialized as
Muslims is routinely questioned by individuals and in institutions. The current study
seeks to contribute to scholarship on Islamophbia by critically engaging with the ways
that Arab and South Asian men from upper-, middle-, and working-class backgrounds
interpret experiences with Islamophobia. Studies have demonstrated that men racialized
as Muslims experience Islamophobia differently than women (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009,
and Selod 2015 and 2019), however little scholarship critically addresses the gendered
ways that men interpret and respond to Islamophobia. The current study contributes to
gender scholarship on Islamophobia by critically analyzing the ways that Arab and South
Asian men performed hegemonic masculinities when Muslim women experienced
Islamophobia, especially in comparison to the ways men discussed their own experiences
with Islamophobia. Finally, although Selod (2015) has demonstrated that groups
racialized as Muslims face “contested citizenship,” little scholarship has addressed the
ways that Islamophobia along with racism, sexism, and classism impact sense of
belonging for affected groups. The current study contributes to this by addressing the
different ways that upper-, middle-, and working-class Arabs and South Asians perceive
personal belonging in a non-traditional immigrant destination in the U.S. South. By
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personal belonging, I mean the feeling that you are accepted as a valid member of a place
and additionally that your belonging is accepted by others.
I address the following primary research questions: (1) how do Arab and South
Asian American men experience and perceive discrimination in new immigrant
destinations in the U.S. south? (2) How are experiences and perceptions of belonging
among Arab and South Asian American men shaped by place and social class in new
immigrant destinations in the U.S. south? By new immigrant destinations, I mean
localities that immigrant-origin groups are settling in during the late-20th and early 21stcenturies that do not match historic immigration trends. By belonging, I mean personal
feelings of “being ‘at home’ in a place” (Antonsich 2010: 645) and the acceptance of
claims to belonging by community members. To address these research questions, I
conducted 23 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with upper-, middle-, and workingclass Arab and South Asian men from a large city and a rural town in the U.S. south. In
doing so, I answer calls from leading scholars (Garner and Selod 2015, and Cainkar and
Selod 2018) who study Islamophobia using an intersectional paradigm and further
analyze perceptions of discrimination, performances of masculinity, and belonging,
among groups racialized as Muslims. Specifically, I answer calls from Garner and Selod
(2015: 10): who urge scholars to conduct further “fieldwork-based studies (particularly
those in which Muslims are the subject of interviews and/or ethnographies),” and Cainkar
and Selod (2018): who call for researchers to use “intersectional approaches that
incorporate gender, communities of belonging, black Muslim experiences, class, and
sexuality” (10) [italics added] into the study of groups racialized as Muslims. Analysis of
interviews reveals three central themes. First, I demonstrate that Arab and South Asian
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men downplay Islamophobic experiences in classed ways. Second, I find that Arab and
South Asian men perform protective hegemonic masculinities when they discuss
women’s Islamophobic experiences. Finally, I demonstrate that upper class Arab and
South Asian men in non-traditional immigrant destinations are able to draw upon class
resources to perceive a particularly strong sense of belonging that is not shared by
middle- and working-class men.
In chapter two, I detail literature that is relevant to this study. I draw from
literature on race, racism, Islamophobia, intersectionality, theories of belonging, and
masculinity to examine my research question. I contribute to these bodies of literature by:
(1) adding nuance to the ways that intermediary racial groups—such as those racialized
as Muslims—experience and interpret the U.S. racial order (Bonilla-Silva 2004), (2)
building on existing understandings of complicit masculinities and hegemonic
performances (Chen 1999), and (3) expanding discussions of belonging in non-traditional
immigrant destinations to include Arabs and South Asians and by addressing the ways
that upper class immigrants experience belonging in comparison to middle- and workingclass groups (Antonsich 2010). In chapter three, I outline my research methods and
justifications. I also describe why the research setting that I chose presents a unique
opportunity to analyze the themes highlighted above. I describe the ways that I used a
grounded theoretical framework to analyze key themes from the data. In chapter four, I
focus on findings related to experiences of Islamophobia and the practice of dismissing or
downplaying these experiences. I find that upper class Arabs and South Asians felt closer
to dominant group members and that this was reflected in their responses to
Islamophobia. In chapter five, I highlight the ways that men discussed women’s
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experiences with Islamophobia, many times unprompted by interview questions. I find
that interviewees performed masculinity in response to these altercations. In chapter six, I
highlight the ways that men perceived themselves as belonging in Townsburg – a rural,
predominantly White town. I find that upper class interviewees perceived a particularly
strong sense of belonging that was rooted in their experiences, narratives, and
professional connections to Townsburg. This was different than the ways that, for the
most part, Arab and South Asian men described belonging in Metro-City – a more
diverse metropolitan city. Middle- and working-class men also did not describe their
belonging in Townsburg with similar strength. In chapter seven, I explore contributions
to scholarship, and address the question of why this research is important in addition to
existing scholarship. I also discuss limitations of this project and potential directions for
future research.
As with any sociological study, this project has some limitations. As I outline in
the methods section of this paper, this data collection and analysis was likely influenced
by my identity as a white, non-Arab, non-South Asian, agnostic, highly educated, young,
cis-gender, and straight male. This likely influenced what participants were willing to
report to me and how they reported it. I also note that sampling was cut off due to the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, so the sample is small for a place-based comparison of
experiences and perceptions. The current research project is also limited in that it
addresses the experiences of Arab and South Asian men from largely upper- and middleclass backgrounds. Greater research attention should be paid to the experiences and
perceptions of working-class and poor groups who are radicalized as Muslims to address
the ways that their experiences compare to the men in this study. Greater research
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attention should also be paid to the experiences and perceptions of upper class Arab and
South Asian women to see if they similarly downplay Islamophobia and perceive
themselves as belonging in new immigrant destinations when they experience
Islamophobia. My findings on gender will need to be verified with research that more
directly explores questions related to masculine performances and Islamophobia.
Masculine performances were a peripheral focus of the original research project and were
pursued when they emerged as a strong theme. Future research should seek to verify the
claim that Muslim women have more severe and frequent experiences with Islamophobia
than Muslim men.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this literature review, I first introduce intersectionality as an overarching
theoretical paradigm that guided this work. Second, I broadly discuss theories on race and
racism(s) in the United States (U.S.) during the 20th and 21st centuries. I highlight the
shortcomings of these theories for understanding the experiences of intermediary racial
groups and more recently racialized ethnic groups, such as Arabs and South Asians,
especially in the context of a global society increasingly shaped by human migration.
Third, I provide a demographic overview of Arab and South Asian Americans in the U.S.
and discuss the ways that they experience systems of race and racism. I discuss the
emerging literatures on Islamophobia and the racialization of Arabs and South Asians as
Muslims, paying special attention to the calls of leading scholars for continuing research.
I demonstrate that the current study answers these calls for qualitative and intersectional
analyses of Arab and South Asian experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia. Fourth, I
briefly discuss scholarship on “model minority” stereotyping because upper class
interviewees in one locale discussed being the subject of this stereotype. Fifth, I outline
literature on place and belonging. I provide a deeper discussion of scholarship on the
ways that new immigrant groups experience belonging and barriers to belonging in nontraditional immigrant destinations—such as rural parts of the U.S. South. I provide a
deidentified overview of the locales studied because place is central to my analysis. As I
will demonstrate,
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the current study presents a unique opportunity to add to our understanding of how social
class impacts belonging and experiences in new immigrant destinations. Sixth, I outline
literature on gender and masculinities. Finally, I briefly outline literature that guide my
discussion of class and social stratification.
Intersectionality
Intersectionality is a critical framework for this study because I analyze the ways
that systems of race, gender, social class and place interact to impact the lived
experiences and perceptions of Arab and South Asian men. Collins (2015) describes
intersectionality as a multidimensional or multifaceted knowledge project that is
historically rooted in the diametric oppressions and activisms of oppressed groups. Thus,
intersectionality—in its purest sense—is not simply an academic theory. Intersectionality
has also gained a growing acceptance in the academy and scholars have reached the
consensus that:
“The term intersectionality references the critical insight that race, class, gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age [I add place] operate not as unitary,
mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in
turn shape complex social inequalities” (Collins 2015: 2).
Perhaps most famously, intersectional theories have been used to analyze the unique
domination-based experiences and positions of Black women. In this example Black
women are marginalized in complex ways, and their “Blackness” and “womanhood” are
mutually constructing categories that cannot be separated. For example, in her seminal
work on “Black Feminist Thought” Collins (2000) demonstrates the ways that black
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women’s lived realities and needs are overlooked by first- and second-wave feminist and
anti-racist movements.
Intersectionality is a dynamic, relatively young and interdisciplinary theoretical
framework. Thus, scholars are continuously revisiting and redeveloping the
epistemological bases for conducting intersectional studies. Choo and Ferree (2010)
outline three types of intersectional analyses as “group-centered”, “process-centered”,
and “system-centered,” and encourage sociologists to vie for the latter. Group-centered
analyses have the positive aim of providing a voice to historically oppressed and silenced
groups, especially with respect to the academy. However, such analyses often prioritize
description rather than providing an institutional-relational and sociological comparison.
Thus, group-centered analyses run the risk of fetishizing difference and constructing
content areas of expertise, e.g. Africana women’s studies. The second, more advanced
form of analysis focuses on intersectional forces via variables where scholars specify
axes of difference to be theoretically isolated. However, these analyses—frequently
characterized by comparative studies—“[run] the risk of focusing on abstracted structures
in their intersectional configuration, thus turning the persons … experiencing …
interactions into incidental figures, underplaying their agency in these complex
constellations of forces” (Choo and Ferree 2010: 134). Instead, Choo and Ferree advocate
for system-centered analyses, where: “the account of intersectionality as a complex
system sees gender and race are fundamentally embedded in, working through and
determining the organization of ownership, profit, and the commodification of labor…”
(Choo and Ferree 2010: 135). For instance, rather than focusing on affected groups or on
what axes of difference are significant in shaping the intersectional experiences of
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groups, studies should focus on the systems themselves that produce inequalities. I use a
system-centered analysis to address the complex ways that place-specific iterations of
Islamophobic racism, sexism, and classism impact perceptions of Islamophobia and
belonging for Arab and South Asian men. In doing so, I incorporate a discussion of the
ways that men from different class backgrounds interact with surrounding geographic
communities, perform masculinities, and describe personal belonging in relation to their
social location and Arab and South Asian histories in a small rural town in the U.S.
South.
Scholars writing to the field of Islamophobia and the racialization have addressed
the ways that gender informs Muslim racialization as foreign or anti-democratic (Akram
and Johnson 2002 and Selod 2015, 2016, and 2019). Scholars who study groups
racialized as Muslims (Cainkar and Selod 2018) and other intermediary groups (Marrow
2009, Rockquemore et al. 2009, Saperstein and Penner 2012) have issued calls for
additional intersectional research addressing the experiences of Muslims and how
intermediary racial categories are formed and inhabited. These calls have been issued
because the various systems of racism, Islamophobia, sexism, and classism interact in
complex ways to maintain systemic inequalities and subordination. A more nuanced
understanding of these systems is needed to combat these forces together. This study
answers these calls by addressing the ways that upper-, middle-, and working-class Arab
and South Asian men experience and interpret their experiences with Islamophobia,
contribute to hegemonic gender orders, and experience and perceive belonging based on
social class in the U.S. South.
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Race and Racisms
Races are historically constructed according to processes of racialization, whereby
“racial meanings are assigned to previously unclassified relationships, social practices, or
groups” (Omi and Winant 2015: 13). Thus, it makes sense to say that races are
historically and socially constructed political categories of difference that are based on
external markers deemed to be significant. Scholars of race agree that races are externally
created and imposed on groups, primarily by dominant group members on subordinate
group members (Bonilla-Silva 1997 and 2015, Kibria 2000, Morning 2001, Omi and
Winant 2015). By contrast, ethnicity is typically defined in Weberian terms, whereby
ethnic groups are formed around claims to kinship, common history, and connections to
certain symbols that capture the core of the group’s identity (Kibria 2000, Morning 2001,
Nagel 1994). Per the process of racialization (Omi and Winant 2015), ethnic groups can
be given racial meaning.
During the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries, sociologists have issued
calls to develop comprehensive theories of racism (Bonilla-Silva 1997, Golash-Boza
2016, Winant 2000). The most popular responses to these calls tend to explain racial
phenomena via an interplay between macro-level: structure, institutions, organizations,
and regimes; and micro-level: experiences, discrimination, groups, and identities.
Furthermore, recent theories (Bonilla Silva 1997, 2004, 2015; Feagin and Elias 2013;
Omi and Winant 2015) have tended to grant more power to structure than individual
agency in describing what shapes racial matters in the U.S. For instance, Bonilla-Silva
(1997, 2015) summarizes his “racialized social systems” here:
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“First, racialized social systems are societies that allocate differential economic,
political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along racial lines ….
After a society becomes racialized, a set of social relations and practices [the
racial structure of society] based on racial distinctions develops at all societal
levels …. Second, races historically are constituted according to the process of
racialization…. Third, on the basis of this structure, there develops a racial
ideology [popularly characterized as racism]. Fourth, most struggles in a
racialized social system contain a racial component, but sometimes they acquire
and/or exhibit a distinct racial character… Finally, the process of racial
contestation reveals the different objective interests of the races in a racialized
system.” (474)
For instance, in U.S. history groups of mostly Western-European ancestry came to define
themselves as white and claim the rewards and privileges associated with whiteness.
Dominant ideologies have developed and shifted that justify racial dominance and
subordination, and a rich history of struggles and contestations that have a racial nature.
All racial groups in the U.S. must consequently grapple with this system of white
supremacy. And Whites, seeking to maintain their advantage, police and protect the
boundaries of whiteness. Historical examples of this are: slave codes, anti-miscegenation
laws, rules of hypo-descent, supreme court rulings on citizenship that appeal to race,
physical segregation, etc.
More recently, however, these structurally based explanations of contemporary
racial regimes have come under theoretical scrutiny for their apparent inability to address
how intermediate racial groups come to be formed, inhabited, and experienced (Marrow
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2009, Rockquemore et al. 2009, Saperstein and Penner 2012). By intermediate, I refer to
groups that exist outside of a prototypical U.S. White/Black racial binary. Many scholars
(Morning 2001, Rockquemore et al. 2009, Selod 2015, Zopf 2018) have argued that the
major paradigms used to understand race in the U.S. are based in this problematic
White/Black racial binary, shaped primarily by the legacies of chattel slavery, postemancipation subordination and violence, Jim Crow segregation, residential apartheid,
the black civil rights movement, white backlash, and colorblindness. Such paradigms do
not adequately explain the complex and unique histories of Asian American, first-nations,
multi-racial, or more recently racialized ethnic groupings—e,g, Arabs and South Asians,
and Latinx groups. Morning (2001) argues in a paper on the racial self-identification of
South Asians,
“Much of the literature on racial formation privileges the broad social and
political forces, historical and contemporary, which shape the development and
spread of racial schema. Students of racial formation writ large, however, often
ignore the individual-level actions and encounters that shape racialization on the
ground.” (63)
These shortcomings are amplified by the large-scale demographic shifts that have
occurred in nation-states like the U.S., as historically restrictive immigration policies
have been lifted and globalization has enabled more people to move internationally; and
furthermore, as popular understandings of race itself changes (Marrow 2009, Meer 2008,
Rockquemore et al. 2009, Saperstein and Penner 2012, Zopf 2018). Until recent history,
virtually all national-U.S. immigration policy was explicitly informed by racialized
nativism that favored European origin whites. For instance, The Chinese Exclusion Act
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[CEA] [also the immigration act of 1882]2 was the first federal legislation to suspend
immigration for an entire group based on their nationality of origin [Chinese] (Wu 2017,
Golash-Boza 2018, Zhou 2012). While the CEA marked a significant moment in U.S.
history, it is not unique from the many federal policies that it set the precedent for. The
Immigration act of 1917 expanded the Chinese Exclusion Act to include India, Burma,
the Malay States, Arabia and Afghanistan (Golash-Boza 2018, Zhou 2012). The JohnsonReed Act of 1924 “cut off almost all immigration from Asia and instituted national
quotas restricting immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, Africa, and the Middle
East” (Munoz 2008: 41). These racial quotas on immigration would remain in effect until
the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 overturned them (Golash-Boza 2018; Hirschman and Massey
2008, Munoz 2008).
Perhaps unsurprisingly so, these racially restrictive histories have had a direct
impact on the demographic composition of the U.S. (Hirschman and Massey 2008). The
Migration Policy Institute (2017) tracks a dramatic growth in the portion of U.S. residents
who are foreign born; from 1970 to 2017 this number increased from 9,619,300 to
44,525,900. During this time foreign-born people in America comprised 4.7, and later
13.7 percent of the total U.S. population (Migration Policy Institute 2017). U.S.
immigrant populations also shifted from being overwhelmingly characterized by Western
European nationalities [Whites] to most immigrants originating in the Americas and Asia
[intermediate racial categories] (Migration Policy Institute 2017). Arab and Pakistani
American populations have drastically increased in recent time. The Arab American
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The CEA was passed in 1882, renewed in 1892, and made permanent in 1902. This act
would ultimately be repealed to permit an annual quota of Chinese immigrants in 1943.
(Wu 2017)
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Institute [AAI] reports that, “[t]he number of Americans who claim Arab ancestry has
more than doubled since the Census first measured ethnic origins in 1980 and is among
the fastest growing Arab diaspora populations in the world.” According to U.S. Census
estimations, AAI reports that there are 2,041,484 Arab Americans in the U.S. Similarly,
López et al. (2017) estimate that the Pakistani American population grew from about
204,000 in 2000 to 519,000 by 2015 [a 154% increase].
In light of these demographic changes and critiques of theories of race and racism,
this research project studies Arab and South Asian men—an intermediary racial group
who are frequently racialized as Muslims. I discuss this process of racialization in the
next section. In the findings sections, I demonstrate how experiences with racism and
perceptions of belonging vary for men based on their social class positions.
Islamophobia and the Racialization of Arabs and South Asians as Muslims
Recall that racialization refers to the processes of assigning racial meanings “to
previously unclassified relationships, social practices, or groups” (Omi and Winant 2015:
13). More specifically, racialization operates to categorize and place people in the
existing racial hierarchy and is thus part of the ascription process. Racialization does not
occur uniformly. In sociology, Islamophobia is increasingly being discussed as a form of
racism, even though Islam is officially a religion and not a race (Akram and Johnson
2002, Allen 2018, Cainkar and Selod 2018, Garner and Selod 2015; Jaffe-Walter 2016,
Rana 2011, Razack 2008, Selod 2015, Zopf 2018). In their seminal work on the
racialization of Muslims, Garner and Selod (2015) outline the theoretical justifications for
this position. Recall that the historical process of creating racial categories is called
racialization (Omi and Winant 2015: 13). Since race is a social construction—not rooted
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in biology, it “has historically been derived from both physical and cultural
characteristics” (Garner and Selod, 2015: 12). This includes cultural attributes such as a
group’s faith tradition. A clear example of this is diasporic Jews who, despite being
racially classified as white, have historically been the victims of racism with pseudoscientific justifications. According to Garner and Selod (2015): “[r]acialization provides
the language needed to discuss newer forms of racism that are not only based on skintone, as well as other forms” (12). Per Gast et al. (2021) “[i]mmigrants face distinct forms
of racialization depending on how their cultural, social, and physical traits are linked to
the U.S. racial hierarchy” (p. 1214). In other words, racialization is group specific and
context specific. The racialized category of Muslims—which includes Arabs and South
Asians—has been ascribed meaning as culturally deficient, anti-American, potential
terrorists, and men are deemed to be misogynist patriarchs who abuse Muslim women
(Selod 2015).
New scholarship (Jaffe-Walter 2016, Love 2017; Rana 2011; Selod 2015, 2016,
and 2019, Zopf 2018) using a racialization framework to address the experiences of
Muslims in Western societies has yielded great theoretical insights during the twenty-first
century. For instance, Love (2017) details a long history of Islamophobia and a
racialization of Muslims that dates to 19th and 20th century Orientalist depictions of ‘the
Muslim world.’ Selod (2015) finds that Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims are racialized
as terrorists, patriarchs, misogynists, and anti-American pundits. Because of this, they
experience surveillance and scrutiny related to their presumed nationalities of origin and
allegiance. She further demonstrates that both government agencies and private citizens
contest Muslim American’s citizenship during everyday social interactions. Despite not
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directly using the term racialization, Lean (2012) traces the historical media development
of Muslims as an oppositional other and reveals the material and financial resources that
have been used to buoy Islamophobic discourse by popular right-wing news. This history
parallels the claims that we are witnessing the construction of a Muslim racial-political
category, which is used and acted against in contemporary racialized social systems.
Selod (2019) broadly argues, “Arabs and South Asians who are also Muslims are
moving down the racial hierarchy because of the racialization of a Muslim identity”
(566). Thus, they are frequently unable to claim all the benefits that whiteness affords.
However, Arab and South Asian citizenship has long been contested. Morning (2001)
writes of South Asians, “[i]n the early years of the twentieth century, when whiteness (or
African ancestry) was a prerequisite for naturalization, American courts vacillated on the
question of whether Asian Indians were white or not” (61). Take for example, the
contradictory U.S. Supreme Court Cases of Takao Ozawa v. U.S. [1922] and Bhagat
Singh Thind [1923] where the U.S. Supreme Court twice ruled on citizenship and
contradicted itself in one instance, appealing to the popular racist sciences of the day and
in the later, appealing to an eye test (Golash-Boza 2018). Scholars have demonstrated
that these groups become more susceptible to discrimination and racialization related to
presumed foreignness and antagonism towards Western democratic values (Allen 2018;
Rana 2011; Selod 2015, 2016, and 2019, Zopf 2018). This susceptibility is popularly
categorized as Islamophobia, though many scholars connect these trends to literature on
racism (Garner and Selod 2015; Love 2017; Meer 2008; Rana 2011; Selod 2015, 2016
and 2019; Zopf 2018).
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As discussed previously, recent scholarship has utilized an intersectional
framework to address how a myriad of social designations and factors contribute to
differential racialization and experiences of discrimination (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009,
Allen 2018, Selod 2015 and 2019). Selod (2019) finds that Arab and South Asian men
and women both are subject to increased surveillance by the state and private citizens.
Surveillance occurs in gendered patterns and has gendered and racial logics, e.g., men are
constructed as truly violent threats to American democracy, and women are marked as
passive victims of patriarchy and a backwards culture. Other scholarship has echoed
these claims (Abu Ras and Suarez 2009, Razack 2008; Selod 2015 and 2016). Abu Ras
and Suarez (2009) find that both Muslim men and women in New York experienced
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] as a result of 9/11, but in gendered
ways. And still others (Allen 2018, Meer 2008) have suggested that visibility may
contribute to an individual’s susceptibility for discrimination. These factors include
religious signifiers such as wearing the hijab, wearing a thobe, praying, or attending
religious services; and physical characteristics such as phenotype.
Though a literature-base is emerging that situates contemporary Islamophobia in
the context of a history of orientalism and racism against Muslims, leading scholars in the
field have issued numerous calls for further research. For instance, Garner and Selod
(2015: 10) urge scholars to conduct further “fieldwork-based studies (particularly those in
which Muslims are the subject of interviews and/or ethnographies)” that engage with the
process of racialization. In their “Review of Race Scholarship and the War on Terror”,
Cainkar and Selod (2018) call for researchers “to embark on studies that fill major gaps
in this emerging field of study—such as intersectional approaches that incorporate
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gender, communities of belonging, black Muslim experiences, class, and sexuality—and
to remain conscious of the global dimensions of this racial project” (10) [italics added]. I
address these calls by qualitatively addressing how the interlocking forces of
racialization, nativism, class hierarchy and regional isolation impact experience,
perceptions, and belonging among Arab and Pakistani American men with immigrantfamily origins.
The Myth of the Model Minority
Though Arabs and South Asian groups have been casted as potential terrorists and
patriarchs (Allen 2018; Rana 2011; Selod 2015, 2016, and 2019, Zopf 2018),
interviewees from the rural town in my study described being casted as “model
minorities.” Because of this, I describe the model minority myth and how and why this
myth is relevant to racism in the U.S. context. Poon et al. (2016) define the model
minority myth as a “racial stereotype [that] generally defines AAPIs, especially Asian
Americans, as a monolithically hardworking racial group whose high achievement
undercuts claims of systemic racism made by other racially minoritized populations,
especially African Americans” (469). They further argue that this myth serves to
maintain a racial structure of white supremacy by supporting racist ideologies and
maintaining racial barriers. The pan-ethnic label, “Asian,” in U.S. racial categorization is
inherently broad and limiting and is an example of how these groups are marginalized by
the state (Poon et al. 2016). Collapsing such a diverse group obscures analyses of the
diverse experiences of Asian Americans, particularly because some sub-groups are
considerably disadvantaged by wealth, income, and education. Furthermore, the
prioritization of some measures such as educational achievement and household income
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obscure the ways that APIs experience racism and white supremacy. In this study, some
upper class Arab and South Asian Americans indicated that they were the subjects of
model minority stereotyping and thus they were racialized as high achieving “brown”
kids or model minorities. However, as I will demonstrate, these same interviewees still
experienced sometimes quite severe Islamophobia. My findings nuance contemporary
understandings of the racialization of Arabs and South Asians because I demonstrate that
social class and local context shape the specific iterations and negotiations of racial
meaning. Ultimately though, all iterations still maintain white dominance in the existing
racial order In Townsburg the racialization of Arabs and South Asians has a model
minority twist. In some instances upper class Arabs and South Asians were racialized as
high achieving “brown” kids instead of as terrorists or patriarchs. This demonstrates the
importance of considering place in analyses of racialization and stereotyping.
Belonging in Place
In a review of sociological literature on place, Gieryn (2000) defines place in
terms of geographic location, material form, and investment with meaning and value. He
notes that place is not just a backdrop or context for something else; furthermore, it is not
a proxy for demographic or racial variables (Gieryn 2000: 466). Rather, place seeks to
address the question of: “[h]ow do geographic locations, material forms, and the cultural
conjuring’s of them intersect with social practices and structures, norms and values,
power and inequality, difference and distinction” (468)? Gieryn (2000) further argues that
“place sustains difference and hierarchy… by routinizing daily rounds in ways that
exclude and segregate categories of people, and by embodying in visible and tangible
ways the cultural meanings variously ascribed to them[;]” (474) and that places can serve
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as a source of engagement or estrangement (476). In this study I interrogate how Arab
and South Asian American men experience and perceive discrimination in new
immigrant destinations in the U.S. South, and how place via geographic localities and
social class impact experiences and perceptions of belonging among Arab and Pakistani
American men in these new immigrant destinations. I use towns and cities as geographic
locations to frame my analysis of belonging. I characterize both of these localities as nontraditional immigrant destinations because of their demographic characteristics. As I
demonstrate, the unique histories of Arabs and South Asians in these places and
relationships to the surrounding communities led to important differences in how Arabs
and South Asians from upper-, and middle- and working-class categories between these
two localities experienced and perceived personal belonging.
I define new-immigrant destinations as localities that immigrant-origin groups are
settling in during the late-20th and early 21st-centuries that do not match historic trends.
Historically, new immigrants to the U.S. have been concentrated in gateway cities, where
immigrants have developed and advocated for formal and informal networks, immigrantserving community-based organizations, and inclusive policies (Hirschman and Massey
2008, Marrow 2009a and b). And consequently, studies of immigrant origin populations
have been concentrated in these spaces. More recently, immigrant groups have been
settling in locations outside of gateway cities. Massey and Capoferro (2008) find that the
percent of immigration to the five primary immigrant destination states [California, New
York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois] dropped significantly between the five-year periods of
1985-1990 and 1995-2000. Specifically, Mexican immigration dropped from 86 to 61
percent to these states respectively. Other Latinx immigrant groups dropped from 72 to
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42 percent to these states. Asian Immigration dropped from 60 to 52 percent to these
states. Non-Asian, Non-Latino immigration dropped from 56 to 47 percent respectively.
Hirschman and Massey (2008) attribute these demographic changes to a restructuring
American industrial economy. Studying immigrant experiences in these new immigrant
destinations provides a unique opportunity to analyze the process of racialization and
how intermediate racial groups experience and perceive racism in the U.S. Because as I
discussed in the prior section, racialization followed place-based logics. A growing body
of scholarship is analyzing experiences in these new immigrant destinations, though most
of it focuses on Latinx groups (Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Brown et al. 2018,
Marrow 2009a and b, Massey and Capoferro 2008, Mendez and Deeb-Sossa 2020). I
argue that the changing place-locations of Arab and South Asian Americans and their
subsequent experiences in these new immigrant destinations warrant further study
because studying the experiences of these groups in new-immigrant destinations gives us
a fuller picture of how Islamophobia, social class, and gender intersect in place-specific
ways to effect perceptions of belonging.
Some scholarship (Chaudhary 2018, Hopkins 2007, Hopkins et al. 2007, Mir
2007) analyzes the effects of place on Muslim identities and experiences. However, much
of this scholarship addresses Muslim experiences in Europe and seemingly little research
attention has been paid to Arab, South Asian, and Muslim experiences in non-traditional
immigrant U.S. destinations. In one study, Chaichian (2008) examines the process of
community formation for first- and second-generation Iranians in Iowa City, Iowa. He
finds that multi-generational Iranian communities are not sustainable because secondgeneration Iranians are migrating out of small urban communities such as Iowa City in
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pursuit of economic and career opportunities. According to survey data Iranian
Americans believe that social isolation and loneliness is a significant pressing problem
facing Iranians in the U.S.
Scholars are beginning to address belonging and place-making in new immigrant
destinations. These scholars (Antonsich 2010, Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Mendez
and Deeb-Sossa 2020, Yuval-Davis 2006) have demonstrated that belonging and place
making are complex processes that vary based on populations in question, community
characteristics, place, etc. In general, sociological definitions of belonging include
personal feeling(s) of “being ‘at home’ in a place” (Antonsich 2010: 645), or an
“identification and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings”
(Yuval-Davis 2006: 199). Belonging can also refer to the systemic level “value systems”
that people use to determine their own and others’ belonging (Yuvall-Davis 2006: 199) or
“discursive resources that constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of social-spatial
inclusion/exclusion” (Antonsich 2010: 645).
In a review of social scientific literature on belonging, Antonsich (2010) argues
that belonging is a term that is frequently used in a variety of social sciences, but that it is
often ill defined. He further claims that scholars have used “identity,” “citizenship,” and
“belonging” interchangeably, or without seeking to address their theoretical or analytical
specifics. Belonging-ness may instead encompass identity and citizenship, but it is not
synonymous with the two. Belonging is multidimensional. Antonsich (2010) outlines this
complexity by incorporating both personal feelings of belongingness and discursive or
systemic-level belongingness.
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Antonsich (2010) outlines five factors highlighted in scholarship on belonging
that contribute to personal feelings of belongingness (647). Autobiographical factors refer
to “personal experiences, relations, and memories that attach a particular person to a
given place” (Antonsich 2010: p 647). Relational factors refer to “the personal and social
ties that enrich the life of an individual in a given place” (Antonsich 2010: p 647).
Antonsich (2010) highlights language as an important cultural factor that contributes to
personal feelings of belonging (648). Economic factors “contribute to create a safe and
stable material condition for the individual and her/his family” (Antonsich 2010: p 647).
Legal factors, for example citizenship and resident permits, produce security, which
many regard as vital to belonging Antonsich 2010: p 647). As I demonstrate in chapter 6,
the current project highlights autobiographical accounts of relationships that contribute to
a sense of belonging for upper class Arabs and South Asian Americans in a nontraditional immigrant destination.
As Antonsich (2010) claims, “[t]o be able to feel at home in a place is not just a
personal matter, but also a social one” (649). Belonging is also a resource in discourses
and in practices of inclusion or exclusion. Antonsich mostly explains this via membership
(to a group) and ownership (of a place) and claiming belonging and being accepted by
others as belonging. Though the current project does not observe whether and how
participants are actually accepted or rejected as belonging in certain geographic locations,
I do observe claims of upper class interviewees in Townsburg who feel that they belong
and examples of times when they felt their belonging was recognized by non-Arab and
South Asian community members.
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Antonsich (2010) argues that scholars have inadequately addressed place in their
analyses of belonging, “as if feelings, discourses, and practices of belonging exist in a
geographical vacuum” (647). Some emerging scholarship has addressed this critique by
more intentionally incorporating place specific themes into their analyses and addressing
the varied and place-specific pathways to belonging for Latinx immigrants in the U.S.
(Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Mendez and Deeb-Sossa 2020). For example, Mendez
and Deeb-Sossa (2020) compare the experiences of Latinx women in traditional and new
immigrant destinations. They find that in new immigrant destinations women had to
overcome social isolation, a lack of public transportation, and the relative absence of coethnics. However, these women developed a sense of belonging by overcoming a variety
of barriers to meeting their families’ needs. It is through their agency that they find
personal belonging. I contribute to these literatures on belonging by analyzing the ways
that social class shapes personal feelings of belonging in a non-traditional immigrant
destination for Arab and South Asian American men. I define personal belonging as the
feeling that you are accepted as a valid member of a place and additionally that your
belonging is accepted by others.
I argue that Metro-City and Townsburg present a unique opportunity to analyze
how the meanings and values assigned to place shape how Arab and South Asian men
experience and perceive Islamophobia and belonging in these locales. This supposition
was based on underlying characteristics, such as: regional isolation in terms of racial and
ethnic populations, percentage of foreign-born population, and religious communities,
which I discuss in the methods section. Analysis of my data demonstrates an urban/rural
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divide in the perceived proclivity toward Islamophobia and consequently the safety of
places.
Doing Masculinity and Hegemonic Bargains
Gender has been conceptualized in many ways, including performances (West
and Zimmerman 1987), boundary-work (Gerson and Piess 1985), elements of cultures
(Ridegeway and Correll 2004), and as an institution that shapes peoples’ lived
experiences and access to power (Martin 2004). At their base, most contemporary
theories of gender (Connell 1987; Gerson and Piess 1985; Ridgeway and Correll 2004;
West and Zimmerman 1987) contend that gender is socially constructed and operates at
both macro- and micro-levels of society. Furthermore, these scholars argue that what we
recognize as gender is actually a complex interplay between ideals and expectations
about gender and individual behaviors that adhere to or resist these gendered ideals and
expectations. For instance in their seminal work on “doing gender,” West and
Zimmerman (1987) claim that “’[g]ender […] is the activity of managing situated
conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s
sex category” (West and Zimmerman 1987: 127). According to West and Zimmerman
(1987), gender-based institutional arrangements are ‘sustained, reproduced, and rendered
legitimate’ (147) through the subsequent ‘doing’ of gender. That is, when individuals
either act in accordance with gender norms or when they are sanctioned for failing to
adhere to those standards, gender is consequentially reproduced.
Whether operationalized as institutions (Martin 2004), elements of culture
(Rigeway and Correll 2004), or “regimes” (Connell 1987), scholars generally agree that
the accepted patterns of doing gender maintain the dominance of men over women,
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certain groups of men over others, and certain groups of women over others. Historically,
wealthy, white, straight men have positioned themselves at the top of the gender order
and have dominated other groups. Scholars have called this wealthy white dominated
gender order “patriarchy” (Connell 1987) and patriarchy has been maintained in different
ways at different points in time in different places (Kandiyoti 1988; Herzog and YahiaYounis 2007). Patriarchy also refers to the institutionalized power of men over women.
In Western societies, e.g. the U.S., scholars generally argue that patriarchy is currently
most frequently maintained through institutions and hegemony (Connell 1987).
Although I interview Arab and South Asian men, and not women, the ways that
these men discuss and “do” masculinity is of interest to this study. I outline three types of
masculinity described by Connell (2005) that are useful as a basis for understanding the
masculinities of men in my sample. First, “[h]egemonic masculinity can be defined as the
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or at least is taken to
guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell
2005, 77). Tenets of hegemonic masculinity in U.S. society include but are not limited to:
the defense of women from threats, heterosexuality, economic success, “whiteness,” and
physical dominance. Notably, relatively few men are actually able to embody hegemonic
masculinity (Connell 2005) because this performance is predicated on the dominance of
others. Second, “[m]en who received the benefits of patriarchy without enacting a strong
version of masculine dominance could be regarded as showing a complicit masculinity
[italics added]” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832). In other words, complicit
masculinities are characterized by the failure to recognize, name, and work against male
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dominance, even if these men do not intentionally support hegemonic masculinity.
Finally, marginalized masculinities are differentiated from hegemonic masculinities, in
that marginalized masculinities are devalued or subjugated in a social order, often against
the will of its holder. In particular, Connell (2005) claims that lower-income men and
men of color perform marginalized masculinities, because they often lack the social
status available to higher-income and/or white men. Hegemonic variations of masculinity
are frequently constructed against marginalized masculinities. Connell (2005: 80-81)
highlights that racial minorities—in particular Black men—have served important
symbolic roles against which hegemonic white masculinities were constructed, namely
via white men protecting white women against would-be Black rapist tropes.
Scholars (Barry 2018, Bridges and Pascoe 2014, Chen 1999, Wingfield 2013)
have expanded on these typologies of masculinities. For instance, Chen (1999) finds that
Chinese American men engage in “hegemonic bargains”, whereby one “trades or
unconsciously benefits from the ‘privileges’ of race, gender, class, generation, and/or
sexuality for the purpose of ‘achieving’ his masculinity” (604). He outlines three
strategies for engaging in “hegemonic bargains:” “compensation,” “deflection,” and
“denial.” He suggests that Chinese men might engage in “compensation,” whereby men
make a concerted effort to break stereotypes against them, e.g. Chinese American men
emphasizing athleticism against model “minority stereotypes.” “Deflection” refers to
emphasizing certain other attributes to detract from negative stereotypes or perceived
shortcomings, e.g. emphasizing wealth or social class despite well-documented
discrimination in occupational advancement to management. And “denial” refers to
strategies that involve a denial of negative stereotypes or a claim to some form of
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exceptionalism, e.g. a Chinese man indicating that stereotypes about Chinese American
men just not being true about him. I apply concepts developed by Chen (1999)—
particularly the concepts of “hegemonic bargains” and “deflection”—to my analysis of
the ways that Arab and South Asian men discussed the experiences of Arab and South
Asian women with Islamophobia. I find that Arab and South Asian men engage in
“hegemonic bargains” when they take responsibility for protecting significant women in
their lives from Islamophobic perpetrators. In particular, interviewees engaged in
deflection because when asked about experiences with Islamophobia, many of these men
pointed out that Muslim women faced more Islamophobia than them and sought to
emphasize their ability to protect significant women from said Islamophobia. Some Arab
and South Asian men further emphasized their own masculinities by voicing support for
the control of women and for violence against Islamophobic perpetrators. By doing so,
they were able to perform hegemony and gain status as protectors of women.
Social Class
Social class emerged as an important theme in this study because I found classed
differences in the ways that Arab and South Asian men discussed experiences with
Islamophobia and in the ways that these men discussed and perceived personal belonging
in Townsburg. Whereas early studies of social class tended to focus on the ways that
class and classism are structured in contemporary societies, more recent post-structural
scholarship (Bourdieu 1989, Gast 2018, Wingfield 2013, Lareau 2002, Lareau 2015)
addresses the ways that social class operates and is reproduced in daily practice. For
example, Lareau (2015) uses longitudinal data to demonstrate that social class matters
with respect to understanding how to successfully navigate institutions. She finds that
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young adults from middle-class backgrounds better understand the “rules of the game”
and feel more entitled to ask for help than their working-class and poor counterparts
when they faced a problem related to an institution. These findings suggest that
institutional knowledge and resources are an important requisite for upward mobility, and
thus, help to explain how class is reproduced and maintained. I took an approach similar
to that taken by Lareau (2002) to measure social class. I extrapolated social class position
primarily from occupational history and educational attainment of participants or their
families.
Some research suggests that social class impacts the ways that individuals and
groups experience and perceive racial discrimination. In a study of anti-Black
discrimination, Feagin (1991) finds that middle-class Black Americans reported
situational discriminatory experiences. Middle-class Black Americans reported more and
worse discrimination in public places, such as grocery stores, where their middle-class
status is unclear. Conversely when they were at their places of employment, e.g. a
professor on a college campus, they reported fewer and less severe moments of
discrimination. I find that though both upper- and middle-class Arab and South Asian
men experienced a wide range of Islamophobic encounters, upper class interviewees were
particularly dismissive of Islamophobia. In exploring why interviewees from upper class
backgrounds dismiss Islamophobia and perceive some personal Islamophobic encounters
as non-threatening, I found that many instances of downplaying Islamophobia were
connected to conversations about “Americanization”, social class, and proximity to other
racial groups—e.g. whites. In particular, I argue that the privileges associated with high
occupational and educational statuses lead the men in my study to downplay their
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personal experiences of Islamophobia. In chapter 6, I discuss my findings that upper class
Arab and South Asian Americans perceived and articulated a particularly strong sense of
belonging whereas middle- and working-class interviewees did not describe belonging in
similar ways.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS
The current project involves in-depth semi-structured interviews with 23 Muslim
Arab and South Asian men who live in a southeastern state. In what immediately follows,
I first discuss why the selected methods are appropriate for addressing my research
questions. Second, I outline the data collection process and interview schedule. Third, I
provide an overview of my study sample. Fourth, I detail the approach I took to analyzing
and preparing data. Fifth, I outline the measures taken to protect research study
participants. And lastly, I outline my social location as a researcher and the ways my
social location likely influenced collection and analysis of data.
Why interviews
As previously indicated, I draw on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Arab
and South Asian Muslim men living in a mid-sized, southern state. This research answers
calls from leading scholars to study racism against Muslims (Cainkar and Selod 2018 and
Garner and Selod 2015). For instance, Garner and Selod (2015) urge scholars to conduct
further “fieldwork-based studies (particularly those in which Muslims are the subject of
interviews and/or ethnographies)” (10). Cainkar and Selod (2018) call for researchers “to
embark on studies that fill major gaps in this [racism against Muslims] emerging field of
study—such as intersectional approaches that incorporate gender, communities of
belonging
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black Muslim experiences, class, and sexuality—and to remain conscious of the global
dimensions of this racial project” (10) [emphasis added]. I address these calls by
interviewing Arab and South Asian men about their experiences and perceptions of
Islamophobia and community membership and expanding on conversations related to
social class and masculinity. Focusing on men in the locale selected allows me to
address: (1) how social class informs experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia and
racism in new immigrant destinations; (2) the ways that Arab and South Asians uniquely
perform masculinity in response to Islamophobia against significant women in their lives;
and (3), how men intersectionally experience belonging in these locales.
At the beginning of this project I attempted to conduct ethnographic observations
at religious meetings, one potluck, and one cookout with two religious groups, one in
Metro-City and one in Townsburg. My aim when I was in the field was twofold: (1) I
hoped to meet potential participants and solicit research interviews; (2) I hoped to
observe and record data relevant to my study. After several observations at these two
sites I determined that I was not meeting either of these goals. Potential interviewees
were not particularly receptive to inquiries in these spaces3. Additionally, I was not able
to observe anything that was of interest to this study. I was, however, able to have an
informal sit-down with an Imam4 and a “community pioneer” to discuss the history of the
Muslim community in Townsburg. I also believe that my early presence in these
communities allowed me to build rapport with research subjects, which improved the
quality of interviews.

3

I had more success in recruiting participants through snowball sampling through [insert
first people who helped connect you with participants, such as the Imam] ….
4
An Imam is a formal spiritual leader at mosques or prayer centers.
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Interviews yielded rich data, and the data discussed in subsequent chapters draws
from these interviews. Qualitative semi-structured interviewing (Gillham 2000: 6)
generally refers to interviewing strategies that follow a series or a schedule of questions5,
but are flexible in that the researcher is free to ask, probe or follow-up questions when
deemed appropriate or when expanding on a conversation that is particularly relevant to
the study. According to Gilham (2004) interviewing is an appropriate methodology if:
“[1] [s]mall numbers of people are involved[;] [2] [p]eople are accessible[;] [3]
[m]ost of the questions are ‘open’ and require an extended response with prompts
and probes[;] [4] [e]very one is ‘key’ and you can’t afford to lose any
[interviews][;] [5] [t]he material is sensitive in character so trust is involved[;] [6]
[a]nonymity is not an issue, though confidentiality may be[;] [7] [d]epth of
meaning is central, with only some approximation to typicality[;] [8] [r]esearch
aims mainly to acquire insight and understanding[.]” (11)
The current research project meets all of these qualifications. Using interviews allowed
me to collect detailed and rich data about participants’ experiences and perceptions of
Islamophobia, community membership, and masculinity in the U.S. South. Such data
could not be gathered from observation, surveying, or other more large-scale quantitative
measures.
Such methods also have a precedent in the research literature. Other scholars
studying similar populations, problems, and engaging with the same theoretical bodies
have used qualitative interviews as their primary units of analysis (Garner and Selod
2015, Massey and Sanchez 2010, Selod 2015, Zopf 2018). For instance, Zopf (2018) uses
5

A copy of the interview schedule is provided in Appendix A at the end of this document.
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qualitative interviews with 53 Egyptian and Egyptian Americans to demonstrate that
respondents are racialized into a broad “Brown” ethnoracial category. Similarly, Selod
(2015) uses qualitative interviews with 48 Muslim Americans to reveal the ways that
racialized Muslims’ citizenship is routinely contested in everyday interactions with other
Americans. Interviews allow me to examine both perceptions and responses to
experiences with Islamophobic racism within the context of local communities.
Interview logistics
Interviews were conducted over a six-month period from Fall 2019 to Spring
2020 and were cut short when the university placed a halt on non-essential research in
response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Interviews were an average of about one hour
and 10 minutes in length. The briefest interview was 32 minutes long and the longest
interview lasted nearly one hour and 45 minutes. Seven interviews were conducted inperson, in a small conference room space that I had access to at the university. Seven
interviews were conducted in-person, in various coffee shops in Metro-City and
Townsburg. Six interviews were conducted over the phone. Two interviews were
conducted in-person, in mosques or religious centers in office spaces graciously provided
by the Imams at those respective locations. And one interview was conducted in-person,
in the respondent’s home, because coffee shops were closed on New Year’s Eve when we
met. Each interview began with an overview of research subject rights, the signing of an
informed consent document6, and the completion of a brief demographic survey7.

6

A copy of the consent form detailing research subject rights is provided in Appendix C
at the end of this document.
7
A copy of the brief demographic survey is provided in Appendix B at the end of this
document.
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Interviews followed a semi-structured schedule8 that was broken up into sections that
focus on perceptions of place, identity and community membership, and Islamophobia.
All interviews were audio-recorded with the permission of research participants.
I used a combination of availability, purposive, and snowball sampling to recruit
interview participants. I began with availability sampling because I have done previous
research on adjacent populations (Allen 2018 and 2019). I remained engaged with the
Muslim community in the area and had key informants and contacts in the field prior to
the study. I also sampled from participants attending religious services and group
meetings in Metro-City and Townsburg. Availability sampling generally refers to
recruiting study participants already immediately available to the researcher. Eleven
interviewees were recruited using some form of availability sampling previously
discussed. However, soliciting interviews as an outsider at religious services proved to be
slow. I saw much more success through snowball sampling. Snowball sampling generally
refers to strategies to recruit study participants that draw from existing social networks.
For instance, I asked interviewees if they knew anyone that might be able to make
significant contributions to my research study at the conclusion of interviews. If they
could think of anyone or were willing to think about it for me, I asked them to discuss the
study with potential interviewees prior to giving me their information. If their contacts
were interested, I then pursued interviews with these study participants. Twelve
interviews were solicited using snowball-sampling techniques.
Purposive sampling refers to sampling based on theoretical justifications. I
applied principles of purposive sampling to both my availability and snowball sampling
8

A copy of the interview schedule is provided in Appendix A at the end of this document.
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strategies. First, I restricted my analysis to Arab and South Asian men in the state of
interest in order to address gaps in the research literature on gender and place. Second, I
began to ask study participants if they knew anyone from a working-class background
when my study became increasingly saturated with men from high social class groups.
This was also, in part, because social class began to emerge as a theme in early
interviews. Unfortunately, some interviewees indicated that they knew middle- and
working-class men who would offer insight into my study, but were unable or unwilling
to make these connections for my research. I was also unable to find many working-class
respondents on my own from availability or snowball sampling; therefore, my sample is
disproportionately comprised of men from higher social class backgrounds, as discussed
below.
Study Location
Arab and South Asian groups are not evenly distributed throughout the U.S. The
Arab American Institute [AAI] suggests that the Arab American population is likely
closer to 3.7 million9. Two-thirds of that population is concentrated in 10 states—with
one-third living in California, New York, and Michigan—and about 94 percent living in
metropolitan areas. The state for my study presents a unique opportunity to study these
groups precisely because it is not one of the more populated states for these groups. In
terms of national rank, the state is close to the middle of the pack in terms of its share of
Per the Arab American Institute (2018): “[t]he American Community Survey
identifies only a portion of the Arab population through a question on ‘ancestry’ on
the census long form. Reasons for the undercount include the placement of and limit
of the ancestry question (as distinct from race and ethnicity); the effect of the
sample methodology on small, unevenly distributed ethnic groups; high levels of
out-marriage among the third and fourth generations; and a
distrust/misunderstanding of government surveys among recent immigrants.”

9
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Arab population, with less than 10,000 people claiming Arab ancestry. Finally, according
to 2010 census data, Arab Americans only reside in 18 of the state’s counties. Metro-City
is the most Arab-populated of those 18. Townsburg did not register in the top 5 (Arab
American Institute 2018). Data on South Asian groups, particularly those most directly
impacted by Islamophobia is more difficult to find10. Here, I present data on Pakistani
Americans to provide a snapshot of regional isolation and the distribution of South Asian
groups in the U.S. López et al (2017) estimates that the Pakistani American population
grew from about 204,000 in 2000 to 519,000 by 2015 [a 154 percent increase]. They
further estimate that nearly 288,000 [55 percent] of that [2015] population live in 10
metropolitan areas. Similarly, the Center for American Progress (2015) uses 2013
American Community Survey Data to estimate the total Pakistani American population at
474,784. 283,671 [60 percent] of this population reside in 5 states: New York, Texas,
California, Virginia, and New Jersey.
Per Pew Research Center (2012) the number Arab Americans living in the U.S.
increased by nearly 47 percent from 2000 to 2011. Less than five percent of the state’s
population is foreign born according to 2013-2017 population estimates. This is
significantly lower than the percentage of the foreign-born population of the U.S. [which
is 13.4 percent]. The percentage of the foreign-population in Metro-City is higher, at over
7 percent. The percent of foreign-born in Townsburg was below 5 percent (US Census
Bureau 2019). Metro-City’s population was approximately under 600,000. Townsburg’s

Difficulties finding data on South Asian populations—particularly those most
directly impacted by Islamophobia—are similar to those outlined by the Arab
American Institute (2018) for Arab American underrepresentation, e.g., ‘the
placement and limit of the ancestry question [used to measure ethnicity]; the effect
of sample methodology on small, unevenly distributed ethnic groups; [etc.].”

10
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population was below 30,000 (US Census Bureau 2019). Thus, my discussion of MetroCity, Townsburg, and the state in general is characterized—not only by regional
isolation—but also by an urban/rural divide. By this I mean that Metro-City is by far the
most densely populated city in a state characterized by smaller towns and localities.
Consequently Metro-City’s demographic characteristics and the racial meaning assigned
to them contrasts starkly with the characteristics and meanings afforded to the rest of the
state. Notably, Metro-City—as a large metropolitan area—offers a wider range of
opportunities for employment and services that might be valued to new immigrant groups
and communities than the rest of the state. Townsburg is a smaller locality that more
closely mirrors the rest of the state. Participants described life in Townsburg as slow, and
described the population as well meaning but lacking diversity and education. So, I
anticipated that the men in my study would interpret Metro-city as relatively hospitable
as compared to other places in the state. However, I demonstrate that perceived belonging
and hospitality were based on class position. In particular, in Townsburg, upper class men
articulated a stronger sense of belonging than middle- and working-class men, possibly
because of how their occupational position marked them as privileged relative to the
majority of people in Townsburg.
The state is also largely comprised of people who religiously identify as
Christians. According to Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Study (2016),
approximately 75 percent of adults in the state are Christian affiliated. Almost 50 percent
of adults in the state are Evangelical-Protestant and 10 percent are Catholic. Only 2
percent of adults in the state are religiously affiliated with faiths that are not Christian,
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and less than 1 percent are Muslim 11(2016). According to the USA Mosque Directory
(2015), the state has less than 30 mosques. This is a relatively low number especially
when compared to more populous states such as New York (258), California (246), and
Texas (168). According to a directory of mosques and religious centers in the U.S.,
Metro-City contains the most mosques/prayer spaces in the state at just over 10.
Townsburg only has 1 mosque/prayer center. While this is an indirect measure of the
number of people identifying with the Muslim-faith in these cities, I argue that more can
be extrapolated from differences in the material existence of mosques/prayer spaces.
Namely, Metro-City has a greater number of religious Muslims—or at the very least, has
more formal religious networks or organizations than other places in the state.
Taken together, these demographic statistics led me to believe that interviewees
would articulate distinct, place-based understandings of Islamophobia. I anticipated that
there might be some differences in perceived discrimination in Townsburg where
Muslims have a more limited presence. Since Metro-City is a rather large urban area
located in the context of a broadly rural state, I anticipated that individuals would find
Metro-City to be a more friendly and inclusive place for them, and consequently MetroCity and Townsburg were deemed theoretically significant settings for study. However,
as I will discuss, perceptions about discrimination and place were more idiosyncratic than
simply a distinction between urban and rural localities. Participants’ discussion of these
themes were nuanced, and varied based on place-specific stereotypes and relative
privilege via social class standing.

This mirrors the national average. But, similarly to percent foreign born and racial
and ethnic group statistics, I anticipate that there is a significant urban/rural divide
in this distribution.

11
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Study sample
Here, I provide a general outline of my study sample. A basic overview of
interviewees is provided in Table 3.112. I assigned each interviewee a pseudonym to
protect them from being identifiable to readers. These names were generated from an
online database of popular religious Muslim names. Since I am studying the racialization
of Muslim men and not one specific racial category—per se—my sample cuts across
racial and ethnic lines. According to data from the brief demographic survey given prior
to interviews 13, participants indicated that they racially categorized themselves as Asian,
five categorized themselves as white, and five categorized themselves as Other/Middle
Eastern. There was more variability in ethnic categorization. Some participants discussed
“sub-ethnicities” that held meaning in their family’s country of origin. Still others
claimed no particular ethnicity or categorized themselves as “American.” Seven
participants claimed Pakistani ethnic identities. Three participants claimed general Arab
ethnic identities. One participant claimed Iraqi ethnicity. One participant claimed
Palestinian ethnicity. One participant claimed Syrian ethnicity. One participant claimed
Yemeni ethnicity. One participant claimed Middle Eastern Ethnicity. Two participants
claimed mixed ethnic origins e.g. Pakistani/Afghani and Arab/Pakistani. One participant
claimed “American” ethnicity. And three participants said that they didn’t claim any
particular ethnicity for themselves. Participants are also almost exclusively first- and
second-generation Americans, which is for the most part reflective of Arab and South
Asian populations in the U.S. generally, and in the state specifically. In addition to these
demographic characteristics, I note that my sample is particularly young, with a median

12

Interview participants are listed in order of approximated socioeconomic status.
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age of 23 [ranging from 19 to 73], which is probably due to my social identity as a
relatively young man with relatively young social contacts.13
As noted, upper class respondents are overrepresented in my sample. It was
difficult to gain contacts with middle- and working-class men. When I did interview
middle- and working-class men, they were reluctant to provide further contacts that might
be willing to interview. For instance, Faizaan—whose family owns a small ethnic
restaurant, moved to the U.S. as refugees, and once lived in government subsidized
housing—indicated that relatives and friends would not be as comfortable discussing
interview items as he was. This made snowball sampling almost impossible for these
groups14.
When measuring social class, I took an approach similar to that taken by Lareau
(2002) in her analysis of social class and parenting in a midwestern elementary school. I
extrapolated social class position primarily from occupational history and educational
attainment. In her work, Lareau (2002) conceptually assigned families to working-class
and middle-class categories based on information provided about “the work that” adults
did, “the nature of the organization that employed them, and their educational
credentials” (752). I similarly developed general class-categories based on occupational
history and educational credentials. First, I considered the educational credentials of
individuals or the families that they came from. Participants who had themselves or came
from families where one parent had a master’s degree or higher were considered to be
13

My primary connection to the Muslim community is through close personal friendships
and contact over the past five years.
14
I began to gain traction with middle and lower socioeconomic status groups by the end
of this project. But, the University of Louisville shut down nonessential research in
response to the global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and effectively ended this sampling.
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upper class. Participants who had themselves or came from families where parents had a
bachelor’s degree or lower were considered to be middle- or working-class Second I
considered occupational status, which largely mirrored educational credentials.
Individuals who were themselves or came from families where at one time one parent
worked in high status categories, for example medical doctors or engineers were
categorized as upper class. Individuals who were themselves or came from families
where at one time on parent worked in a middle- or working-class category—e.g.
teachers, mechanics, food service, and retail workers were categorized as middle- or
working-class. I discuss this in greater detail in chapters 4 and 6 that address social class
position. I created one upper class category composed almost exclusively of medical
doctors and engineers—all of who had or came from families where the primary earner
held at least a master’s degree. The middle- and working-class group was comprised of
mostly individuals who worked in food service, retail, or factories and whose parents
were educators. Only a few participants in the middle- and working-class category came
from families where parents held post-secondary degrees.
Table 3.1: Participants by Location and Social Class Categories
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Location

Social Class Category

Interviewees

Metro-City

Upper Class

(4)
Bassam
Imad
Omair
Qais

Middle- and WorkingClass

(6)
Abid
Anzar
Faizaan
Nur
Shayan
Zain

Townsburg

Upper Class

(9)
Abbas
Hamza
Muhammad
Musa
Mustafa
Omar
Rafi
Samir
Talha

Middle- and WorkingClass

(4)
Ammar
Saeed
Rahim
Yahya

Where participants were unemployed or unable to work, I used work history this
background arguably influenced the classed ways that they interpreted Islamophobia and
belonging. For instance, one participant (Abid) indicated that his parents had been
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unemployed in the years leading up to the study. Because both parents previously worked
in factories, I analyze this interviewee in the middle- and working-social class category.
A second participant (Rafi) indicated that he was unable to work and had been unable to
work for some time; however, he also held a PhD and had previously worked in
Information Technologies as a director. I categorize him as upper class but make note of
the ways that his responses were not patterned like that of other highly educated
respondents. Other interviewees that were difficult to categorize came from international
families. One participant (Qais) iterated that his family was relatively well to do, had high
levels of education U.S. graduate degrees), and full funding to pursue his graduate
education from the national government of his home country. I categorized this
interviewee as upper class. Another (Nur) was an international student who currently
lived with his American grandparents, and whose parents were educators. I categorized
this interviewee as middle- or working-social class. Finally, Shayan was a student worker
with a sales job who had refugee status. I categorize this interviewee as middle- or
working-class. Though these categories are imperfect, they are useful for addressing the
classed patterns of responses that interviewees had to moments of Islamophobia and
classed perceptions about belonging in the rural U.S. South because they reflect family
occupational and educational statuses within the U.S. class hierarchy. This gives me
analytical leverage for examining how class status might shape responses to
Islamophobia.
Data analysis
I personally transcribed fifteen interview recordings using Express Scribe. The
other eight were transcribed by Rev.com, which was funded by the Endowed Rieger
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Research Fund housed in the Department of Sociology at the University of Louisville.
Transcribed interviews were then analyzed using Dedoose—“a cross-platform app for
analyzing qualitative and mixed method research with text, photos, audio, videos,
spreadsheet data and more” (Dedoose website 2020).
I use a grounded theory approach to my analysis of data. According to Charmaz
(2012):
“Grounded theory methods consist of systemic, yet flexible guidelines for
collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the
data themselves. The guidelines offer a set of general principles and heuristic
devices rather than formulaic rules. Thus, data from the foundation of our theory
and our analysis of these data generate the concepts we construct” (2).
As Charmaz (2012) outlines, grounded theory approaches to research are
inductive. Rather than building a hypothesis and testing that hypothesis using evidence, I
kept a relatively open mind both in the field and during analysis. The themes that I
analyze emerged from interview data. I used three waves of coding in my analysis. The
initial wave involved “line-by-line coding” (50) where I used Dedoose to develop and
connect codes to each line of interview data15. During this stage of coding Charmaz
(2012) suggests that researchers:

15

One of the unique functions that Dedoose has is its memoing. According to Charmaz
(2012): “[m]emos catch your thoughts, capture comparisons, and connections you make,
and crystallize questions and directions for you to pursue” (72). I was able to write and
connect “memos” to early codes to help connect early codes to existing theories,
concepts, and literatures, and develop more advanced codes for the next stages of
analysis.
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“[1] Remain open; [2] stay close to the data; [3] keep … codes simple and
precise; [4] construct short codes; [5] preserve actions; [6] compare data with
data; [7] move quickly through the data” (49).
Since I conducted all of the interviews and transcribed many of the interviews by hand,
this was really a second review of the interview data. I was able to use thematic memos
written during the interview process to piece together many of these initial codes. The
second wave of coding involved “focused coding.” Charmaz (2012) categorizes such
coding as “using the most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large
amounts of data16” (57). For example, as I demonstrate in chapter 7, I found that upper
class Arab and South Asian men in Townsburg used strong inclusive language to
describe their relationship to the rest of Townsburg. This was not the case for middle and
working-class men or men from Metro-City. During this stage of coding, I transformed
line-by-line codes and memos about that specified when interviewees discussed
Townsburg and others where participants using language like, “family,” into more
focused codes and subcodes about strong perceptions of personal belonging to the
broader community. When I cross-referenced these codes about belonging with the social
class categories that I developed, I began to see that upper class interviewees in
Townsburg articulated a stronger sense of belonging to the broader community than their
middle- and working-class counterparts.
Finally, I engaged in “theoretical coding.” Charmaz (2012) says of theoretical
coding:
16

During this stage of coding I also engaged in what Charmaz (2012: 60) calls “axial
coding” whereby more focused codes are broken up into subcategories that conceptually
brings the data “back together”—after it has been broken up by initial and focused
coding.
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“[t]heoretical codes are integrative; they lend form to the focused codes you have
collected. These codes may help you tell an analytic story that has coherence.
Hence, these codes not only conceptualize how your substantive codes are related,
but also move your analytic story in a theoretical direction” (63).
For example, I transformed focused codes and sub-codes about class and belonging in
Townsburg into more robust theoretical codes about the ways that upper class
interviewees described belonging in Townsburg. For instance, in chapter 6 I analyze the
ways that interviewees performed hegemonic masculinities in defense of significant
women in their lives who faced Islamophobic treatment. Though I only asked about
gender as a probing question, interviewees repeatedly iterated that Muslim women
experienced more and more severe Islamophobia than men and men’s responses to this
treatment were patterned. Thus, I built an analysis of masculinities into my analysis
where I did not previously anticipate it. Doing this allowed me to build and contribute to
theories based in my data rather than exclusively from preexisting frameworks.
Ethical considerations
In order to protect the participants in this study I assigned pseudonyms to all study
participants and study sites. Pseudonyms for study participants were selected from
websites listing the most popular ethnic and religiously Muslim names. I renamed MetroCity and Townsburg to prevent the identification of religious centers, businesses, and to
further protect the participants that I interviewed. I kept interview data on Card Box—a
password-protected and secure server provided by the University of Louisville. This
research project was approved by the IRB at the University of Louisville.
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Researcher social location
My social position arguably influenced my ability to collect data and my
interpretation of research data. Here, I outline that social position. I am a white nonMuslim man, born and raised in the rural south. I am educated, and young. These factors
probably influenced interviews. For instance these participants may have provided
different responses when asked about discrimination and Islamophobia if I shared their
ethnic or religious background. For example, several interviewees specified that they
“loved white people.” I doubt they would have said this if I was not white. My being
male probably led participants to be upfront about their views on gender; they may have
shared different views with a woman. My education and association with the university
made it easier to gain interviews with highly educated men, and probably affected the
language that they used to describe their experiences. For instance, one participant used
the term “micro-aggressions” to describe his experiences with Islamophobia. However,
my university status probably limited conversations on Islamophobia with middle- and
working-class respondents.
Though I am an outsider by multiple measures, I have remained connected to
Muslim communities for the past five years after initial research and close friendships.
This has included maintaining close friendships with young Muslim men, playing pickup
basketball and tournaments at mosques and schools, attending religious services, and
attending and even hosting special events in the community e.g., Ramadan meals and
graduation parties. I believe that I am recognized as an ally in the community. On several
occasions community members have joked that I may as well be “Muslim” or “brown.” I
believe that my connection as a close friend to many Arab and South Asian men in the
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community helped me to collect rich data because in some instances I interviewed friends
and in others, friends vouched for me as a trusted contact.
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL CLASS AND DISMISSING OR DOWNPLAYING
ISLAMOPHOBIA
The Arab and South Asian Muslim men in this sample regularly experience a
wide range of Islamophobic encounters. They also understand and interpret these
experiences based on their class and gender positions. In this chapter, I demonstrate the
class-mitigated ways that Arab and South Asian Muslim men experience, understand, and
interpret experiences with Islamophobia. In particular, I demonstrate that Arab and South
Asian men with upper class positions—those who come from relatively high levels of
education

and

occupational

prestige—downplayed

personal

experiences

with

Islamophobia in ways that maintained their social position and communicated a low
degree of threat as compared to men with middle and working social class positions. To
do this I first outline and address the range of Islamophobic incidents that Arab and South
Asian Muslim men in Metro-City and Townsburg reported. Second, I highlight upper-,
middle-, and working-class interviewees’ general tendencies to dismiss and downplay
Islamophobic experiences. Finally, I critically address the classed ways that Arab and
South Asian men responded to Islamophobia. I argue that scholars and activists studying
and combatting Islamophobia must engage in intersectional analyses because Muslim
men with varying class positions experience, perceive, and thus report experiences of
Islamophobia differently.

53

Experiencing Islamophobia
Interviewees described a wide range of Islamophobia that they or people that they
knew personally experienced or were familiar with. In this section, I outline and address
this range of Islamophobic experiences. As discussed previously, Islamophobia can be
described as racism against Muslims. Racism and Islamophobia are multifaceted (Garner
and Selod 2015 and Golash-Boza 2016) and can generally be defined as: (1) “A set of
ideas [ideology] in which the human race is divisible into distinct ‘races’, each with
specific natural characteristics derived from culture, physical appearance or both”; (2) “a
historical power relationship in which, over time, groups are racialized, that is, treated as
if specific characteristics were natural and innate to each member of the group”; (3)
forms of discrimination flowing from this [practices] ranging on spectrums from denial of
access to material resources at one end to genocide at the other” (Garner and Selod 2015,
p. 11). I find that the men in my sample similarly experience Islamophobia in dynamic
ways at various levels of society. These experiences ranged from subtle Islamophobia in
the form of various “micro-aggressions,” to more overt “individual acts of bigotry”, and
to broader or institutional Islamophobia in a variety of contexts. I outline the most
commonly discussed experiences of Islamophobia in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Levels and categorization of discussing Islamophobic experiences

Individual Level(s)
Micro-Aggressions
§ “daily, commonplace insults and racial slights that
cumulatively affect the psychological well-being of
people of color” (Golash-Boza 2016, 132)
§ includes: “school-yard” jokes, lighter off-hand
remarks, “disconcerting stares”
Individual Acts of Bigotry
§ a range of racist actions that individuals may commit,
including using racial slurs and committing hatecrimes
§ includes: “public epithets”, “acts of violence”,
property crimes/defacement or targeting of
organizations

17 of 23

15 of 23

Broader or Institutional Level(s)
Islamophobia in Organizations or Institutions
§ includes: air-travel, education, employment,
immigration, news media, police, and the U.S. military

13 of 23

Micro-Aggressions
The most frequently discussed experiences with Islamophobia could be
categorized as racial micro-aggressions. Recall that micro-aggressions are “daily,
commonplace insults and racial slights that cumulatively affect the psychological wellbeing of people of color” (Golash-Boza 2016, 132). Some men were familiar with the
term, “micro-aggressions” and even used it to describe their experiences. For example—
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Rahim a middle-class Pakistani American—described a majority of his experiences as
such:
When I think of […] negative things that happened, there’s not one or even a
handful that can stand out to me, like wow, that was really [changes direction]. I
think I was in a lecture or [inaudible] call them micro-aggressions. […] Where
they’re not necessarily burning a flag, or doing something extreme, but kind of
how they look at you. You can, I hate to use the word vibe, it’s so outdated.
While Rahim uses the term, “micro-aggressions,” to describe his experiences, many of
the men did not. Rather, I—the researcher—categorized narrated experiences as such
during analysis. Interviewees discussed micro-aggressions that I have organized into
three categories most frequently: “school-yard” jokes, “off-hand remarks”, and
“disconcerting stares”. I use the term, “school-yard” jokes to refer to jokes that
classmates made that linked Arab, South Asian, and Muslim men to radical Islamic terror
or sexism. In this study, “off-hand remarks” generally refer to off-putting questions,
comments, or statements muttered or made under someone’s breath that did not rise to
the threat-level of “individual acts of bigotry,” and that did not occur in a school-setting.
By “disconcerting stares”, potentially threatening and prolonged staring that participants
felt they were the subject of because of their ethnic, racial, or religious identities. I
provide examples of these categorized micro-aggressions in table 4.2. Micro-aggressions
were reported to be common and most frequently were discussed as first-hand accounts.
Seventeen of the 23 respondents reported personally experiencing racial microaggressions. Most of these men had cited numerous examples of each type.
Table 4.2: Examples of micro-aggressions
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“School-yard”
Jokes

§

Samir, an upper class Pakistani American student:
“The only real mistreatment that I had direct contact with, as far
as people my age, they all took form in jokes. [Imitates joke]
‘What are you going to do? Blow me up?’ Or very, back-sided
attempts at humor to elicit shock value laughs, I would laugh
along with it because I was the only one. I didn’t really have a
backing for me to hold on to, and I would feel threatened.”

“Off-hand”
Remarks

§

Musa, an upper class Pakistani American medical doctor:
“Uh, you do go into the grocery store and somebody has made a
comment. And basically, you have two choices, you can ignore
and walk away or you can confront the person.”

“Disconcerting
Staring”

§

Samir, an upper class Pakistani American above:
“The context of a look, I would say is, places are definitely,
parking lots are a big one. And the context of a look usually
falls between prolonged staring for more than a minute. […]
More than you’re dazed off, yeah. Prolonged staring, like
focusing on the eyes and a kind of slackness of the face. So, just
like the overall look of contempt that somebody would have.
[Italics added.]”

Scholars have demonstrated that racial micro-aggressions can have a significant
psychological impact on persons of color. Several men who reported personal
experiences with micro-aggressions indicated that such experiences were frightening or
upsetting, despite the fact that a number of men downplayed these experiences, as
discussed below. For instance, Samir connects the Islamophobic micro-aggressions that
he describes to feelings of isolation as he laughed off jokes; and “contempt” for Arabs,
South Asians, or Muslims and a feeling of “threat” when he is the subject of
disconcerting stares. While Musa indicates that at least a number of off-handed
comments can be brushed off, he indicates elsewhere that other Islamophobic encounters
were more jarring.
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Individual Acts of Bigotry
Golash-Boza (2016) uses the phrase, “individual acts of bigotry” to describe a
range of racist actions that individuals may commit, including using racial slurs and
committing hate-crimes. I differentiate “individual acts of bigotry” from racial microaggressions because of their explicitness, level of threat, and physicality. The men that I
interviewed described a number of experiences that they were familiar with that could be
described as more explicitly Islamophobic than the micro-aggressions discussed
previously. Such acts were apparently intended to make racial and ethnic minorities feel
uncomfortable. I organize these experiences into three primary categories: public
epithets, racial violence, and property defacement. I define “public epithets” as overtly
racist speech or rhetoric designed to unnerve Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims.
Participants indicated that they or people that they knew were sometimes the subject of
slurs in public spaces or that they had had things shouted at them in stores or from
moving vehicles.
Racially motivated violence involved physical confrontations related to
Islamophobia. Participants reported fights, having things spilled or thrown at them or
others, and other physical threats—e.g. having a knife pulled “on them.” I use “property
crimes/defacement or targeting organizations” to capture instances where property was
defaced or destroyed. Notably, interviewees indicated that both personal property and
community religious spaces had been defaced in Metro-city and Townsburg. Mosques in
each location had been threatened with violence [guns or bombs] or defaced [using
graffiti]. I provide examples of individual acts of bigotry in table 4.3. Most interviewees
had experienced or knew someone who had experienced Islamophobia in these forms.
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Fifteen of the 23 interviewees reported that they had or knew someone personally who
had experienced “individual acts of bigotry” related to Islamophobia.
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Table 4.3: Examples of individual acts of bigotry
“Public
Epithets”

§

Samir, an upper class Pakistani American:
“Mostly, I get looks. That’s what it is. I get a lot of looks. There
was one time that I was called a sand nigger [sic.] That was
shocking to me because I was 18. I was in [a small town in
state]. I went to Walmart to get some groceries and a man is
standing outside on his pickup truck and just staring at me as
I’m trying to load my groceries, and he was close enough for
me to hear him say it under his breath, but loud enough. Just,
[imitating epithet] ‘blah, blah, blah, sand nigger [sic.]”

“Acts of
Violence”

§

Imad, an upper class Syrian American medical school student:
“I think one that sticks out to me, is one of my friends, he was
conducting one of the daily five prayers that we do, in a parking
lot, in a corner, very conspicuous, just by himself. […] in an
empty parking lot as well. And somebody went out of their way
to dump hot coffee onto him while he was in prayer. And so,
that particular instance stuck out to me.”

§

Muhammad, an upper class Pakistani American medical doctor:
“But one time, in our old mosque where we had, that was [in
the] late nineties, somebody had thrown a bomb, a small bomb
inside and there was damage. We had to change the carpet. It
was all smoke and stuff.”

§

Musa, an upper class Pakistani American:
“So, this is a patient who was wanting a certain medication that
was not appropriate for him. And I explained to him and I
declined. Uh, the patient had a psychiatric illness. […] So, this
patient used all kinds of racial slurs and blasted out of my
office. And then at night when we were closed he brought a
spray paint can and sprayed on our doors some racial slurs
there. [Italics added.] So that was a really upsetting event. And I
remember […] then I view the patient also as the patient’s
illness also. So I don’t know if he did it in right mind or not
there. But yeah, it was upsetting for me. [Italics added.]”

“Property
crimes
or defacement”

As indicated previously, “individual acts of bigotry” were more overt and
generally unnerved interviewees more than “micro-aggressions” discussed previously. In
the examples provided Samir differentiates between “disconcerting stares” and “racial
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epithets”, indicating that he is the subject of staring with a higher frequency. Imad
indicates that moments of violence, such as friends having coffee poured on them “stand
out” from other Islamophobic experiences. And while Musa is fairly dismissive of
Islamophobia in other parts of the interview, he reveals that the defacement of his
medical practice with Islamophobic slurs was personally upsetting.
Islamophobia in Organizations and Institutions
Participants also discussed Islamophobia that I characterize as structural and
institutional in nature, albeit less frequently than the individual forms of Islamophobia
outlined previously. Thirteen of 23 interviewees discussed such encounters. Again, this
may have been partially the result of interview questions using language of: “being
treated differently”, “mistreated”, and “experiencing discrimination” related to their
religious or ethnic and racial identities. Such language likely elicits individualized
responses. Interviewees indicated that they experienced or were aware of racism in
institutions such as: air-travel, education, employment, immigration, news media, police,
and the U.S. military. I provide few examples of the most cited institutions in table 4.4,
but note that they were not discussed uniformly across participants. I highlight
institutional Islamophobia because it adds a dimension to the range of Islamophobia that
interviewees experienced.
Table 4.4: Examples of Islamophobia Experienced in Institutions
“Air Travel”

§

Rahim, a middle-class Pakistani American:
“I am very cautious when I go to the airport because I’m aware
of what they’re looking for. […] For the last few times we just
got through, no trouble or anything like that. But it used to be
pretty bad. Every single time they were like, full searches, full
bag searches.
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“Education”

§

Raffi, an upper class Jordanian American:
[Discussing the local school administration’s apparent inability
to deal appropriately with his daughter being called a lesbian
and having her hijab pulled off:] “I was surprised from the
school principal, the assistant principal, the counselor, they
were all ignorant about how important [it is] for a girl to not be
touched by a boy, not to be harassed, not to pull the hair scarf,
and things like that. Yeah [imitating complicit educators] ‘oh,
what’s the big deal? It’s a piece of fabric. She can put it back
on.’ That’s what the assistant school principal said.”

Overall, the regularity of Islamophobic encounters that I found in my sample is
consistent with that reported by other scholars studying Islamophobia (Selod 2015 and
2019). In what follows, I address the classed ways that men interpreted and responded to
these normal Islamophobic encounters.
Dismissing and Downplaying Islamophobia
As previously indicated many Arab and South Asian men dismissed and
downplayed Islamophobic experiences by directly or indirectly indicating that
Islamophobia was not a significant problem to them or that particular experiences with
Islamophobia were not that severe. Twenty of 23 interviewees dismissed and downplayed
Islamophobia in some form. Generally speaking this involved (1) beliefs that
Islamophobia was not widespread in the communities that they lived in; (2) a comparison
of their known experiences to other people’s more severe Islamophobic encounters; and
(3) a focus on offenders’ assumed mental health and ill-fated attributes. They relegated
offenders to be “crazy” or extreme and on the margins of society. Thus, they interpreted
Islamophobia to be isolated events reflecting extreme or otherwise not “normal”
incidents. What’s particularly noteworthy is that in many incidents, men dismissed or
downplayed Islamophobia in immediate conjunction with describing personal
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Islamophobic encounters, or encounters someone that they knew had. Notably, most of
these experiences occurred in the communities that they lived in.
Most interviewees who dismissed or downplayed Islamophobia generally
believed that Islamophobic encounters were “few and far between” and that people
holding Islamophobic beliefs were representative of a significant minority. As I will
discuss in a later chapter, interviewees frequently believed the local communities that
they lived in were exceptional—that Metro-City and Townsburg had fewer Islamophobic
people than other parts of the state. For example, Abbas—an upper class Pakistani
American—indicates that he believes that “less than one percent of people” in
Townsburg hold Islamophobic beliefs.
So, I feel like in Townsburg, it was very like, maybe the one percent of people
who were like, I wouldn’t want to say racist, but racist. Or um, fearful of what
they don’t know said that kind of stuff. And um, they have that Islamophobic
mindset. But Townsburg, for the most part was very, it strayed away from
Islamophobia. It wasn’t too bad. When it comes to Metro-City, I have
experienced nothing.
Abbas offers this commentary after describing an Islamophobic encounter where a brick
with hate-speech was thrown through his window. This pattern of dismissing or
minimizing Islamophobic incidents was repeated in interviews. In this case, Abbas
described a severe Islamophobic encounter, and then he dismissed or downplayed the
effects and breadth of Islamophobia. In addition to estimating that such a small portion of
Townsburg’s population held Islamophobic beliefs, Abbas hesitates to call those that do
hold such beliefs racist. Instead, he opts for people who are “fearful of what they do not
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know.” Again, the prevalence of Islamophobic experiences—detailed earlier in this
chapter—seemingly contradicts this narrative.
A majority of the interviewees counted themselves fortunate. By their estimation,
their experiences with Islamophobia were minor. Men generally attributed this to their
gender, race, and social class position. For example, Faizaan, a working-class Yemeni
American student laughed while he recounted the Islamophobic joking that he
encountered in school:
Like I remember, [school] wasn’t too far from the airport. So planes would go
over the building all the time [chuckling] and people would be like, “Oh, Faizaan,
your ride’s here. They came early.” You know, crap like that [chuckles].
By comparison, his tone is more serious when he discusses the purportedly more severe
Islamophobia his women relatives experience, and he says: “[B]ut I never get that type of
treatment, probably because I am a guy.” I explore gender in more detail in the next
chapter on masculinities. However, here I note that participants believed that they were
fortunate in comparison to women that they knew. Musa, an upper class Pakistani
American, similarly indicates that his social class and occupational position privilege
him.
The other thing you need to look at is the majority of the people you’re talking
about—the South Asian group there—[…] they come almost near the poverty line
or the lower-middle class, if you look at the whole population. So their exposure
is different than my perspective. My perspective is a minority. […] And those
people have a much higher level of people looking negatively at them. […] They
face more discrimination than I would. [Italics added.]
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What’s noteworthy is that a significant contingent of men dismissed or otherwise
downplayed Islamophobia by counting themselves fortunate in comparison to people
with lower social class positions, e.g. lower socio-economic status groups, racial
minorities, or women. They indicated that if I—the researcher—“really wanted to
understand Islamophobia,” that I should be interviewing these groups.
Several men, when dismissing or downplaying Islamophobia, made or
emphasized claims about the people who were committing Islamophobic acts against
them. In particular, these interviewees indicated that perpetrators of Islamophobia were
“crazy”, “probably just “drunk”, or otherwise not mentally stable. For example, Talha—
an upper class Pakistani American medical doctor—describes a scenario where a drunk
stranger questioned his [Talha’s] wife’s allegiance to the U.S. in a bowling alley, while
he was out with some of the non-Muslim staff from one of his medical practices—
presumably in Townsburg. When discussing this encounter, Talha repeatedly downplays
this questioning by emphasizing the fact that the perpetrator was drunk or not in his right
mind.
And you know, he was drunk. […]
I said, “He’s drunk. I mean you have to understand.” […]
So, when somebody’s not in their senses, what the hell are you going to say?
Similarly, Mustafa—an upper class Pakistani American student describes the general
ignorance that he encounters with some regularity in rural spaces and at college. He
backtracks though to say that generally, people are accepting.
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I would say in [small rural town in state], again, […]. So a lot of people, I felt like,
were kind of ignorant, not even in a bad way per se, just ignorant as to what
Islam is. […] Because even the people that I met in college from [small rural town
in state], and you know they were pretty much […] very accepting and everything
like that.
Interviewees repeatedly downplayed the effect or impact of Islamophobia by pointing to,
highlighting, or emphasizing the extreme, not “normal,” or pathological nature of
characteristics of offenders of Islamophobia. In other words, if it was just drunk or
ignorant people, Islamophobia wasn’t that significant of an issue. This trend seems
unique to Arabs and South Asians, particularly those with upper class positions.
Scholarship that details other racial minority groups’ experiences with discrimination has
seldom found these groups to similarly dismiss those experiences.
Social Class and Dismissing or Downplaying Islamophobia
So why then, after interviewees reported such a range of—some quite severe—
Islamophobic encounters, would they continue to dismiss or downplay those
experiences? Part of this trend can be explained by examining how the responses of men
to Islamophobia differ across social class categories. Interviewees were not uniform in
their dismissal of Islamophobia and Islamophobic encounters. In this section I argue that
interviewees in upper class categories generally downplayed or were dismissive of
Islamophobia because they perceived themselves as having a relatively close social
proximity to powerful groups—in particular, upper class white Americans.
Recall that my sample is disproportionately comprised of upper class men. In this
study, “upper class” includes individuals or individuals from families where one parent
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works or have worked in occupations that offer relatively high social status, generally
high earnings, a high degree of autonomy at work, and require at least a master’s degree
or higher, e.g. medical doctors, engineers, and/or directors of departments or medical
practices. Over half (13) of the men in this sample had or grew up in upper class
positions. I differentiate upper class men from “middle-” and “working-class men” who
work or come from families where one or both parents have worked in occupations that
offer relatively modest social status, generally median earnings, and require less than a
master’s degree, e.g. school teachers, mechanics, retail and food service, manufacturing.
Ten participants were categorized in this broad middle- and working-class category. Most
of them came from families that worked in retail or food service in some capacity and
several owned stores. All of this is highlighted in table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Participants by Social Class Categories
Social Class
Category

Definition

(Number of)
Interviewees

Upper Class

Characterized by individuals who
meet the following characteristics or
whose parent(s) do so:

(13)

(1) Have worked in high status
occupational categories—
mostly medical doctors and
engineers
(2) Have obtained high levels of
education; all had a masters
or doctorate-level degree

Abbas
Bassam
Hamza
Imad
Muhammad
Musa
Mustafa
Omair
Omar
Qais
Rafi
Samir
Talha

Middle- and
Working-Class

Characterized by individuals who
meet the following characteristics or
whose parents do so:
(1) Have worked in middle- or
working-class occupational
prestige—ranging from
parent(s) who were a public
school teacher and a
mechanic at the high end,
and retail store and food
service workers at the low
end
(2) Have obtained middle-levels
of education, typically less
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(10)
Abid
Ammar
Anzar
Faizaan
Nur
Rahim
Saeed
Shayan

than a master’s degree e.g. a
bachelor’s degree, associates
degree, some college, or no
college education.

Yahya
Zain

As I indicated previously, some of this dismissal of Islamophobia can be
explained via relative class-position and proximity to powerful groups. Nearly all of the
men [12 of 13] that I categorize as upper class downplayed Islamophobia in some
capacity. Eight of the remaining ten men from the middle- and working-class category
similarly downplayed Islamophobic experiences.
Men with Upper Class Positions
First, I address the trends of dismissing and downplaying Islamophobia among
men who were categorized as coming from upper class positions. It is unclear whether or
not upper class Arabs and South Asians actually experienced less severe Islamophobia
than those with middle- and working-class positions. As noted above, en from each group
described a range of Islamophobic encounters that occurred with some regularity.
However, interviewees in the upper class category were more frequently forgiving of
Islamophobic encounters or describe such confrontations as misunderstandings or benign.
As indicated previously, almost all of the men who belonged to the upper class category
dismissed or downplayed Islamophobia. Upper class interviewees were the only
participants to report that Islamophobia was muted in Metro-City or Townsburg, they did
not personally experience it “all that much”, or that they didn’t get it as bad as others.
Interviewees who came from upper class positions seemed able to draw on their
social status and occupational prestige at work when responding to Islamophobia. This
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apparently impacted their interpretation of Islamophobic encounters and led them to
downplay these negative experiences. For example, the line between off-handed
comments and public epithets was sometimes unclear. Musa is an upper class medical
doctor in Townsburg. Here he describes multiple encounters that I categorize as racial
micro-aggressions.
So you know, sometimes people, as I said, have misconceptions. And I’m open to
discuss misconceptions with my patients, when they bring up some concern. And
some of them are very innocent questions, which is a lack of knowledge or of
understanding. [Italics added.]
Uh, you do go into the grocery store and somebody has made a comment. And
basically, you have two choices, you can ignore and walk away or you can
confront the person.
Both of these verbal altercations are described in ways that seems to indicate that these
experiences occur with some regularity. In the first excerpt, I draw attention to Musa’s
use of the term “misconceptions.” Musa describes the Islamophobic questions that he is
asked by patients generously. However, outside of his office—e.g. the second excerpt—
he is less forgiving of Islamophobic comments or actions. In a study of Anti-Black
discrimination, Feagin (1991) finds that middle-class Black Americans reported
situational discriminatory experiences. Middle-class Black Americans reported more and
worse discrimination in public places, such as grocery stores, where their middle-class
status is unclear. Conversely when they were at their places of employment, e.g. a
professor on a college campus, they reported fewer and less severe moments of
discrimination. Similarly, I find that Arab and South Asian men were less likely to report
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Islamophobic discrimination as severe when they were in positions of power. In the
second excerpt, Musa takes a more mater-of-fact tone. He indicates that off-handed
remarks do occur, and follows up by saying that Arabs and South Asians in these
scenarios have two options when responding to these incidents. Notably, men with upper
class positions were protected from the brunt of Islamophobia in professional settings,
but outside of those settings those protections waned (I discuss this trend more in chapter
7). In some cases, men took more stern positions against the Islamophobia that they
experienced outside of professional settings. In others, they similarly downplayed these
experiences.
Men from upper class positions also seemed to downplay Islamophobia in ways
that were connected to their perceived proximity to others in privileged positions. In
particular, upper class men peripherally described themselves as close to whites, other
high-status immigrant-origin groups, and “Americans”, while mostly distancing
themselves from poor and rural whites, recent immigrants, or people who “failed to
assimilate.” In some instances, peripheral discussions of groups coincided directly with
downplaying Islamophobic experiences.
Six upper class men described themselves as Americanized or otherwise made a
point to express very pro-American meritocratic ideals. I differentiate this from
discussing actual citizenship status, since almost all of the men that I interviewed were
citizens of the U.S. Previous scholarship (Glenn 2011; Selod 2015) on citizenship finds
that the term, “American,” does not always refer to legal citizenship status. These
scholars (Glenn 2011; Selod 2015) argue that there are important distinctions between the
concepts of legal and “substantive citizenship,” whereby the later refers to a group’s
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ability to lay claim to the social rights and privileges and sense of belonging popularly
associated with citizenship which generally requires acceptance by community members.
For example, Black Americans have had legal naturalized citizenship for much of
America’s history, but have not historically and contemporarily enjoyed all the rights and
privileges associated with that citizenship. Other scholarship (Selod 2015) has
demonstrated that Muslims in America routinely have their citizenship denied because
when they identified as Muslim, they are questioned about their allegiance to the U.S.
The Arab and South Asian men that I interviewed similarly had their substantive
citizenship challenged through Islamophobic encounters.
Interviewees drew upon their “American” identity in ways that could be read as
claims to “substantive citizenship” (Glenn 2011). I argue that upper class Arab and South
Asian men downplay Islamophobia in order to support such claims and to shore up for
themselves the benefits of substantive citizenship. For example, Bassam is an upper class
and recent college graduate comes from a family of engineers. When questioned about
community membership, he offers: “I’ve grown up here since I was a kid, I’ve been
around more Americans than I have Arabs. […] I think I could fit in either community”,
and later: “I feel like I am Americanized. […] I am more American than anything.”
Notably, Bassam’s discussion of “Americanness” is situated in the broader context of
conversations about getting along with others in his majority white, private high school
and in conversations about why he prefers life in America to life in Jordan. He
differentiates between Arab—an ethnicity, and Americans—a nationality. Other
participants described their generally upper class extracurricular activities as part of what
makes them “American” e.g., participating on travel soccer teams and going boating.
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Some upper class participants indicated that relatives were “more American than most
Americans” or described spouses as “soccer moms.” And, several of the men who
described themselves as American additionally indicated that other Arab and South Asian
immigrants “didn’t assimilate well” or just wanted to go home, and thus were responsible
for some of the discrimination that they faced. In dismissing their own encounters with
Islamophobia, emphasizing their “Americanness”, and distancing themselves from
immigrants who routinely experience Islamophobia, upper class Arabs and South Asians
aligned themselves with those perceived as high-status groups in the U.S. These
responses differ from the responses of middle- and working-class participants who
emphasized differences between themselves and “Americans” or whites. I assert that
positioning oneself as a “red blooded American”, is an attempt—by Arab and South
Asian men with upper class positions—to trade on their social class position so they can
continue to enjoy the benefits of that social class position and their perceived closeness to
whites.
The term “American” has also notably been used by Whites to discuss race in
thinly veiled ways (Bonilla-Silva 2014). This use of “American” most typically
functionally means Whites, at the exclusion of other groups, in particular intermediary
racial categories such as Asian and non-White Latinx groups. Because of this, it is useful
to consider Bonilla-Silva’s (2004) tri-racial theory and “honorary whites” racial category
with respect to the ways that Arab and South Asian men in this sample described
themselves as Americans and positioned themselves in proximity to whites. BonillaSilva’s (2004) “honorary whites” racial category indicates changes in the racial structure
of America that serve to maintain a system of advantage based on race amidst large-scale
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demographic shifts in the US population. During this shift several groups in America like
many Asians and Middle Easterners have benefitted from the “wages of whiteness,” e.g.
through the ways that they are able to participate in relationships with whites and
institutions such as education and the labor economy.
Several upper class men described closeness with whites, and a few of these
interviewees explicitly downplayed Islamophobia from the whites that they were in close
proximity with. Upper class men in both Metro-City and Townsburg reported that most
of their neighbors were either white or were other racial groups in high-status
occupations such as medicine. These men also generally reported that their closest
relationships were with other people in their occupation, e.g., other Muslim doctors.
Omar—an upper class Pakistani man from Townsburg—downplays the Islamophobia
that he experienced in school when it was white people making jokes, but did not do so
when other people of color were committing similar infractions:
I think socioeconomic status has a lot to do with the immigrants’ experience of
[…] the western world. Mine have been great. Um, I mean, we can say that I dealt
with, I can’t even, in the moment I thought it was racism, but like, it was just
idiots. I mean, actually they were just joking. Actually, I don’t even think they
were malicious. They were, ‘cause actually some of them were best friends with
some of my other brown, Muslim friends. And I think they were just kind of like,
poking fun in a light-hearted way. More or less, we all do that. It was high school.
Um, so other than making, you know, general terrorist jokes, like, it was just up
from a few guys who ended up actually being friends with us down the road. It’s
been great. [Italics added.]
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What is particularly interesting about Omar’s conversations about Islamophobia is that he
was frequently dismissive of Islamophobic encounters with white people—whom he
apparently viewed as his peers—while he took a harder stance towards Islamophobia
committed by other people of color.
Omar: I never have a friend come to me saying, ‘this racist person came up to
me.’ And they all have lots of white friends, and non-, I’m sorry, I keep saying
‘white,’ dude, non-brown friends.
Interviewer: I’m interested in race, so you know, yeah.
Omar: Cause I’m insinuating that only racist tendencies come from white people.
That’s eff-ed [messed] up. That’s not the case. … I will tell you this. And this is
from my own cousins and me, and people that I know in this community in
Metro-City. If there are racist behaviors being shown, like if someone is being
racist to a person of the Islamic faith, it’s been coming from Black people and
Mexican people, always.
By many markers, Omar has upper class standing. He comes from a family of medical
doctors and has a masters-level degree. He indicated that he and his Arab and South
Asian classmates had close social proximity to white people making Islamophobic jokes
in school. Other interviewees indicated that the people making jokes were “their friends.”
This perceived close proximity to whites appears to be so strong that Omar did not
consider experiences with white perpetrators to be Islamophobic in nature. However,
Omar was not as dismissive of Islamophobia where “Black people” and “Mexicans” were
implicated. I argue that Omar’s social class position leads him to downplay Islamophobic
experiences at the hands of young white men, which he views as his peers. On the other
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hand, he highlights experiences with Islamophobia from “Black people” and “Mexicans”
– people that he does not consider his peers. Omar was the only participant to discuss
race this explicitly. However, four men noted experiences where they felt that they
emphasized that they faced racial discrimination involving Black or Latinx groups. Most
upper class men were not as overt in their expressed proximity and dismissal of
Islamophobia committed by whites. This understanding of social proximity and
positioning is telling, upper class Arab and South Asian men appeared to feel close to
high status whites and elevated in status above other minority racial groups. For these
men, perhaps, being associated with other high-status groups was part of claiming
substantive citizenship for themselves.
While upper class interviewees tended to describe a relative proximity to upper
class whites, they drew significant differences between themselves and rural whites,
which they perceived to be poor and ignorant. Because of this, social positioning was
understood in relation to perceptions of rural America. Some upper class interviewees
positioned themselves socially above many of the residents of rural towns in the state.
Relative to the seemingly impoverished and uneducated surrounding populations, many
of these men’s upper class positions were amplified. In many ways, upper class
interviewees seemed to position themselves as having more education, prestige, and
power than would-be-racists in rural parts of the state. For example, Tahla—an upper
class Pakistani doctor with a number of medical practices in rural parts of the state—
describes a conversation that he purportedly had with a resident of a rural town in the
state:

76

So I actually tell them at that time, “So, let’s say my children, let’s say the
minimum education they’re going to have [is a] college education. They’re going
to have some master’s [degree] probably also. And they will have some skill
education. Tomorrow, if your [presumably white person from rural town in the
state] grandson or your child who is barely high school [educated], when they are
in the market, how [are] they going to compete? You can call me [an] immigrant
as you want, but it’s not going to matter. [An] employer is not going to look at
that.”
Tahla positions himself and the educational opportunities that he pushes his children to
pursue as economically superior to the general attitude of the rural part of the state that he
is in. Though he is offering advice on economic opportunity, Tahla is peripherally
positioning himself “in-the-know,” and above many of the residents of the town in
question. And again, this reflection was situational, because many of the upper class men
who spent extensive time in rural parts of the state had or worked in medical practices in
these locales. These men had a high degree of prestige that they could leverage in most of
their interactions in these places. And importantly, though they appreciated their
neighbors, they were significantly different from low status and rural whites.
Upper class interviewees in particular downplayed Islamophobia that they
experienced by characterizing perpetrators as ignorant, uneducated, or somehow not in
their right mind. In this way, Arabs and South Asians with upper class positions further
distanced themselves from low-status whites. These interviewees asserted that the
ignorance of rural residents was understandable since, in their minds, rural residents
lacked critical exposure to Muslims and education. Six interviewees directly discussed
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education-levels while they dismissed incidents of Islamophobia. All except one of these
men belonged to the upper class category. And the one remaining participant was from
the middle- or working-class category, but his mother was a public educator and he was
enrolled in medical school. Mustafa, an upper class Pakistani man, attributes the
Islamophobia that he has encountered to “small-town” ignorance.
Because I mean, for example, on a college campus, as a freshman starting out,
there’s people that come from very small towns where they might’ve never seen
anyone not really white. You know, they probably, even if they don’t mean to,
even if they don’t mean any ill-will or harm or what have you, they may
sometimes have those mentalities, and they may say things in a way that kind of
makes you look twice or anything like that. So Metro-City […] it’s been very
different, in that a lot of people I met may have never met a Muslim, or really
don’t know what Islam is about, or even what Pakistani… or what Pakistan is or
anything like that.
Notably, Mustafa downplays Islamophobic beliefs, which he calls “some of those
mentalities.” He believes that these “mentalities” are not malicious. He thus reports that
much of the Islamophobia that he does experience is described as relatively benign. In his
estimation, whites from rural America lack critical exposure to racial minorities and
Muslims, and thus it is understandable that they would hold these views. In contrast,
many of the upper class men that I interviewed understood themselves to be cultured and
aware of the world around them.
As indicated previously, only one interviewee that I categorize as upper class did
not downplay Islamophobia. Raffi previously worked as a director in information
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technologies, but has been unable to work for some time due to a disability. After his
partner died, he raised two children on his own. Raffi’s responses to Islamophobic
encounters more closely mirrored participants in the middle- and working-class
category—which I discuss in the next section. In comparison to other upper class
interviewees, Raffi seemed to feel more powerless during Islamophobic encounters. He
took a more hardened stance towards Islamophobia than his other upper class peers. Here
he critiques the generally dismissive stance that many young men in Townsburg took
towards Islamophobia:
Absolutely. Absolutely. It [has] happened to most of the kids that I know here [in
Townsburg]. Um, but I’m not going to mention any names, because their reaction
to most of the incidents, they shook it off and just kept on moving as if nothing
happened.
During the interview, Raffi seemed irritated that young Muslims would be so dismissive
of what he felt were severe offenses. Based on this study, I understand that many of the
young men that Raffi is referring to come from upper class families. Raffi’s family’s
experiences with Islamophobia in the local school system are serious. Classmates beat his
son “unconscious”. And his daughter had her hijab ripped off and was called a lesbian for
not dating. Thus Raffi has no desire to excuse or dismiss such behavior. His responses to
Islamophobia are more similar to those of middle- and working-class men.
Middle- and Working-Class Men
In this section, I address the trends of dismissing and downplaying Islamophobia
among middle- or working-class men. Though they still downplayed Islamophobia to
some extent, men with middle- and working-class positions and backgrounds tended to
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take a more stern tone in discussing Islamophobic experiences than their upper class
counterparts. When these men did downplay experiences with Islamophobia, they tended
to do so in ways that did not draw on their social class position or proximity to other high
status groups.
Again, it is unclear whether or not middle- and- working-class Arabs and South
Asians actually experienced more severe Islamophobia than those with upper class
positions. Men from each group described a range of Islamophobic encounters that
occurred with some regularity. However, middle-class interviewees more frequently
described such confrontations as aggressive. Earlier, I provided an example of how an
upper class interviewee discussed off-putting comments or questions and public epithets.
Here I provide a parallel interaction described by Zain—a working-class Pakistani Arab
American student whose parents worked in the non-profit sector and retail at a local mall:
I feel like my mom gets it more than me. […] She wears a hijab. And she doesn’t
mind people asking her questions. But some people come up to her really rudely.
Even when I was growing up people would ask, like in [another southeastern
state], some of the white people there. I’m not trying to call out white people. On
record, I love white people. But they’re just really rude about the questions and
the way they would go about things. [Italics added.]
And:
Oh no, my dad’s a jeweler and he works in the malls and all that. And some
people just come at him sideways [with a bad attitude]. They’ll be like, ‘the stupid
little Arabs just selling me fucking’ blah, blah, blah. [Italics added.]
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Notably, Zain’s discussion of his parent’s experiences is decidedly different than that
paralleled by men with upper class positions such as Musa, discussed previously. It is
unclear where Zain’s mother was asked the questions the purportedly “rude” questions
that she was asked. But Zain makes his point clear, that the questions were rude. He was
not forgiving of the way the questions were asked, whereas Musa and other upper class
men generally did not provide such commentary. The latter excerpt also demonstrates
that men from lower status occupations and who worked in drastically different places
that were open to the public described their experiences with off-handed comments
differently. This narrative arguably rises to the level of “public epithet,” but I include it
here because the comparison is important. Interviewees who were differentially
positioned in social class hierarchies interpreted similar instances of Islamophobia
differently. Unlike upper class men, middle- and working-class interviewees did not have
the occupational resources to dismiss or downplay Islamophobia in the same ways when
they were at work. This bore out in their less-than-forgiving interpretation of these
encounters.
Middle- and working-class men also expressed that social class impacted
experiences and interpretations of Islamophobia. And some of this commentary mirrored
my earlier claim that upper class Arabs and South Asians felt a social proximity to
whites. When asked if he thought that there were any racial or ethnic divides outside of
religious distinction between sects in the Muslim community, Zain—who is from a
working-class family—offered the following:
They’re [some Arab and South Asian groups] usually of a higher economic
status. They live in the East end. They have nice cars and everything. […] And
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it’s just like, I wouldn’t say they were ‘whiter,’ but I would say they were
wealthier than us. […] They’re more Americanized than us. […] But you can tell,
we say they act ‘whiter’. And I guess they do because they’re more assimilated
into the upper class and the upper class is mostly white. […] So they abide by
those upper class society norms. So I guess they’re more ‘whiter’ in that sense.
But at the end of the day, they still look like me. They still look like another
brown guy. […] There are some things [susceptibility to Islamophobia] you can’t
change no matter how much money you have.
To Zain, there is a clear divide in the perceptions between wealthy and middle- and
working-class Arabs and South Asians with Islamophobia. Zain did not feel close to
whites and indicated such on numerous occasions throughout the interview. He reported
that upper class Arabs and South Asians had a high degree social proximity to whites, but
ultimately indicates that this proximity doesn’t afford any substantive protections: “They
still look like another brown guy.”
In addition to providing commentary about wealthy Arab and South Asian’s
relationships to whites, middle- and working-class interviewees also discussed their
relationships to other racial groups. Men of generally middle- and working-class
positions—though not exclusively—were more likely to describe themselves as having
closer racial proximity to subordinated minority groups, e.g. Black Americans and Latinx
groups. In contrast to the upper class interviewees, men from middle- and working-class
positions generally lived closer to other racial and ethnic minorities and went to majorityminority schools, and generally reported more close friendships with racial minorities
that were not other Arab or South Asian Muslims. For instance, Yahya—a middle-class
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Palestinian medical student from Townsburg, whose parents were a public school teacher
and a mechanic—indicated that he had closer friendships with African Americans in high
school.
And to be specific, it’s like the African American community, because, I don’t
know if you’ve noticed, but when I was in high school, […] I was friends better
with the African American community than the white group. And I don’t know
why, they were just friendlier, I guess, and they weren’t as ignorant. Maybe that’s
just a Townsburg thing. But yeah, that’s the fear [of facing Islamophobic
encounters or anti-Black discrimination—when pulled over by police]. I think we
get grouped with the African Americans or the, just the foreigners in general and
we have that fear.
Yahya indicates that he was always closer to African Americans than whites in high
school. He iterates that African Americans weren’t “as ignorant,” by which Yahya means
Islamophobic or xenophobic. Another working social class interviewee indicated that
white children “didn’t want to be friends” with him and his Pakistani cousins growing up.
Unlike some of the upper class young men, other participants from middle- and workingclass group took critical stances and specified that people making Islamophobic jokes
were not their friends, but instead were “acquaintances.” Soon after this excerpt, Yahya
indicates that he has a heightened fear when he is pulled over by police—an experience
that he links to his perceived closeness to African Americans. Upper class interviewees
did not express reciprocal sentiments. I note that perceived proximity to subordinated
groups is intersectional and shapes how interviewees perceived Islamophobic joking,
“off-handed comments,” and the like. Men who perceived themselves as close to
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powerful groups were able to dismiss Islamophobic encounters as benign, whereas less
powerful groups read these experiences as threatening because they were less able to
engage with a “honorary white” status.
Finally, when middle- and working-class Arab and South Asian men discussed
low-income and rural Whites, they were more likely to describe these groups as
potentially threatening, rather than simply misguided or ignorant like their upper class
counter parts. For example, Faizaan—a working-class Yemeni American man—
participated in a Muslim service group that traveled, sometimes through rural parts of the
state. He feels that tensions were frequently high when he and other Muslim men were
dressed in traditional garb on these trips.
Sometimes it would get serious to me personally. Because we’d be praying, right,
we pray outside. [If it’s] time to pray, we pray. So like, we’d be praying outside of
a rest stop and people would be surrounding us, watching us, taking pictures,
looking, whatever. And I’ve heard stories where like, people throw things at
somebody that’s praying […]. So in the back of my head, I’d be like, “Oh, I really
hope that one of these truck driver dudes from Alabama doesn’t decide to have a
fun Tuesday or whatever.” […]
Notably, Faizaan draws on popular stereotypes about people from rural America.
However, this quote highlights a significant break from the ways that men from upper
class positions described their relationship with rural whites. Faizaan notices surveillance
from rural whites. They surrounded his group. They watched his group and took pictures
of them. And further, Faizaan is fearful that a rural white racist would physically harm
them. Whereas upper class interviewees understood rural America largely through
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professional relationships—e.g. as medical providers—Faizaan had no such situational
prestige to draw on. He was simply a Muslim. And as such, he felt that he was subject to
Islamophobia. For middle- and working-class men, rural whites were to be potentially
feared.
When middle- and working-class Arab and South Asian men did dismiss and
downplay Islamophobia, they had a tendency to do so in unique ways. Three middle- and
working-class interviewees reported that they probably did experience Islamophobia, but
that they “just didn’t really pay attention to that kind of stuff.” For example, Ammar—a
middle-class Pakistani American student whose single mother runs a small catering
company—offers this:
Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t really catch an eye to it. So like, if anyone actually
did say something to me, I probably just don’t care. I mean, people probably do
get discrimination, but I just don’t catch an eye to it. I don’t really care.
This response to Islamophobia is categorically different than those of upper class men.
Rather than indicating that Islamophobia isn’t a problem, Ammar acknowledges that it
probably does occur. And rather than dismissing or downplaying Islamophobia as benign,
Ammar indicates that he just ignores such encounters. Responses like this did not involve
an elevated sense of occupational and educated status, like many of the upper class men’s
responses did.
Discussion
In this chapter, I highlighted the wide range of Islamophobia that Arab and South
Asian men experienced in two cities in a largely rural southern state. Consistent with
other scholarship (Selod 2015 and 2019), I found that Arabs and South Asians routinely
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encounter Islamophobia in a variety of forms, and that these encounters have an impact
on the psychological well being of these men. I further highlighted and critically
addressed a trend that many interviewees tended to dismiss or downplay Islamophobia in
ways that seemingly contradicted the normal and often quite severe encounters that they
outlined. I demonstrated that this tendency to dismiss and downplay Islamophobic
experiences is classed, because upper class men—e.g., men with high levels of education
and occupational prestige drew on their positionality when they dismissed and
downplayed Islamophobia. I use interview data to demonstrate that class positions and
dismissing Islamophobia were related to perceived proximity to powerful groups, namely
Americanized groups and high-status whites. Upper class Arab and South Asian men
described a close proximity to wealthy whites while they distanced themselves and
dismissed discrimination from rural, poor, and whites with low levels of education. In
contrast, middle- and working-class men were not able to similarly draw on class
resources in their dismissal of Islamophobia. And even though they dismissed
Islamophobia, they did not interpret Islamophobia as benign. Middle- and working-class
men did not describe close social proximity to whites and instead distanced themselves
from whites. Middle- and working-class men also tended to read poor and rural whites as
more threatening, since they were unable to draw on situational resources such as
occupational prestige and relationships, and additionally because these groups did not
perceive themselves as close to whites and other powerful groups.
I have demonstrated some significant dimensions of how social class intersects
with racialized status to shape interpretations of Islamophobia. This adds nuance to
theories of substantive citizenship (Glenn 2011) and of the U.S. tri-racial order (Bonilla-
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Silva 2004), because this study demonstrates that perceptions about social and racial
position are truncated by class, particularly by groups that may be considered to be
intermediary or honorary whites. Future research should address the way social class
position impacts perceptions and experiences for other racialized groups. These findings
also have implications for the future of research on Arabs, South Asians, and other
intermediary racialized groups that routinely experience discrimination. Future research
should continue to explore the relationship between social class and perceptions of
discrimination, as well as the relationship between social class and actual experiences of
discrimination.
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CHAPTER 5: GENDER, MASCULINITY, PATRIARCHY, AND ISLAMOPHOBIA
Interviewees’ gender informed their experiences of Islamophobia and their
interpretations and responses to said experiences. In this chapter, I address the gendered
ways that Arab and South Asian Muslim men perceived and responded to Islamophobia
that they and significant women in their lives experienced. Men reported that women
faced more instances and more severe forms of Islamophobia than they did themselves—
a theme that is consistent with my past research on similar groups (Allen 2019). Their
responses also seemed indicative of performed hegemonic masculinity when they
discussed experiences of Islamophobia that involved Muslim women. This is particularly
noteworthy because hegemonic masculinity is usually analyzed through the lens of white
men. I use the work of Connell (2005) and others (Barry 2018, Bridges and Pascoe 2014,
Chen 1999, Wingfield 2013) to interpret these trends. In this chapter, I address these
themes and analyze the ways that masculinity shapes how men discuss and downplay
experiences with Islamophobia.
Connell (2005) develops a theoretical framework that can be used to analyze and
critically address masculinities. In it, she asserts that gender is a way of organizing social
practice (Connell 2005). Gendered social practices shape and adhere to structures of
power relations. And in western societies, social structures and power relations
subordinate women. For example, in the U.S. economy many
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occupations are gendered. Work that is done by women often pays less and takes a
greater emotional toll than the work done by men, e.g. doctors versus nurses. This can in
turn justify a gendered division of labor in the home, because men generally have a
higher earning potential than women. And consequently, women do more than their fair
share of “reproductive labor” (Duffy 2007) in the home. Virtually all structures in
America are gendered, e.g. education, families, and the economy. Scholars and activists
call the gender order, in which men typically have power over women, patriarchy
(Connell 2005). Within this patriarchal system, however, not all men and women are
benefited or subordinated in the same ways, or in the same contexts. Thus, Connell
(2005) differentiates the ways groups of men experience the benefits of masculinity.
I outline three types of masculinity described by Connell (2005) that are relevant
to themes from my interviews. First, “[h]egemonic masculinity can be defined as the
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or at least is taken to
guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell
2005, 77). In other words, if masculinity exists on a continuum, hegemonic masculinity
represents the starkest contrast from idealized femininity. Tenets of hegemonic
masculinity in U.S. society include but are not limited to: the defense of women from
threats, heterosexuality, economic success, “whiteness,” and physical dominance.
Second, relatively few men are actually able to embody hegemonic masculinity (Connell
2005). Per Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), “[m]en who received the benefits of
patriarchy without enacting a strong version of masculine dominance could be regarded
as showing a complicit masculinity [italics added]” (832). Nearly all men benefit from
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American patriarchy, and thus masculine hegemony, even men who are proponents of
gender equality. Complicit masculinities maintain the patriarchy through their
subscription to hegemonic masculinities. Finally, marginalized masculinities are
differentiated from hegemonic masculinities, in that marginalized masculinities are
devalued or subjugated in a social order, often against the will of its holder. In particular,
Connell (2005) claims that lower-income men and men of color perform marginalized
masculinities, because they often lack the social status available to higher-income and/or
white men. Hegemonic variations of masculinity are frequently constructed against
marginalized masculinities. Connell (2005) highlights that racial minorities—in particular
Black men—have served important symbolic roles against which hegemonic white
masculinities were constructed, namely via white men protecting white women against
would-be Black rapist tropes. My findings are interesting because I address the
experiences of Arab and South Asian men who are disadvantaged by their racialized
status, but who use experiences associated with that status to perform hegemonic
masculinity. In other words, whereas one might anticipate that Arab and South Asian
men in the U.S. south might perform complicit or marginalized masculinities, I find that
these groups also perform hegemonic masculinity in response to Islamophobic
racialization.
Recent scholarship (Barry 2018, Bridges and Pascoe 2014, Chen 1999, Wingfield
2013) has expanded on the typologies of masculinity that Connell (2005) has developed. I
find that the men in my sample perform hegemonic masculinities when faced with
potential Islamophobic encounters targeted at significant women in their lives. This
included behind-the-scenes negotiations of women’s practices including religious
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practices such as determining whether or not their partners should wear the hijab, or work
practices such as whether or not women should work outside of the home.
“Hegemonic bargains” are a useful analytic tool for explaining how Arab and
South Asian men perform hegemonic masculinities. Chen (1999) finds that Chinese
American men engage in “hegemonic bargains”, whereby one “trades or unconsciously
benefits from the ‘privileges’ of race, gender, class, generation, and/or sexuality for the
purpose of ‘achieving’ his masculinity” (604). I expand this discussion to include Arab
and South Asian men. He outlines three strategies for engaging in “hegemonic bargains:”
“compensation,” “deflection,” and “denial.” He suggests that Chinese men might engage
in “compensation,” whereby men make a concerted effort to break stereotypes against
them, e.g. Chinese American men emphasizing athleticism against model “minority
stereotypes.” “Deflection” refers to emphasizing certain other attributes to detract from
negative stereotypes or perceived shortcomings, e.g. emphasizing wealth or social class
despite well-documented discrimination in occupational advancement to management.
And “denial” refers to strategies that involve a denial of negative stereotypes or a claim
to some form of exceptionalism, e.g. a Chinese man indicating that stereotypes about
Chinese American men just not being true about him. The men that I interview engage in
“hegemonic bargains” when they took responsibility for protecting significant women in
their lives from Islamophobic perpetrators. Notably, I categorize much of this response as
deflection, because when asked about experiences with Islamophobia, many of these men
pointed out that Muslim women faced more Islamophobia than them and sought to
emphasize their ability to protect significant women from said Islamophobia.
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Using this theoretical base, I am able to critically analyze the ways that Arab and
South Asian men discuss and engage with gender, masculinity, and patriarchy. I argue
that, generally, Arab and South Asian Muslim men in the American south are racialized
and thus not able to lay pure claims to hegemonic masculinity. However, these same men
are able to appeal to hegemony during moments where Muslim women face
discrimination. This is evidenced by their claims that women received more and worse
Islamophobia than men, and their subscription to hegemonic masculine ideals—
particularly in the ways that they were protective of Arab and South Asian women. In the
case of Arab and South Asian men—as I will demonstrate—interviewees embodied
certain components of hegemonic masculinity when they described or discussed
defending significant women in their lives from Islamophobic encounters. Recognition of
Islamophobia and attempts to defend Muslim women family members provide stark
contrasts with their dismissive responses to personal experiences with Islamophobia
described in the previous chapter. These findings offer important insights into how we
understand the intersectional positions of marginalized racial groups and into how
Islamophobia is experienced and responded to by men—particularly those with higher
social status. Additionally, they expand on more recent developments in “bargaining on
gender” by analyzing the ways that subordinated men lay claims to hegemonic
masculinity through the protective measures they take for women.
“Women get it worse than men”
Interviewees were in general agreement that women experienced more and worse
Islamophobic treatment than men. Men directly stated that “women got ‘it’ worse than
men” particularly when asked “if [they] knew of any groups of Arabs, South Asians, or
Muslims who were more susceptible to Islamophobia than others?” Several men,
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however, indicated that Muslim women who wear the hijab receive more or worse
Islamophobic treatment than men, when they expressed that they enjoyed relative
privilege or experienced less Islamophobia than other Muslims because of their more
muted markers—e.g. beards and skin-tone—of their religious or ethnic identities.
Respondents observed that women may experience more severe Islamophobia than men,
and that this might indeed be attributable to the religious practice of wearing the hijab.
However, I focus on the differences between how men discuss their experiences with
Islamophobia—outlined in the previous chapter—and those of significant women in their
lives—in this chapter. Sixteen of the 23 men that I interviewed made direct statements
that Muslim women bore the brunt of Islamophobia. I asked follow-up questions that
specifically addressed gender, but many men actually offered this commentary before I
got there, when they dismissed or downplayed their experiences with Islamophobia—as
discussed in the previous chapter. For instance, Imad—a 22-year-old Syrian Muslim—
prefaced his description of the Islamophobia that he faced personally with this:
I’m also a male [laughs], right. I’m not a female. I’m not a woman. Um, I’m not a
Muslim woman. And for that reason … the tendency for Islamophobic
experiences to occur drastically reduces. And I know for a fact that Muslim
women tend to have more severe Islamophobic encounters, particularly those who
wear the hijab[.]
According to Imad, women experience both more numerical and more severe
Islamophobic encounters than men. As outlined in the previous chapter, this general
understanding led many men to downplay their own experiences with Islamophobia. And
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it also seems to have led men to highlight moments where men stood up for women
against Islamophobic perpetrators—as I address below.
Other interviewees shared a number of stories of Islamophobic encounters to
support their claims that Muslim women—particularly those who wear the hijab—are
subject to more and worse Islamophobic treatment than men. For instance, Faizaan—a
23-year-old Yemeni Muslim—compares his experiences to those of his female relatives.
My female cousins, my mom, my nieces, they go out and I hear stories all the
time about how someone shouted at them, or like someone flicked them off, or
like someone told them to go home, or do this or that, it’s all, in Metro-City even
… I remember my niece told me a story, she was driving and some guy just yelled
across the parking lot, like “terrorist!” for no reason. Like, she was just driving.
… [B]ut I never get that type of treatment, probably because I’m a guy. … But
definitely, I hear stories where Muslim women in the hijab definitely get a lot of
hate.
Faizaan indicates that his female relatives’ experiences with “individual acts of bigotry”
were more common and more severe than his own. Here he outlines a specific incident
where his niece had a “public epithet” shouted at her while she was in a parking lot.
Faizaan—and other interviewees—primarily attributed these differences in experience to
gender. He says, “Muslim women in the hijab … get a lot of hate.”
Several of the Islamophobic experiences that men described appeared to be
heightened when Muslim women were involved. Thirteen of the 23 men described such
experiences. For instance, Bassam—a 22-year-old recent college graduate—details an
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off-putting experience that he had that was seemingly amplified by his mother’s
presence:
One specific instance for me, uh, I went to see the movie, “American Sniper” with
my mother. I don’t know if you remember that movie … when that movie was in
theaters. … And I went in there and my mom and I were the only, you know, the
out-group, minority in that theater. And the rest were all whites. … And it, you
could tell that the whole setting was kind of like, just a patriotic hoorah type of
thing.
So, as we were walking up the stairs, and I was holding my mom’s hand to help
assist her up the stairs, one man … said, “Hello” to us. And I was like, “Hi.” And
he was like, “How are you guys doing today?” And we were like, “Oh, we’re
good. How are you?” And I guess he didn’t hear us. So he reiterated it again. Just
not [in] as friendly [of a] tone. And he was like, [greater emphasis] “I said, how
are you guys today?” And I was like, “We said, we’re good. How are you?” And
he was like, “Oh, I’m fine.” And I was like, [to self] “Okay weird.”
But as we were walking up the stairs, all eyes were on us. It was just kind of just
like … we were getting that vibe where it was like, something might happen.
It is unclear whether the confrontation that Bassam outlines was Islamophobic in nature.
It could be that the hijab—a religious marker—solidified Bassam and his mother’s
identity as Muslims to a would-be perpetrator who proceeded to give the pair a hard time.
It could also be that Bassam had a heightened consciousness towards Islamophobia,
because the stage was set for a “patriotic hoorah” or because his mother—a woman—was
with him. It was, however, enough to make him feel uncomfortable because he feared
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that “something might happen.” He seems to believe that these apparent microaggressions were attributable to Islamophobia and were likely amplified by the presence
of his mother who wears the hijab.
Interviewees also indicated that women were subject to a unique form of violence
that is apparently widespread in the U.S. A number of interviewees indicated that they
knew of, or knew women personally who had, had their hijabs and headscarves yanked
off by perpetrators of Islamophobia. All of the instances reported to me occurred in
schools. Abbas—a 23-year-old Pakistani American—indicates that his friends who wore
the hijab in high schools in Metro-City were subject to having their hijabs “yanked off”
on more than one occasion.
Yes, I have heard stories. Of course I went to high school in Townsburg
[currently lives and attends university in Metro-City]. But, I have heard stories
from some of my female friends here on campus that wore a headdress. When
they went to high school people would literally grab and yank them off of their
heads and say different things about them.
Rafi—the father of a Muslim daughter in Townsburg—indicates that his daughter had her
headscarf torn off, which resulted in a fight, and that school administrators and officials
did nothing about the incident. Still other men reported that Muslim women that they met
from other parts of the country were subject to similar treatment while they attended
secondary schools. These incidents of racially motivated violence were described as
particularly troubling by the interviewees who described them. These incidents were so
troubling because they violated a woman’s space—something that interviewees were
unable to successfully police—and they were overt acts against the interviewees’
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religion. Participants “bargained their gender” by emphasizing women’s negative
experiences with Islamophobia while detracting attention from their personal
experiences. By focusing on the defenselessness of women, men were generally able to
discuss the ways that they succeeded or hoped to succeed as protectors by preventing the
brunt of Islamophobic encounters. Physical altercations—like those involving tearing
hijabs—meant that these men were unable to successfully protect significant women in
their lives.
Protecting and Defending Muslim Women
Perhaps unsurprisingly, interviewees who said that women experienced more or
worse Islamophobia than men expressed a high degree of concern for the Muslim women
in their lives. Men were fearful for their women family and friends and expressed such in
gendered ways. For instance, Zain—a 21-year-old Pakistani American—shares that he
has feared for his mother’s safety since he was a younger kid.
Even when I was younger, I would realize my mom has a target on her back and I
don’t want anybody to come for my mother. I can fit in. That’s fine. My dad can
fit in, that’s fine. We can try at our best. But my mom has a straight distinction to
her that keeps her separated as her own sub-group, no matter what.
Zain says that his mom “has a target on her back” and he fears that someone might “come
for her” [try to hurt her]. Men expressed hegemonic masculinity when they discussed the
ways that they responded to moments of Islamophobia and when they discussed attempts
to protect women from experiencing Islamophobia. Notably, many of these efforts at
protecting Muslim women were patriarchal in nature. In this section, I highlight the ways
men expressed masculinities in response to Islamophobia generally, but also particularly

97

as it pertained to potential Islamophobia committed against women. I propose that Arab
and South Asian men engage in “protective hegemonic bargains” when significant
women in their lives are the real or potential subjects of Islamophobia. “Protective
hegemonic bargains” are situational expressions of hegemonic ideals, namely those of
protecting women either through control or the use of violence in the context of
heterosexual or heterosexually modeled relationships—e.g. spouse or significant other,
potential partners, family members—e.g., mother, sister, daughter, cousins. I observed
men with racialized statuses perform hegemonic masculinity by pointing attention to
efforts to protect women. These performances were hegemonic because they generally
involved controlling women or celebrating violence in order to protect them.
In addition to believing that their masculinity prevented them from bearing the
brunt of Islamophobia, several interviewees seemed to place a high degree of value on
protecting the women in their lives from Islamophobic experiences. Interviewees
described several precautions that they encouraged or wished women in their lives would
take to prevent themselves from being subject to Islamophobia, and they also highlighted
and seemingly celebrated moments where they or people they knew defended women
from moments of Islamophobia, sometimes by engaging in violence. Only one participant
directly cited traditional religious justifications for being protective of the women in his
life. Rafi—who has a son and daughter who both experienced Islamophobic violence in
Townsburg’s public school—addresses an interviewer question about why he withdrew
his daughter from public school, but not his son.
Oh, in Islam, in general, we’re more sensitive towards our female, because they’re
the jewels of our life. And we don’t want [women] to be exposed to harm’s way,
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by no means. So, a lot of people think that this is a primitive mentality. No, I
think it’s a bigger responsibility when you put the male and female, they make a
unit of a family. And each person has certain characteristics and skills that suits
them for that … role that they play. When you put them both together, they
complete each other. … So, I was more protective of my daughter because I
didn’t want anybody to hurt her[.]
As indicated previously, no other men expressed such religious justifications for
defending women. Several interviewees took pretty strong verbal stances against such
religious practices and beliefs, which they categorized as backwards and sexist. One
participant in particular indicated that Muslims who maintained more rigid gendered
practices “didn’t assimilate well” and indicated that he and his family were much more
progressive on a wide-range of social issues. However, nine interviewees engaged in
what I am calling “protective hegemonic bargains”, because their voiced concerns and
efforts to protect significant women in their lives were patriarchal in nature. These
defensive responses maintain the dominance of men over women, even if they are, “well
intended.”
The first form of protecting and defending Muslim women from Islamophobia
involved a control or negotiation of Muslim women in public spaces. According to
interviewees, they had to negotiate the general threat of Islamophobic encounters and that
women who wore the hijab had experienced more and worse Islamophobia. Two
interviewees iterated that they wished that women in their lives would not wear the hijab,
because it increased their susceptibility to Islamophobia. For instance Yayha discusses
how and why he wishes that his mother would discontinue wearing the hijab:
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I don’t think we get it as bad as the women in our culture, specifically those who
wear the hijab, which my mom wears the hijab. And I told her a few years ago, I
was like, “Mum, just take it off.” I’ll be honest with you, I did tell her that just
because … it’s doing the opposite in this country. It’s like, you’re labeling
yourself differently from other groups, which isn’t a bad thing. You should feel
comfortable doing whatever you feel. But for me it’s just like, “Mum, I don’t
know, I feel it’s dangerous. You should just take it off.” … And again, the hijab
isn’t forced on the woman in our culture at all. My sister is in high school. She
doesn’t wear it. … It’s up to her if she wants to or not. … And [when] you’re
putting it on, the purpose is humility or something like that. And then you
standout … in contrast. [Italics added.]
Yahya states that women should be able to do what they want. However, he also believes
that his mother’s wearing the hijab in public draws attention to her that might make her a
potential target of Islamophobic acts of bigotry. As a result, Yayha has requested that his
mother stop wearing the hijab in public. This contrasts his claim that women should be
able to do what they want. Although his request may seem relatively benign, it is
paternalistic in nature because it involves a control of women’s behavior—particularly in
the public sphere—by men. This is just one example of the ways that men protected
women by controlling their interaction with the public sphere. Notably, Yahya is aware
of the stereotype that Muslim men are misogynistic patriarchs, and he works to
differentiate his patriarchal request of his mother from his faith or “culture”, stating that,
“the hijab isn’t forced on women in our culture at all.” However, the protection of women
has long been a justification for the maintenance of hegemonic performances. Under this
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justification, women are subordinated and controlled for their “own best interest”—even
if the threat of Islamophobic discrimination may be real.
Still other men detailed paternalistic conversations and decisions that they had
with women in their lives about going to school, work, or just navigating public spaces.
Others described hypothetical scenarios where women traveling to parts of the state
associated in their mind with Islamophobia would make them more uncomfortable than
their being there. As mentioned earlier, after his daughter and son experienced
Islamophobia in Townsburg’s public school system, Raffi elected to homeschool his
daughter, but not his son. Other men iterated that they had a heightened awareness when
they were with Muslim women in public or rural places—where they believed women
might be more susceptible to Islamophobic acts of bigotry. One man in particular
encouraged his wife not to work, because he was fearful about what could happen to his
wife in the workplace. Omair offers:
We know of a couple of incidences where somebody got threatened because of
their religious background or their religion in general. One of those was my wife,
she does [laughs], she doesn’t need to work, but she decided to go to work
because she was getting tired of sitting in the house. So she went to work, and she
worked in a place [retail work], I wont name it, but I advised her against it. Uh,
not because I know that, that place is bad, but just because the nature of that
place will have her deal with people from all walks of life. And my idea was that
one of those million people that she’ll see on a daily basis will discriminate
against her. … And that’s exactly what happened. … It actually happened to her
three times in a period of two weeks. [Italics added.]
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Here, Omair describes specific experiences that his wife had when she decided to work in
a publicly facing retail company. He advised against it, and even had an “I told you so”
moment, when his wife experienced racial epithets three times in two weeks of work.
Apparently this is more widespread than just his wife, because he later specifies that this
has been a problem for Muslim women in the community. Omair’s notion that his wife
“doesn’t need to work” is paternalistic, but it is also reflective of his class position. Omair
is a software engineer for a large multi-national corporation. Other upper class men
indicated that their wives were stay-at-home moms or “soccer moms”—meaning that
they took on additional responsibilities with their children’s extra-curricular activities,
such as sports. None-the-less, Omair encourages his wife to be a homemaker—in part—
because the jobs that she is eligible for involve interacting with customers, customers
who have the potential to commit acts of Islamophobia against her. This is paternalistic
because even though Omair’s wife had a different vision for herself, she was reportedly
encouraged to limit her public presence and increase her economic dependence on him
for the sake of her safety. Whereas both upper- and middle- and working-class Arab and
South Asian men were potentially disadvantaged by their racialized identities as
Muslims, they were all privileged by their status as men. And several of these men
performed hegemonic masculinity and paternalistically controlling or expressing a desire
to control women “for their own good.” In these instances, men enhanced their status as
men, even as their loved ones were disadvantaged due to their racialized Muslim status.
They did this by establishing themselves as protectors of women.
A second form of protecting and defending Muslim women from Islamophobia
involved confronting people who committed Islamophobic micro-aggressions or
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individual acts of bigotry against significant women in participants’ lives. For example,
when asked if he had any specific examples that supported his claim that women faced
more Islamophobic discrimination than men, Yayha describes a confrontation that he had
when some people at the state fair said something about his mother.
I remember one time, I was at the [state] fair actually. It was maybe a few years
ago. And I remember I was with my mom and then two teenagers, I think they
were two teens or two adults … They said something. And I can’t remember
exactly what they said, but I know it was towards my mom. And I didn’t want to
ignore it. And I actually did stop. I was like, “What did you say?” And they were
shocked because they weren’t expecting me to say something back to them and
they acted like they didn’t say anything. So, we both went our separate ways. But
just stuff like that.
Most confrontations that participants personally described took this form. Like Yayha’s
experience, a passer-by made an Islamophobic comment or committed another microaggression directed at Muslim women or a group containing a Muslim woman, and the
interviewee verbally confronted the perpetrator. In almost every scenario described the
perpetrator backed off, and the interviewee described the perpetrator as not expecting
them to actually say or do anything. What’s notable, is again, I did not ask any questions
about protecting women or how men responded when women did face Islamophobia.
These data emerged as themes later in interview analysis. Protecting women from
violence has long been a central justification and pattern in western patriarchy. By
emphasizing and gladly telling of moments where they protected Muslim women,
interviewees were able to elevate themselves to a stronger position in interviews that
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focused on negative experiences associated with their racialized status. Such a focus on
Islamophobia committed against women allowed these interviewees to change the script
so that they fulfilled hegemonic masculine duties, by protecting Muslim women.
Even interviewees who did not personally recall encounters where women in their
lives were threatened detailed, and seemingly expressed some degree of pleasure about,
confrontations that friends or people that they knew had when Islamophobic perpetrators
said things about their mothers. Notably, reveling in fighting was exclusively a trend that
young men discussed. But other men discussed confronting Islamophobic perpetrators
fondly. For instance, Ammar—a 20-year-old, Pakistani man—laughs while he describes
a fight that a friend got of into in defense of his Muslim mother.
Ammar: [Laughter] I do, actually, I do know one thing of discrimination on
someone else. … So one person, uh, was making fun of my friend’s mom or
something like that. Which I completely understand, if anyone made fun of my
mom
Interviewer: Who wears the hijab or who is Muslim?
Ammar: Muslim, yeah. And so he, and then after that, he just kept going on and
on while they were in line. They were both in line for something. I think it was
like coffee or something.
Interviewer: Were they friends prior to this?
Ammar: No, no, completely strangers. And I guess they went outside and fought.
And my friend whooped his ass. [laughter] [italics added.]
In this scenario, Ammar’s friend beat an Islamophobic stranger in a fight to defend his
mother—a Muslim woman. Many of the men—including Ammar—who recounted such
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third-person narratives fondly—indicated that if they were in a similar situation, that they
would have probably done the same thing. Other men described scenarios where
Islamophobic comments were directed at women, that they did not hear, but when they
were told later what was said, they indicated that they would have taken confrontational
action. Arab and South Asian men make claims to hegemonic masculine ideals when they
celebrate the ability to carry out violence to protect women that they love. Notably, this
starkly contrasted the ways that men were dismissive of Islamophobia—as discussed in
the previous chapter. Men seemingly reserved more aggressive responses to
Islamophobia for scenarios that involved defending women.
I argue that these moments of “protective hegemonic bargains”—where Arab and
South Asian men made women’s experiences the topic of conversation and tapped into
hegemonic patriarchy—are significant because they dramatize some of the most central
tenants of hegemonic masculinity: heterosexism, a control of women, and the threat of
physical confrontation. It is evident that interviewees genuinely care for the women in
their lives. However, it is also clear that interviewees celebrated moments where they
were able to protect women that they loved in hegemonic and patriarchal ways. This is
particularly clear when men provided details about hegemonic performances while
largely unprompted. This adds a layer to our understanding of how intersectional systems
of power operate to keep some groups subordinated while elevating others. While
interviewees’ defense of Muslim women was anti-Islamophobic in nature, it legitimated
masculine hegemony, thus complicating the ways that these interlocking systems of
domination interact to maintain domination.
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Discussion
The themes discussed in this chapter have a number of implications for the future
study of and understanding of intersectional masculinities. Recall that the interview
schedule had a limited focus on gender; so many of the themes outlined in this chapter
were relatively unprompted. In my mind, this strengthens the salience of the themes
presented here, but further research is needed to verify and build on these findings. It has
generally been accepted in activist, religious, and scholarly communities that Muslim
women experience Islamophobia in greater quantity and severity than men. My data do
not contest these trends; these men’s narratives suggest that the women in their lives
experience more Islamophobia than they do. What this research does more definitively
offer is a critical analysis of patriarchal hegemony in the ways that men talked about how
significant women in their lives experienced Islamophobia.
I find that though Arab and South Asian men in the American South occupy a
marginalized masculinity because of racist stereotypes about them, they simultaneously
embody components of hegemonic masculinity in the ways that they discussed
responding to Islamophobic threats against women. Whereas these men typically engaged
in more passive responses to Islamophobia when they were the subjects of threat and
conversation—see previous chapter—participants made women’s experiences the
subjects of interviews and responded to Islamophobia against women by controlling
women’s bodies and movement in public spaces and with aggression. These themes
parallel more recent developments in the literature on masculinities, because these men
are able to “bargain” their gender privilege to elevate their status (Chen 1999).
Interviewees emphasized their own masculinities or imitated hegemonic forms of

106

masculinity by supporting the control of women and violence. They did this by
controlling (or attempting to control) when and how women presented themselves in
public, for example whether or not women worked or wore the hijab, and through
celebrating violence against perpetrators or actively defending women when they were
faced with Islamophobia. In doing such, they were able to elevate their own social
standing in a situation where they were compromised by their racialized Muslim
identities. I expand on these literatures (Bridges and Pascoe 2014, Connell 2005, and
Chen 1999) by addressing the ways that Arab and South Asian men bargain their
masculinity during moments of Islamophobia where significant women in their lives are
the targets. For now, I call these moments “protective hegemonic bargains,” because
these men focus their discussion of Islamophobia on the experiences of women and
because of the components of hegemony that are embodied during highlighted moments
are intended to protect significant women in their lives. Notably the telling of these
moments celebrates patriarchal ideals, e.g. heterosexism, controlling women, physical
violence. Even men who expressed progressive political, religious, and gender views
embodied hegemonic protective masculinity when responded to Islamophobia against
women. I posit that men bargain their gender because, perhaps unconsciously, these are
moments where men can regain some of the power that they lose by being a member of a
subordinated group. I suspect that the men that I interview are preforming their
masculinities for other men. This is evidenced by the apparent reporting of defending
Muslim women to other men in the community. Furthermore, I believe that interviewees
may not similarly share these reports in the ways that they did if I—the researcher—were
not a man.
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Future research should address more centrally the ways that patriarchy informs
responses to Islamophobia or at least be cognizant of the ways masculinity informs the
perceptions of affected groups. I suspect that there might be significant class differences
in the protective responses or at least the celebration of these responses among men, e.g.
lower status men may be more likely to celebrate violence than high status men, who can
maintain patriarchy by suggesting that women cautiously engage with the public sphere.
However, future research should focus more directly on these questions to develop more
robust findings. However, most specifically, future research should focus on similar
groups who are susceptible to discrimination, racism, classism, xenophobia, etc. and seek
to address how and if men in these groups similarly engage in “protective hegemonic
bargains.”
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CHAPTER 6: FINDING BELONGING IN TOWNSBURG
In chapter 4, I highlighted that Arab and South Asian men in Metro-City and
Townsburg regularly downplayed and dismissed Islamophobia that they experienced or
heard about. I argued that upper class Arab and South Asian men were uniquely
dismissive of these experiences because of their perceived proximity to economically
advantaged groups and white Americans. In this chapter, I analyze the classed and placemitigated ways that interviewees discussed perceiving belonging in Townsburg. I find
that upper class men described a strong sense of connection to the broader populationlevel community in Townsburg especially in comparison to middle and working-class
men.
This particular sense of connection was unique to upper class men in Townsburg
because these interviewees felt that Arabs and South Asians had more-or-less earned the
respect of the surrounding community through their role as medical providers in
Townsburg. I also find that upper class men in Townsburg were still the subjects of racial
stereotyping, however they reported that they were frequently cast as “model minorities,”
rather than terrorists and misogynists. I argue that participants were willing to overlook
these harmful stereotypes or otherwise left them unchallenged while indicating their
belonging to the broader community in Townsburg. Limited interview evidence from
men from middle- and working-class positions in Townsburg suggests that these
interviewees benefitted in some way from local generalizations about Arabs and South
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Asians being from upper class backgrounds. However, these interviewees did not discuss
belonging in the same way as their Townsburg upper class counterparts. These findings
expand on existing analyses of belonging for immigrant-origin populations in new
immigrant or non-traditional immigrant destinations such as small towns in the U.S.
south, by analyzing the experiences of upper class men Arab and South Asian men. This
analysis is place-specific because belonging in Townsburg was predicated on personal
relationships to the community rather than the diversity that exists in more traditional
immigrant destinations and larger cities.
First, I outline social scientific literature on belonging. Specifically, I draw on
frameworks developed by Antonsich (2010) and Yuval-Davis (2006) and more recent
studies of belonging in new immigrant or non-traditional immigrant destinations (Dreby
and Schmalzbauer 2013, Flores-González 2017, Mendez and Deeb-Sossa 2020). Second,
I discuss the ways that upper class Arab and South Asian men from Townsburg were
frequently stereotyped as model minorities, rather than exclusively terrorists or
patriarchs. Third, I compare perceptions of belonging among upper class Arab and South
Asian men from Townsburg with those of the Metro-City men. Finally, I outline
interviews with four Arab and South Asian men from Townsburg with middle- and
working-class positions and differentiate their discussion of belonging from the ways that
the nine upper class interviewees from Townsburg discussed belonging.
Social Class in Townsburg
At the onset of this chapter, I find it necessary to remind the reader of some of the
unique characteristics of my sample. I had greater difficulty finding interviewees from
Townsburg who were from middle- and working-class standing. I provide an overview of
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the social class characteristics of interviewees from Townsburg in table 6.1. During
snowball sampling, some interviewees discussed knowing Arabs and South Asians from
middle- and working-class positions in the area but were unwilling or unable to put me in
contact with these groups. Future studies should continue to focus on the intersectional
experiences of groups that have less power and privilege, particularly in non-traditional
immigrant destinations. Additionally, 11 of the 13 interviewees that I interviewed were
Pakistani. Per several interviewees from Townsburg, this was reflective of the Muslim
population in Townsburg that is largely comprised of South Asian and Pakistani
Americans. This may impact racial stereotyping as “model minorities” because South
Asian Americans may be racialized differently than Arab Americans.
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Table 6.1: Townsburg Participants by Social Class Categories
Townsburg

Upper Class

(9)

Characterized by individuals who meet the
following characteristics or whose parent(s) do so:

Abbas

(1) Have worked in high status occupational
categories—mostly medical doctors and
engineers
(2) Have obtained high levels of education; all
had a masters or doctorate-level degree

Hamza
Muhammad
Musa
Mustafa
Omar
Rafi
Samir
Talha

Middle- or Working-Class

(4)

Characterized by individuals who meet the
following characteristics or whose parents do so:

Ammar

(1) Have worked in middle or working-class
occupational prestige—ranging from
parent(s) who were a public school teacher
and a mechanic at the high end, and retail
store and food service workers at the low
end
(2) Have obtained middle-levels of education,
typically less than a master’s degree e.g. a
bachelor’s degree, associates degree, some
college, or no college education.

Saeed
Rahim
Yahya

Belonging
Scholars (Antonsich 2010, Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Mendez and DeebSossa 2020, Yuval-Davis 2006) have demonstrated that belonging and place making are
complex processes that vary based on populations in question, community characteristics,
and place. Antonsich (2010) argues that belonging is a term that is frequently used in a
variety of social sciences, but that it is often ill defined. He further claims that scholars
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have used “identity,” “citizenship,” and “belonging” interchangeably, or without seeking
to address their theoretical or analytical specifics. Belonging-ness may instead encompass
identity and citizenship, but it is not synonymous with the two. As I will demonstrate,
interviewees with formal citizenship also express varying levels of place-based belonging
contingent on social class positioning.
Belonging is multidimensional. It can be analyzed at the individual level via
personal feeling(s) of “being ‘at home’ in a place” (Antonsich 2010: 645), or an
“identification and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings”
(Yuval-Davis 2006: 199). However, belonging can also be analyzed at a systemic level
via the various “value systems” that people use to determine their own and others’
belonging (Yuvall-Davis 2006: 199) or “discursive resources that constructs, claims,
justifies, or resists forms of social-spatial inclusion/exclusion” (Antonsich 2010: 645).
Because I use individual interviews, I mostly analyze belonging at the individual-level.
However, I am able to address system-level belonging in some instances where certain
groups feel accepted as community members and others did not.
Antonsich (2010) outlines five factors highlighted in scholarship on belonging
that contribute to feelings of belongingness (647). Of these, my findings specifically
address “autobiographical,” “relational,” and “economic” factors. I do not address
“cultural factors” in this study and “legal factors” are assumed because most of the men
in my study reported being formal U.S. citizens (647). In particular, my analysis is built
around the social class position of interviewees, which is partially related to economic
standing. I highlight many autobiographical accounts of Arabs and South Asians detailing
their relationship to the broader community in Townsburg as medical providers, instances
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where stereotyping was evaluated by interviewees as benign or positive in its basis, and
moments where interviewees felt a strong sense of belonging. I find that all interviewees
from Townsburg reviewed the surrounding community positively and benefitted from
generalizations about Arabs and South Asians being healthcare providers, but some
interviewees with upper class positions were able to use their actual relationships as
medical providers to be accepted as productive members of the community. These
participants felt a stronger sense of belonging than their counterparts with middle- and
working-class positions.
Antonsich (2010) argues that scholars have inadequately addressed place in their
analyses of belonging, “as if feelings, discourses, and practices of belonging exist in a
geographical vacuum” (647). Some emerging scholarship has addressed this critique by
more intentionally incorporating place-specific themes into their analyses and addressing
the varied and place-specific pathways to belonging for Latinx immigrants in the U.S.
(Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Mendez and Deeb-Sossa 2020). For example, Mendez
and Deeb-Sossa (2020) compare the experiences of Latinx women in traditional and new
immigrant destinations. They find that in new immigrant destinations women had to
overcome social isolation, a lack of public transportation, and the relative absence of coethnics. However, these women developed a sense of belonging by overcoming a variety
of barriers to meeting their families’ needs. I contribute to this emerging literature by
analyzing the ways that upper class Arab and South Asian men from a non-traditional
immigrant destination discuss and perceive “belonging-ness” and community
membership. I argue that Townsburg—a new immigrant destination in the U.S. South—
presents a unique opportunity to analyze how social class positions impact belonging and
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place making in the historic absence of other resources for subordinate ethnic groups. I
find that Arab and South Asian men with high social class discussed a unique sense of
belonging in Townsburg that was predicated on the prevalence of Arabs and South
Asians as healthcare providers in the local health system. While interviewees with
middle- and working-class in Townsburg enjoyed some of the benefits of being classified
with upper class Arabs and South Asians, they did not similarly describe themselves as
belonging to the broader community. I assert that Arab and South Asian men from upper
class positions and who were connected to the local healthcare system were able to draw
on relationships and class position to cast themselves as contributing members of the
Townsburg community and as a result, they felt a stronger sense of belonging than
middle- and working-class men.
Townsburg as a New Immigrant Destination
According to interviewees who lived in or came from Townsburg, social class
played an important role in how South Asian men in particular, but Muslims more
generally, were treated locally. Several interviewees iterated that they were some of the
first or were related to some of the first Muslims or South Asian families to settle in
Townsburg. These interviewees told me that the move to Townsburg was a calculated
one. Early “pioneers” of the Muslim community reported that they were taking advantage
of U.S. programs that offered benefits like paths to citizenship in exchange for working
as medical providers in rural and high need areas. They also discussed the proximity to
Metro-City as a significant reason that they moved to Townsburg. It was appealing to
have a large city close where they could visit with other Arabs, South Asians, or Muslims
if they were not able to establish a community for themselves in Townsburg. These early
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pioneers discussed the ways that they intentionally recruited other Arab or South Asian
medical doctors to join them in Townsburg once they were there. Others who joined the
community later specified that they or their families were drawn to Townsburg because
of the community of Arab and Pakistani medical professionals in the area.
Per a number of accounts, the Arab and South Asian population in Townsburg is
roughly two generations old. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a handful of Pakistani
medical professionals moved to the area and helped to establish a local mosque. As the
local hospital system expanded, greater numbers of Arab and South Asian families
moved to the area—many with professional and familial ties to the existing medical
community. Today, much of the Arab and South Asian community of Townsburg are
medical doctors and several had medical practices in the area. Samir—an upper class
Pakistani American man—estimates that over a third of the healthcare providers in
Townsburg are Pakistani or Indian. He indicated that that status impacted the way that—
at least—Pakistani Muslims were treated and viewed in the local community.
I would say at least a third, maybe even a little more than that, of the healthcare
providers in Townsburg are Pakistani or Indian. And so as far as status within the
community goes we were treated with respect.
I assert that this history of mostly upper class Arabs and South Asians settling first in
Townsburg offers a unique vantage point for understanding belonging and place making.
Though I focus on the prior, I emphasize that interviewees are not simply the passive
recipients of reportedly high esteem from the surrounding community. Rather, their
positive treatment by the surrounding community of Townsburg is the product of
collectively drawing on social class and occupational standing to establish a recognized
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presence in a particular place. Interviewees were able to feel a sense of belonging
because Arab and South Asians strategically built a presence in the surrounding
community where their standing was recognized.
“A Doctor Until Proven Otherwise”
Nine of the 13 interviewees from Townsburg asserted—sometimes repeatedly—
that the generally high social class standing of Pakistani and South Asian Muslims
positively shaped the ways that they were perceived by and interacted with the broader
community. For young interviewees, this class position translated into positive
experiences with non-Muslim peers. For example, Samir—an upper class Pakistani
American man—states: “[s]pecifically, the Pakistani community in Townsburg, we were
lucky in the fact that our social class let us become popular.” Interviewees with upper
class backgrounds were in general agreement that this social class was almost exclusively
derived from the predominance of South Asians as medical doctors in Townsburg. This
relationship, in their eyes, explained their positive treatment. For example, Omar—an
upper class Pakistani American man—offers:
I just can’t help but think that us, that our parents were well respected, stuff like
that. “Oh, he’s a doctor. He’s part of another community, who does a lot of good
work in the town. They don’t get into trouble. Blah, blah, blah.” Um, and so, I
think that has something to do with it.
Here, Omar directly connects the respect that his parents’ received to his father’s
occupation. In other words, Omar believes that his family was treated well because his
father was believed to be an asset to the community. These discussions frequently
followed an interview question that asked: Is there anything unique about being an Arab
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or South Asian man in Townsburg? As I will demonstrate, generalizations about the Arab
and South Asian communities in Townsburg seemed to lead many to believe that they
experienced less Islamophobia than they otherwise might in a rural town in the U.S.
South. However, upper class interviewees, and particularly those who were connected to
medical professionals described a particularly deep sense of belonging.
One trend in particular was unique exclusively to Townsburg and not Metro-City.
Interviewees indicated that they were sometimes stereotyped as “model-minorities”
rather than as potential terrorists or misogynists. Poon et al. (2016) define the model
minority myth as a “racial stereotype [that] generally defines AAPIs, especially Asian
Americans, as a monolithically hardworking racial group whose high achievement
undercuts claims of systemic racism made by other racially minoritized populations,
especially African Americans” (469). They further argue that this myth serves to
maintain a racial structure of white supremacy by supporting racist ideologies and
maintaining racial barriers. Interviewees from Townsburg were assumed to be smart,
good students, who had a likely future in medicine. I didn’t observe any such discussions
of model-minority stereotyping in Metro-City. Most young interviewees who attended
secondary schools in Townsburg discussed stereotypes held by classmates, which
assumed “brown” kids like them to be intelligent, wealthy, or otherwise on track to
become a doctor. For example, Mustafa—a Pakistani American from a family with upper
class standing—shares:
I think the people of Townsburg mainly they saw us as basically doctors, because
that’s just the field that we dominated and just health care. … there was a more
positive stereotype. … Now obviously, being in school, I got terrorist jokes or
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whatever. But … I don’t think the people that said that really meant them in that
way. … But, I saw more of, ‘oh, he’s brown. He’s probably really smart. [He’s]
probably going to be a doctor. That was really the stereotype that I got a lot of
growing up.
Interestingly, Mustafa describes model minority stereotyping as “positive.” This is one of
the dangers of “model minority” stereotyping, that it can be used to downplay the
experiences of Asian Americans and other groups with racism. Perhaps Mustafa intended
to iterate that model minority stereotypes were preferable to him to Islamophobic
stereotyping, but here he uses it to downplay the Islamophobia and racial stereotyping
that he did experience. I assert that this acceptance of “model minority” stereotyping
complies with the dominant racial order in Townsburg, and that upper class interviewees
are willing to overlook this form of racism in favor of individual-level belonging. As I
will discuss later, interviewees from middle- and working-class positions sometimes
reported being stereotyped as “model minorities,” however this did not translate to a
strong sense of belonging. This trend is consistent with what I outlined in chapter 5 where
particularly upper class interviewees were more likely to dismiss or otherwise downplay
Islamophobia. In Townsburg, upper class interviewees noted stereotypes about
themselves and connected these generalizations to positive treatment.
Such stereotypes were not exclusive to school-aged interviewees, Musa who is a
medical doctor with upper class standing—and one of the “pioneers” of the community in
Townsburg recounts what he characterizes as a humorous case of mistaken identity at a
Townsburg hospital where the local Imam was assumed to be a doctor by medical staff.
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I’ll tell you one funny thing. … We’ve [South Asian’s in Townsburg] had quite a
bit of presence at the local hospital … and if you were of the appearance of a
Pakistani or Indian, by default you were a physician until proven otherwise. So
our preacher, you know, sometimes, if anybody from our community was sick,
would come visit there. Uh, you know, just as a courtesy, he would come. And all
of the nurses would before they asked for identification say, ‘doctor, how can we
help you?’ He’s our preacher [laughs]. But they were very respectable in that
manner.
In general, interviewees used these reports to emphasize that in contrast to experiencing
rampant Islamophobia, Townsburg Arabs and South Asians perceived their standing as
generally high locally. However, I again assert that such an acceptance of stereotyping
ignores the negative effects of model-minority myths on affected groups.
Upper Class Men: Townsburg as ‘Family’
Interviewees from both locales generally reviewed the places that they lived
positively. Both Metro-City and Townsburg were described as not representative of the
widespread Islamophobic attitudes in the U.S. South. By this, Men perceived their
surrounding local populations as less likely to be racist and hold Islamophobic beliefs
than the rest of the state and the U.S. South. Musa a 56-year-old Pakistani American
medical doctor with upper class standing from Townsburg, reports that Arabs and South
Asians are viewed positively in Townsburg.
Interviewer: How do you think Arabs, Pakistanis, or South Asians are viewed in
Townsburg?
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Musa: Okay, so Townsburg as I told you, pretty well respected. But when you
zoom out, overall you go to the state level or the country level. There’s a very
negative attitude.
These ideas were so widespread that even interviewees who were from Metro-City and
had not lived in Townsburg believed that Islamophobia was less rampant in Townsburg.
Musa and others repeatedly reported that they felt that Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims
were respected—or at least tolerated—in Metro-City and Townsburg. Many reciprocally
iterated that they were not similarly esteemed in other parts of the state and American
South. As I will discuss, this treatment in Townsburg was presumed to mostly stem from
the relatively high economic and occupational standing of particularly South Asian
groups in the community.
While all of the men both locales generally reviewed the places that they lived
positively, there were important differences in how interviewees from these locations
described belonging. Predictably, interviewees from Metro-City referenced the value of
diversity, socially progressive attitudes, and the significant immigrant and Muslim
populations and organizations in Metro-City, as reasons that they felt at home in MetroCity. For example, Imad—an upper class Middle Eastern medical school student from
Metro-City, offers:
I think it’s important to divide Metro-City and [the state] too, because Metro-City
is definitely the anomaly in this case. … [B]ecause of the great diversity in terms
of racial and ethnic composition, as compared to the rest of the state. But, in
addition to that, the just, progressivism in the attitudes that people have in MetroCity are much more welcoming to people of, I guess I would say, non-traditional
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descent, or just immigrants and refugees in general. And so, I know of people
who come from different small areas in [the state]. And when they come to
Metro-City they found that there is a pretty dramatic change in how they are
perceived and viewed, and it’s typically on the more welcoming and hospitable
side.
Imad differentiates Metro-City from the rest of the state and emphasizes the diversity and
progressive characterization of this metropolitan place as compared to the other state.
Elsewhere he indicates that Metro-City is his favorite place and that he intends to live
there for the foreseeable future. Imad later emphasizes that his closest friends were ethnic
and racial minorities and that he felt more connected to those groups than the dominant
white population. Most interviewees in and from Metro-City appraised the city in this
way. They believed it was a great place for Arabs and South Asians to live because of the
diversity and acceptance that the city offered, and they celebrated the ability to be around
other Muslims or other ethnic and racial minorities.
In contrast, I find that seven of the nine upper class Townsburg interviewees
described a strong sense of belonging to the broader community in Townsburg despite a
lack of diversity or progressive attitudes. Notably six of these seven respondents were
somehow connected to medical practices—either they were themselves doctors or they
came from families with at least one doctor in the community. Several of these
interviewees explicitly indicated that they were connected to non-Muslims and
presumably white Americans and used strong language to describe this connection. For
instance Abbas evokes the word, “family,” when describing life in Townsburg.
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Abbas: One word that I would use to describe it all would definitely be family. So
whether we’re related or not, um, if anyone ever needs help in the community,
people are always there to back you up. … We’re very close-knit as a community
in Townsburg.
Interviewer: And you’re still generally referring to all of Townsburg?
Abbas: Correct, yeah. [Italics added]
I add emphasis to Abbas’s use of the word, “family” because this image is particularly
powerful in terms of rhetorically defining oneself as belonging. Family communicates a
high degree of intimacy, and Abbas expands on this by saying that community members
are willing to “back you up.” And when asked to confirm that he was not exclusively
talking about the Muslim community or Pakistani community in Townsburg, Abbas
responds in the affirmative. Omar—another upper class Pakistani American man—
similarly says that people in Townsburg treat his family or Arabs and South Asians in
Townsburg “really nice.”
I’m not trying to characterize things, but I think there’s a perception that these
kinds of people are racists. But I gotta say, I defend them because in my
experience, man, they treat us really nice. [Italics added]
I emphasize Omar’s defense of the broader community of Townsburg as not being racist
because language like this is important rhetorically for establishing belonging. By
defending people from Townsburg against being called racist, Omar is establishing a line
of connection between himself and these community members. Instead of simply
coexisting with the community of Townsburg, he comes to their defense when they are
123

spoken about negatively. This is also notable because community members did commit
acts of Islamophobia and stereotyped Arabs and South Asians as “model minorities,” but
men with upper class backgrounds tended to dismiss these experiences. Respondents like
Omar draw important lines of community membership and belonging by defending the
general population of Townsburg from being called racist. They are rhetorically
positioning themselves with the broader community, rather than separating themselves
from Townsburg’s community.
Three upper class interviewees from Townsburg who were medical doctors all
believed that their relationship to the broader community as medical providers led to
positive treatment as community members. They all generally felt that they experienced
less discrimination and received more respect because they were known as doctors in the
community. For instance, in describing why he feels he has not faced notable
discrimination, Muhammad—an upper class Pakistani American doctor—offers:
There have been people who I have treated here in Townsburg who have been in
prominent positions, who work in big offices and stuff like that, who I have taken
care of in their elder ages. So, it has been very gratifying, very satisfying. … If I
walked out right now in Walmart, there would be somebody who, [imitates
conversation] “oh, you took care of my grandmother.” [or] “You took care of my
family.” So that part probably plays a role. [Italics added.]
Muhammad reports that others recognize him as a part of the community because he has
cared for aging members of many families in the area, and he provides examples of
interactions that he has had that verify his feelings of belonging. Hey also emphasizes
that he, personally, derived a great deal of meaning from this relationship. This
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recognition is an important prerequisite to interviewees’ perceptions of belonging. Upper
class men felt strongly that they belonged when dominant group members recognized
their contributions to the community.
Another upper class medical doctor highlighted belonging when providing an
autobiographical account of Islamophobia when he and his family were out bowling with
staff and staff’s families from one of his medical practices. Talha has a number of
medical practices in several rural communities in the surrounding state. When he and his
wife went bowling with some of his staff members from one of these rural practices, his
wife is approached and antagonized by a perpetrator that Talha characterizes as
potentially drunk. Talha gladly reports that his staff and staff’s families stood up to the
perpetrators in their defense. He indicates that a lot of people might characterize these
staff and their families as “rednecks.” Here, Talha reflects on his relationship with the
families that he works with:
But the way they came, ‘You guys are family. So we cannot let anybody come and
talk to you disrespectfully, the way you guys treat us.’ So when somebody’s not in
their senses, what the hell are you going to say? So, all I’m saying is purely a lot
of people call them rednecks, but what also you have there, how deeply we care
for each other. [Italics added.]
Tahla uses this narrative about an Islamophobic encounters to highlight a positive
experience where non-Muslim community members in Townsburg came to his family’s
aid. Like Abbas, Talha describes the use of the term “family” in his account of his
relationship to the broader community in Townsburg. Unlike Abbas and Omar, however,
Tahla describes a scenario where people from the broader community came to his
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defense and described their relationship as a familial one. He later indicates that the story
is meant to convey, “how deeply we care for each other.” I assert that the strong
rhetorical use “family” and description that “we” [the community in Townsburg] care
deeply for each other depicts a strong sense of belonging. And I further argue that this
strong sense of belonging was made possible because of the established Arab and South
Asian community in Metro-City and Tahla’s social class position and employeremployee relationship with Townsburg residents.
Interviewees did not experience the same belonging when they went to locales
where their upper class position was not already established or acknowledged. This
further supports my claim that interviewees’ belonging was predicated on place-specific
generalizations and relationships connected to their social class position. When men left
Townsburg as a “community of belonging,” they appeared to be more aware of
Islamophobic events. For instance, Hamza, a Pakistani-American who came from an
upper class background reports only one experience with Islamophobia when he attended
medical school in a rural town in the state:
Um definitely in [small rural town in state] it’s a little more uncomfortable
because it’s like eastern [state] there and rural. There’s barely any people of color
there. So, just walking into the Walmart, you get some stares. … when I go to
Walmart … so maybe every couple of days.
Notably, Hamza did not similarly state that he was the subject of stares in Townsburg, I
argue in part because Arabs and South Asians had an established and perceived sense of

126

belonging there. Abbas similarly reported that when he visited relatives in another
southern large southern city, that people were more “aggressive” towards Muslims.
When I did visit my family in [another southern city], um, people were fairly
aggressive there. … By aggressive, like, there’s more senses, and this could be
because of cultural, like differences, how we look etcetera. Uh, there’s usually
more stares. … Like, “oh, there’s something wrong with you.” That kind of thing.
Like, “Oh you don’t fit in.” Uh, when it comes to Townsburg, when you’re at
Walmart, people smile. That kind of stuff.
Abbas describes his interactions with people as aggressive and he indicates that he is the
recipient of more micro-aggressions, such as staring when he is in places that are not
Townsburg. Upper class interviewees generally did not perceive themselves as safe or
belonging when the left Townsburg because their relationships and established
generalizations as local medical doctors did not travel with them.
Middle- and Working-Class Men: Townsburg as Livable
Interviewees from Townsburg with middle- and working-class positions also
reviewed the places they lived positively and some even described the town as “home.”
For instance, Ammar—who came from a working-class family describes his experiences
as positive and says that Townsburg is “home.”
Interviewer: How would you describe your experiences in Townsburg?
Ammar: … Positive, only. It’s my home.
Interviewer Are there any specific reasons for that?
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Ammar: I’ve never really had a negative, yeah. Everything has happened there.
As I will demonstrate, interviewees perceived that they were generally well treated in
Townsburg, and they explained this by referencing generalizations about Arabs and
South Asians as medical providers in the local health system and through exposure to
Arab and South Asian groups. Even though middle- and working-class respondents felt
that they were treated well, this did not translate into the same strong sense of belonging
expressed by some of the interviewees from Townsburg with upper class positions.
Interviewees who came from middle- and working-class families reported
enjoying the benefits of the generalization that Arabs and South Asians had high social
standing. For example, Saeed—a working-class Pakistani-American—believes that he
may have faced more severe Islamophobia growing up in the rural South if Muslims
weren’t deeply connected to the medical community locally:
I think the one major advantage is the whole community was pretty predominant,
as far as being the medical group in Townsburg. … if that wasn’t the case, … I
think there might have been a different turn out.
Rahim—a middle-class Pakistani American interviewee—who moved to Townsburg
during childhood further verified this theme when he compared his experiences growing
up in another state where the general social class position of Muslims was lower. He
reported shock when his Muslim peers were near the purported top of the social hierarchy
in the local public high school.
The Pakistani community here is [treated] differently than we were in Michigan,
because here, everybody, all my friends, all their dads are physicians. They’re all
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doctors. They’re all known in the community. Back in Michigan, where I was, the
people of my culture were gas station owners or tech shop owners, small business
owners. It was completely different.
Reports such as this make it evident that interviewees believed they benefitted in some
ways from the general standing of Arabs and South Asians in Townsburg. However,
these benefits did not extend far past presumably experiencing less Islamophobia locally
for most men.
While respondents with middle- and working-class positions from Townsburg did
report being the benefactors of positive generalizations and perceived the town as home,
they did not generally emphasize deep feelings of connection to the community of
Townsburg like upper class men did. For instance Yahya—a Palestinian American from a
middle-class family—describes Townsburg as “home,” but indicates that people keep to
themselves and that he wished he knew his neighbors better.
In general, people seem to be nice. No one really is in your business all the time
or everyone is on their own. If anything it’s too quite. … They keep to themselves
a lot, too much actually. I would like to get to know my neighbors more, but yeah.
[Italics added.]
And Saeed—working-class Pakistani American who grew up in Townsburg and some of
the surrounding towns—offers:
Um, that is a, a little bit of a loaded question, but um, so you know, I. I guess to
answer that, I love [the state], but I hate it as well. … So because there is not a
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diverse group of individuals in [the state], I guess you could say it’s a little
rougher at times. … I mean, it’s livable.
Yahya—a middle-class Palestinian American—indicates that people seem to be nice in
Townsburg, but iterates that he does not feel that he knows his neighbors very well. He
indicates that they “keep to themselves” and that he wished he knew them better. This is
a sharp contrast from the ways that upper class men described their connection to the
surrounding community of Townsburg when they used terms like, “family.” Saeed
similarly indicates that he was appreciative of growing up where he grew up, but
simultaneously suggests that his experiences were not always great. Instead of raving
about Townsburg or the places that he lived, he describes them as “livable.” This too
contrasted the deep sense of belonging that interviewees with upper class positions
described feeling in Townsburg.
Interviewees from Townsburg with middle- and working-class positions indicated
that they appreciated their upbringing, but—as you may recall from chapter 5—they were
typically more critical of Islamophobia than upper class interviewees. Yahya—a middleclass Palestinian American who grew up in Townsburg but went to college in Metro-City
explains:
In Metro-City, I don’t think Islamophobia is as bad, just because … I feel people
have gotten used to knowing there are Middle Eastern families, their kids are
going to school with other Middle Eastern kids. … and plus Metro-City is a big
refugee area. [.] … Townsburg is probably worse, maybe not as bad now just
because, like I said, it’s more diverse, I feel like.
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Yahya echoes the claims of Metro-City residents, that Metro-City was a site with less
rampant Islamophobic attitudes than the rest of the state because of racial and ethnic
diversity within the city. Yahya also indicates that due to the increasing presence of
immigrants of color, Townsburg was becoming more hospitable to Arabs, South Asians,
and other immigrant groups. But he does not shy away from saying that it is a worse
location in terms of experiencing Islamophobia. This is different than similar appraisals
from some upper class men who indicated that they were respected in Townsburg. Many
of the men—including Yahya iterated that community exposure Muslims, Arabs, South
Asians, and other immigrant groups of color is important in decreasing such negative
attitudes about these groups. But this generalized exposure is different than having and
benefiting from established relationships with the broader community. Unlike their
counterparts in Townsburg with upper class positions, Yahya did not benefit from
occupational relationships with the community to gain personal respect or be accepted as
personally belonging in Townsburg.
Discussion
Recall that Antonsich (2010) argues that scholars have inadequately addressed
place in their analyses of belonging (647). Emerging scholarship has addressed this
critique by more intentionally incorporating place specific themes into their analyses and
addressing the varied and place-specific pathways to belonging for Latinx immigrants in
the U.S. (Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013, Mendez and Deeb-Sossa 2020). I contribute to
this emerging literature by analyzing the ways that Arab and South Asian men from a
non-traditional immigrant destination discuss and perceive “belonging-ness” and
community membership.
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I argue that Arab and South Asian belonging in Townsburg offers a unique
opportunity to observe how belonging and place making are established and experienced
by immigrant-origin groups in a new immigrant or non-traditional immigrant destination
because the two-generation South Asian community in Townsburg has a particularly
strong presence in the local health system. One respondent even estimated that
approximately a third of Townsburg’s medical professionals were South Asian. Because
of this standing, nearly all interviewees reported that they believed themselves to face
less Islamophobia than they otherwise might in a rural town in the U.S South. The
belonging expressed by Arabs and South Asians in Townsburg differed from that of
interviewees from Metro-City—a location with larger Arab and South Asian populations
and more cultural resources such as ethnic mosques and community centers. Whereas
interviewees from Metro-City generally highlighted diversity and progressive ideas as
reasons that they “belonged” in Metro-City, interviewees with upper class positions in
Townsburg detailed moments where their belonging was highlighted or recognized
through their relationships with others. This sense of belonging was place-specific,
because “pioneering” Arab and South Asian medical doctors in Townsburg had
established themselves in the community in the local healthcare community, and because
this strong sense of belonging did not translate to other non-traditional immigrant
destinations in the American South.
Perhaps because of the relatively high social class standing of the South Asian
community in Townsburg, interviewees also reported being the subject of “model
minority” stereotyping whereby they were presumed to or joked about being good
students with a future career in medicine. These stereotypes are place-based because no
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similar reports were offered in Metro-City. Upper class Interviewees from Townsburg
were generally dismissive of these stereotypes and instead viewed them as evidence that
they were highly esteemed in the local community. However, this acceptance may also be
complicit in maintaining the racial status quo in Townsburg. If Arab and South Asian
American Muslims are more widely cast as “model minorities,” future studies should
investigate under what conditions this stereotyping occurs.
Recall also that, Antonsich (2010) outlines factors that contribute to feelings of
belongingness (647). I address “autobiographical,” “relational,” and “economic” factors
in my study. In particular, I use interview data and autobiographical accounts to
demonstrate that upper class Arab and South Asian men in a non-traditional immigrant
destination are able to draw upon social class and relationships with the surrounding
community to feel an individual-level sense of belonging. Upper class men were able to
use relationships to establish themselves as contributing members of the local
community. These interviewees provided autobiographical accounts where they
identified themselves as community members—using strong language like “family”—
and in a few instances provided autobiographical accounts where others recognized their
individual-level belonging. Middle- and working-social class Arab and South Asian men
reported that they benefited from generalizations about Arabs and South Asians in
Townsburg but were not able to similarly draw upon existing resources and subsequently
did not report as deep an individual-level sense of belonging. They still described
Townsburg as home, but they reported a more ambivalent understanding of their
connection to the community. They did not report similar autobiographical accounts
whereby their individual-belongingness was recognized. My findings point towards
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place-based understandings of belonging for new immigrant groups that account for
social class standing and unique community and occupational characteristics that might
change the ways that groups are perceived and interpret their own belonging.
The themes discussed in this chapter have a number of implications for the future
study of and understanding of belonging in new immigrant and non-traditional immigrant
destinations. First, research should address more centrally the ways that social class
position impacts perceptions of belonging and the role of immigrants from various social
class positions in place making in new immigrant destinations. The strong evidence that I
present here should be verified or compared to studies in other new immigrant
destinations. I suspect that because we live in a society stratified by social class,
occupational prestige and economic resources play important roles in establishing
immigrant groups’ belonging in new immigrant destinations. Second, I demonstrate that
upper class men in Townsburg are able to draw upon their social class position and
occupational relationships with the local community to perceive a strong sense of
belonging in Townsburg. I did not, however, interview women in Townsburg about their
perceptions of belonging. It remains to be seen whether women who are family-members
of men in such social class and occupational positions similarly perceive themselves as
belonging at an individual-level or if women who themselves are medical doctors can
similarly draw upon these occupational relationships in Townsburg. Lastly, future
research on Islamophobia should carefully consider how place factors into Islamphobic
experiences. Thus far, U.S studies of Islamophobia have mostly considered the
experiences of Arabs and South Asians in large cities, but I find evidence that rural
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experiences with Islamophobia have place-specific impacts. These should be explored in
greater detail.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I review my findings from the previous three chapters and discuss
their implications and connections to literature on belonging in new immigrant
destinations, gender, intersectionality, and Islamophobia. First, I summarize and discuss
the findings of this study. Second, I discuss the limitations and subsequent future research
that this study points towards. I conclude with a discussion of how these findings nuance
what we know about Islamophobia, intersectionality, and belonging in place and how
future scholars can continue to build on emerging intersectional studies of intermediary
racial categories and groups racialized as Muslims.
Summary of Findings
In order to more fully understand the intersectional ways which Islamophobia is
experienced, I addressed the following primary research questions: First, how do Arab
and South Asian American men experience and perceive discrimination in new
immigrant destinations in the U.S. South? Second, how do place, masculinity, and social
class affect experiences and perceptions of belonging among Arab and South Asian
American men in new immigrant destinations in the U.S. South? I uncover a complex
interplay between Islamophobia, social class, gender, and place through my analysis of
23 interviews with upper-, middle-, and working-class Arab and South Asian men from
two non-traditional immigrant destinations.
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In chapter 4, I highlight how social class shaped the ways Arab and South Asian
men discuss Islamophobia. Interviewees reported a wide range of routine experiences
with Islamophobia. I found that men in general were dismissive in their reports of—
sometimes quite severe—personal experiences with Islamophobia, albeit in classed ways.
Interviewees with upper class backgrounds drew on ccupational prestige and proximity to
high status groups when they dismissed Islamophobia. These men tended to describe a
close proximity to high-status groups, e.g. upper class whites and “Americans,” while
distancing themselves from subordinate groups, e.g. poor whites and Arabs and South
Asians who—some interviewees claimed—refused to or were unable to assimilate. These
interviewees repeatedly theorized that they might not experience the brunt of
Islamophobia because they were “pretty Americanized” and emphasized their
“American-ness” in interviews. In contrast, middle- and working-class men typically took
a more serious tone when they discussed Islamophobic experiences than their upper class
counterparts. Middle- and working-class men described people committing Islamophobic
acts as more threatening than upper class men. When these men did downplay
experiences with Islamophobia, they did not draw upon class resources or position
themselves as close to dominant groups. Upper class men attempted to claim the benefits
associated with substantive citizenship and belonging when they downplayed
Islamophobia committed by dominant group members in Townsburg. Recall that
substantive citizenship refers to the ability to lay claim to the social rights and privileges
and sense of belonging popularly associated with citizenship, which generally requires
acceptance by community members (Glenn 2011). In doing such, I argue that these men
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attempted to position themselves better in local racial orders but were ultimately
complicit in that order.
In chapter 5, I highlight the ways that Arab and South Asian men discussed
Muslim women’s experiences with Islamophobia. The themes in this chapter are
especially pronounced when compared to those in chapter 4. Whereas Arab and South
Asian men were generally dismissive of their own experiences with Islamophobia,
Islamophobia directed at Muslim women troubled them. This study is not positioned to
ascertain whether middle- and working-class men experience more incidents and more
severe Islamophobia than their upper class counterparts or women. The Arab and South
Asian men that I interviewed reported—frequently unprompted—that women were more
frequently the targets of Islamophobia and were subjected to more severe incidents as
compared to Muslim men. Deeper analysis revealed that Arab and South Asian men
embody components of hegemonic masculinity in the ways that they discussed
responding to Islamophobic threats against women. Arab and South Asian men reported
that they controlled or expressed a desire for Muslim women to adjust their behavior in
public to decrease their susceptibility to Islamophobia. Some interviewees celebrated
moments of violence where they or people that they knew defended the honor of Muslim
women by confronting Islamophobic perpetrators. I draw on the work of Chen (1999) to
analyze these themes. In particular, I argue that Arab and South Asian men engaged in
“deflection” when they focused attention on women’s experiences instead of their own
and then engaged in hegemonic bargains when they emphasized or celebrated their ability
to defend women in interviews Because these bargains occurred during reported
Islamophobic encounters, I call these performances “protective hegemonic bargains.”

138

In chapter 6, I analyze the different ways that Arab and South Asian men in
Townsburg—a rural town in the U.S. South, and a non-traditional immigrant
destination—described belonging to the broader community. Numerous interviewees
reported that the Muslim population in Townsburg was just two-generations old and that
Arabs and South Asians had a strong presence in the local health system. One respondent
even estimated that approximately a third of Townsburg’s medical professionals were
South Asian. Interviewees reported that because of this local history, participants were
sometimes stereotyped as current or future rich medical doctors instead of as potential
terrorists. Though Arabs and South Asians from upper-, middle-, and working-class
backgrounds reported that they benefitted from generalizations about Arabs and South
Asians as medical providers and the resultant positive treatment, upper class interviewees
described a particularly strong, place-specific form of belonging in comparison to Arab
and South Asian men from Metro-City and middle- and working-class men from
Townsburg. These findings offer insight into how upper class immigrants and immigrants
with occupational resources such as prestige experience and affect belonging in nontraditional or new immigrant destinations. In doing such, I affirm Antonsich’s (2010)
theory that relationships and local histories are important for successfully constructing or
claiming belonging.
Recommendations for Future Research
I argue that future studies of Islamophobia should critically address the ways that
social class influences how and what types of experiences are reported by Muslim
Americans or those racialized as such. Furthermore, future studies of Islamophobia
should study the experiences of low income and poor groups who are racialized as
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Muslims to see if these groups similarly dismiss or downplay experiences with
Islamophobia. These analyses will allow for future research to more comprehensively
understand the pronounced trend of downplaying Islamophoiba. If lower-class men do
not downplay and dismiss Islamophobia similarly to the mostly upper-, middle-, and
working-class men that I study, then my argument that social class resources and
perceived proximity to powerful groups affects interpretation of discriminatory
experiences might be verified. If this claim were verified, then this would help scholars to
understand how social class shapes racial ideologies for groups experiencing racism. As
discussed previously, the men in this study interpreted Islamophobic experiences as less
threatening when they came from upper class positions. If men from upper class
backgrounds are less likely to report discrimination that they downplay, then these
findings would have implications for activist organizations that track Islamophobia and
discrimination because such trends would mean that Islamophobic discrimination is
significantly underreported among upper class Muslim populations. Organizations
tracking these trends would need to use more intentional language in surveys to track the
range of Islamophobia experienced and not simply rely on complaints filed for statistical
evidence. Future studies should also address whether women similarly downplay and
dismiss Islamophobia. Similarly, if studies find that women do not downplay
Islamophobia in ways that mirror the men that I interviewed, then my claim that men
dismiss and downplay personal experiences with Islamophobia as a masculine
performance might be verified. Verifying these arguments would help scholars and
activist organizations to understand how gender shapes racial ideologies and reporting of
discrimination.
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Future scholarship should also expand on my findings that men performed
masculinities in response to discrimination against Muslim women. Scholars could
further study the ways that men racialized as Muslims respond to Islamophobic
discrimination against women, or they could study the ways that other groups respond to
scenarios where significant women in their lives face discrimination. These studies could
even take the form of participants responding to hypothetical scenarios in a controlled
setting, so that statistical analyses can be performed.
Future studies should seek to address whether and how Arab and South Asian
women with upper class backgrounds similarly perceive themselves as belonging in nontraditional immigrant destinations in the U.S. South. If these women experience greater
and more extreme Islamophobia then perhaps even women who are positioned by class or
occupationally to “belong” might not similarly experience belonging. Such studies would
offer theoretical insight into whether and how perceptions of class positionality transfer
across gender when considering responses to Islamophobia. Furthermore, further research
should seek to address when and how dependents perceive themselves as belonging in
response to the family narratives.
Finally, future research into the experiences of groups racialized as Muslims in
non-traditional immigrant destinations should look at a larger sample of interviews as this
study was shortened by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. With a larger sample, researchers
can make more robust place-based comparisons. Since my samples were small, nuanced
trends of belonging did not emerge from interviews in Metro-City.
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Social Class and Perceiving Islamophobia
Recall that scholarship (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009, Allen 2018, Selod 2015 and
2019) has addressed the gendered experiences of men and women who are racialized as
Muslims and demonstrated that these groups experience Islamophobia and are racialized
differently, e.g. men are casted as anti-American patriarchs and potential terrorists and
women are stereotyped as helpless victims of misogynist men. Despite this, relatively
little scholarship has addressed the ways that the interlocking systems of social class and
gender influences experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia. I contribute to this void
by critically addressing the different ways that upper-, middle-, and working-class Arab
and South Asian men perceive and report their experiences with Islamophobia.
Social class clearly has an effect on reporting experiences with Islamophobia, if
not also experiences themselves. Discrimination is a complex phenomenon and
challenging to quantify in comparative ways, especially for qualitative research.
Nonetheless, scholarship has demonstrated that racial discrimination is common and has
a significant impact on the lives and well being of people of color (Golash-Boza 2016).
The findings from this research project demonstrate that social class shapes the ways that
Muslim men interpret their own and the experiences of others with Islamophobia.
Interviewees with upper class backgrounds were generally more dismissive of
Islamophobia as they were able to draw on class resources when revisiting these
experiences.
I propose that these findings add nuance to scholarship that seeks to explain the
experiences and positions of intermediary racial categories. For instance, if the U.S. is
moving towards a tri-racial society, as Bonilla-Silva (2004) has suggested, then research
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should address the ways that social class, gender, and place influence the ways that
groups are situated in the racial order. I concur with Bonilla-Silva (2004) that the position
of Arabs and South Asians in this new racial order is largely predicated on social class
and may even be place-specific. I argue that Arabs and South Asians in the U.S. South
occupy an honorary white racial position in the tri-racial order, but that their experiences
of this position vary widely on the basis of social class and gender. For example, upper
class Arab and South Asian men are positioned to benefit from their class position and
thus perceive themselves as close to powerful groups, such as wealthy whites. I propose
that Arab and South Asian women, and men from middle-, working-, and lower-class
positions may not similarly feel that their experiences are similar to whites. They also
may be more deeply affected by Islamophobic encounters because they lack social class
and occupational resources to lay claims to substantive citizenship and belonging. My
analysis strengthens scholarly understandings of some of the ways that intermediary
racial groups experience intersectional forces of Islamophobic racism and social class,
since social class at least appears to have muted the emotional effects of experiencing
Islamophobic discrimination.
If upper class Arab and South Asian men are willing to overlook or dismiss
Islamophobic experiences, then they may be complicit to existing racial regimes. This is
supported by the fact that six upper class interviewees described themselves as
Americanized or otherwise made a point to express very pro-American meritocratic
ideals while dismissing or downplaying the Islamophobia that they did experience. I
argue that some of these men were attempting to claim to benefits of substantive
citizenship and reap the benefits of belonging when they described a close proximity to
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Americans and whites and distanced themselves from immigrants perceived to have not
yet culturally assimilated. In some instances, upper class interviewees downplayed
Islamophobic experiences when whites were the perpetrators but not when “Black people
and Mexicans” made Islamophobic comments. In contrast, middle- and working-class
Arabs and South Asians were more likely to read rural whites as threatening and
described a close proximity to other subordinate racial groups, e.g. Black classmates for
school-aged students. I propose that upper class Arab and South Asian men attempted to
lay claim to substantive citizenship when they dismissed Islamophobia out of a well-todo position, but these responses to Islamophobia did little to challenge the Islamophobia
racism in Metro-City and Townsburg.
I reveal the power of racial ideologies among Arab and South Asian men with
respect to framing experiences and potentially barriers to addressing Islamophobia. I do
not mean to suggest that upper class Arab and South Asian men are unsympathetic to the
experiences of groups with lower social class standing. Many interviewees, in-fact
suggested that they experienced privilege in comparison to these groups. However,
because they thought of their own experiences as benign, they may be less likely to report
and draw attention to Islamophobia in their localities—some Arab and South Asian men
even indicated that they did not discuss these experiences with friends or family. These
findings are important for activists seeking to address and dismantle Islamophobia that is
widespread in the U.S. Knowing what groups are likely to underreport Islamophobia
allows these groups to more strategically engage to understand experiences and trends
with respect to discrimination and Islamophobie experiences.
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Responding to Islamophobia as a masculine performance
I contribute to the literature on Islamophobia through an in-depth analysis of the
ways that Arab and South Asian men perceive and respond to Islamophobia committed
against Muslim women. I suggest that these themes are particularly noteworthy because
interviews often shared their assessment of women’s experiences with Islamophobia
without being prompted to do so. In light of the findings presented in chapters 4 and 5, I
argue that Arab and South Asian men preform masculinity first by downplaying their
own personal experiences with Islamophobia, and second by emphasizing women’s
experiences with Islamophobia and discussing the ways that they intervened or prevented
these experiences on behalf of significant women in their lives. As an aside: deflecting,
downplaying, or otherwise minimizing personal experiences with Islamophobia did not
exclusively occur in contexts where men performed hegemonic masculinity in tandem
with controlling or defending Muslim women. I argue that minimizing severe experiences
with Islamophobia is still a gendered practice, even when it occurs without referencing
Muslim women or women’s experiences. I found that some men reported controlling or
attempting to control the ways that women inhabited public spaces and celebrated
moments where they defended the honor of women through physical and verbal
altercations.
These findings add nuance to existing theories of masculinities, because I find
that men who are marginalized by their racialization as Muslims perform hegemonic
masculinity in their defensive responses to Islamophobia committed against women.
Chen (1999) forwards the concept of the “hegemonic bargain” to describe when men
“trade or unconsciously benefit from the ‘privileges’ of race, gender, class, generation,
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and/or sexuality for the purpose of ‘achieving’ his masculinity.” Chen’s (1999) concepts
of deflection and hegemonic bargains explain these trends well, as interviewees
emphasized their ability or response to Islamophobia against women when they were
asked about their own experiences with Islamophobia. I call these moments “protective
hegemonic bargains” because they focus on relationships with women and hegemonic
ideals of protecting women’s honor in order to perform a version of hegemonic
masculinity. By emphasizing qualities of hegemonic masculinities, these men were able
to “save face” in situations when they are typically thought of as victims. I suggest that
Chen’s (1999) discussion of hegemonic bargains should be expanded to include
performances that occur in relationships, because hegemonic performances often depend
on other actors. In this case, they depend on significant women in the lives of men. My
concept of protective hegemonic bargains should be expanded where applicable to other
intermediary groups who routinely experience discrimination to determine how racial
discrimination and hegemonic masculine ideals interact to subjugate women and certain
men.
In the context of literature on complicit masculinities and hegemonic bargains,
these trends strengthen sociological understandings of the ways that racism and classism
interact to maintain white masculine hegemony. They demonstrate that discriminatory
experiences can actually reify gender orders for affected groups or at least in the minds of
men. Furthermore, they point towards a system-centered (Choo and Ferree 2010)
understanding of intersectional forces. When Arab and South Asian men control or
attempt to control women in their lives to protect them from Islamophobia they uphold
the existing unequal gender order. These practices and their logics reify hetero-normative
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gender ideologies that cast women in general as defenseless and in need of protection.
Interview evidence from some interviews suggested that some of the women that these
men were referring to did not or were encouraged not to work outside of the home or go
to certain places where Islamophobia is believed to be likely to occur. Thus, keeping
women from work or otherwise limiting their mobility deepens economic dependence on
men. The celebration of violence or protection against Islamophobic perpetrators reifies
hegemonic masculine ideals that suggest that men who defend women are superior to
men who are unable to do so. In these instances, Islamophobic experiences or the threat
of these experiences serve as the impetuous or logic for maintaining the gender order. I
suspect that the men that I interviewed were performing hegemony for other men. For
instance, some men shared other stories of men performing hegemony that had evidently
been shared with them. I also suspect that these interviewees would have at least shared
these narratives differently if I were a woman. Future research should seek to address
these questions.
Recall that intersectionality encompasses both academic theory and activist
efforts to dismantle systems of oppression (Collins 2000). As such, activists seeking to
address systems of racism that effect Arab and South Asian men—specifically
Islamophobia—should remain cognizant of the ways that masculine domination of
women is built into experiences with racism. Activist should ensure that they don’t reify
gender domination in their response to wide spread Islamophobia in the U.S.
Before I conclude this section, I want to emphasize that Arab and South Asian
men’s adherence to patriarchy is not qualitatively different than that which we see from
other groups of men, but it is unique. In other words, I do not want to reify stereotypes
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that suggest that Muslim men are uniquely patriarchal. For example, Stone and Lovejoy
(2019) and Stone (2007) find that white, upper-income men say they support their wives
working outside of the home, but still retort that they are too focused on their careers to
help with children or house work. Thus, the “it’s your choice” rhetoric that many of these
men use actually leaves partners without a choice and so women are forced to stay home
with their kids. In this study, Arab and South Asian men are discussing “taking away”
women’s choices, e.g. dress or employment, but they claim to be doing so “for their
benefit. These Muslim men respondents are reporting a desire to take away the choices of
women to protect them from the very real effects of Islamophobic racism.
Islamophobia and Belonging in non-traditional immigrant destinations
A final contribution that I make to research literatures is by contributing to a
growing body of scholarship that addresses immigrant-origin group experiences in new
and non-traditional immigrant destinations. Recall that much of the existing body of
literature that addresses immigrant experiences and belonging in non-traditional
immigrant destinations addresses the experiences of Latinx groups. I build on the work of
these scholars by addressing the ways that Arab and South Asian men experience and
perceive belonging in the U.S. South. Furthermore, I address the ways that social class
affects belonging for upper-, and middle- and working-class Arab and South Asian men.
Thus, my analysis is more nuanced than merely an analysis of Arab and South Asian men
in a non-traditional immigrant destination. I am able to critically analyze how community
histories, general social class standing, and personal class resources—such as
occupational relationships—shape the ability of Arabs and South Asians to perceive
themselves as belonging in the rural U.S. South. Recall that while many interviewees
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from Townsburg felt “at home” in Townsburg, the belonging discussed by upper class
Arab and South Asian men was particularly pronounced because they described
meaningful relationships, interactions, and used strong language like “family” to describe
their relationship to people in Townsburg. Middle- and working-class men more
frequently iterated that their experience in Townsburg was a “mixed bag” with some
good and some bad experiences. They did not use similar language to emphasize their
relationship to the Townsburg community.
Scholars who study Latinx women and mothers in non-traditional immigrant
destinations, for example, have found that Latinx women are able to experience a
personal sense of belonging by overcoming barriers to engagement (Mendez and DeebSossa 2020). In other words, through the process of overcoming everyday obstacles such
as lacking reliable transportation by learning to drive or discrimination in local school
systems by critically engaging with the school board, mothers claimed belonging by
developing and exercising personal agency. Instead, I find that Arabs and South Asian
men with upper class positions are able to draw on class and occupational resources such
as community standing for doctors to perceive themselves as belonging to the broader
community. I propose that occupational prestige could translate to other STEM fields
outside of medicine, though further research would need to determine if it was truly the
relational component of being a medical doctor that informed belonging. That Arab and
South Asians with high occupational standing expressed a deeper sense of belonging than
middle- and working-class men adds nuance and examples to Antonsich’s (2010) claims
that belonging is place-specific and dependent on local histories and relationships. Arab
and South Asians from upper-, middle-, and working-class backgrounds in Townsburg all

149

cited the Arab and South Asian population’s unique labor migration history in as rural
health care providers as a cause of their experiencing less and less severe Islamophobia
than one might expect in the rural U.S. South. The upper class Arabs and South Asians
who are medical doctors cited their relationships with the surrounding community as
evidence of the deep sense of personal belonging that they felt. I expect that there are
likely other communities like Townsburg, where new immigrant communities are built
around pioneers who are well-to-do or medical doctors. It is possible that my findings are
more broadly representative of the ways that belonging and place-making operate in these
communities.
I argue that intersectional scholarship should more deeply incorporate place into
their analyses because place was so central to understanding how interviewees made
sense of their experiences. Moving towards a place-inclusive analysis of intersectionality
will allow scholars to address how particular geographic locations; material forms,
meanings and values shape the localized systems of domination through racism, classism,
and sexism more closely. Again, a nuanced understanding of these place-specific logics is
not only needed for theoretical development, but also for activists seeking to promote
belonging and dismantle systems of oppression like Islamophobia (Collins 2000).
Activists seeking inclusion and belonging for Arabs and South Asians in new-immigrant
destinations need to address the place-specific iterations of Islamophobia and racism. In
the case of this study, the positive evaluation of “model minority” Arabs and South
Asians may detract important attention from Arabs and South Asians who do not feel a
strong sense of belonging and who may more deeply feel the effects of Islamophobia and
Islamophobic encounters.

150

REFERENCES
Abu-Ras, W. M. and Z. E. Suarez. 2009. “Muslim Men and Women’s Perception of
Discrimination, Hate Crimes, and PTSD Symptoms Post 9/11.” Traumatology 15
(3): p. 48-63.
Akram, S. M, and K. R. Johnson. 2002. “Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims.” NYU Annual
Survey of American Law 58 (1): p. 295-357. Retrieved May 3, 2019
https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/akram.pdf
Allen, J. 2018. Muslim American Men and Stigma: An Argument for the Use of
Theories of Stigma Management in the Study of Post-Terror Muslim
Experiences.” Contemporary Journal of Anthropology and Sociology 8 (1): p. 518
Allen, Jack “Trey.” 2019. “’He goes by Mo’: Drawing Boundaries Around Muslim
Identities.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 15 (5):1-22
Anderson, Elijah. 2004. “Cosmopolitan Canopy.’” The Annals of the American
Academy 595: p. 14-31
Antonsich, Marco. 2010. “Searching for Belonging – An Analytical Framework.”
Geography Compass 4/6 (2010) p 644-659. DOI 10.1111/j.17498198.2009.00317.x
Barry, Ben. 2018. “(Re)fashioning Masculinity: Social Identity and Context in
Men’s Hybrid Masculinities through Dress.” Gender & Society 32 (5): p 638662
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 1997. “Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural
Interpretation.” American Sociological Review 62 (3): p. 465-480
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2004 “From bi-racial to tri-racial: Towards a new system of
racial stratification in the USA.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27 (6): p. 931-950.
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2015. “More than Prejudice: Restatement, Reflections, and
New Directions in Critical Race Theory.” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1 (1):
p. 73-8

151

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” Sociological Theory 7
(1): p. 14-25
Bridges, Tristan and CJ Pascoe .2018. “Hybrid Masculinities: New Directions in the
Sociology of Men and Masculinities.” Sociology Compass 8 (3): p. 246-258
Brown, Hana E. Jennifer A. Jones, and Andrea Becker. 2018. “The Racialization of
Latino Immigrants in New Destinations: Criminality, Ascription, and
Countermobilization.” The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social
Sciences 4 (5): 118-140
Cainkar, L. 2002. “No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion After
September 11.” Middle East Report Online 32: p. 22-29.
Cainkar, L. and S Selod. 2018. “Review of Race Scholarship and the War on Terror.”
Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 4 (2): p. 165-177
Carter, Brandon. 2018. “READ: Supreme Court Decision Upholding Trump’s Travel
Ban.” Retrieved May, 7, 2019. https://www.npr.org/
Chaichian, Mohammad. 2008. “Getting Settled in the Heartland: Community
Formation among First- and Second-Generation Iranians in Iowa Citi, Iowa.” In
(Ed) Richard C. Jones. Immigrants Outside Megalopolis (p. 213-236). Landham,
M.D.: Lexington Books
Charmaz, K. 2012. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through
Qualitative Analysis. Los Angeles, C.A.: Sage.
Chaudhary, A. R. 2018. “Organizing Transnationalism and Belonging among
Pakistani Immigrants in London and New York” Migration Studies.6(3): p. 420447.
Chen, Anthony S. 1999. “Lives at the Center of the Periphery, Lives at the Periphery
of the Center: Chinese American Masculinities and Bargaining with Hegemony.”
Gender & Society 13 (5): p584-607
Choo, Hae Yeon and Myra Marx Ferree. 2010. “Practicing Intersectionality in
Sociological Research: A Critical Analysis of Inclusions, Interactions, and
Institutions in the Study of Inequalities.” Sociological Theory 28 (2): p. 129-149
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness,
and the Politics of Empowerment. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2015. “Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas.” Annual
Review of Sociology 41 (1): p. 1-20
152

Connell, Raewyn. 1987. Gender and Power : Society, the Person, and Sexual
Politics. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Connell, R.W. 2005. Masculinities. Berkley: University of California Press.
Connell, R.W. and James W. Messerschmidt. 2005. “Hegemonic Masculinity:
Rethinking the Concept.” Gender & Society 19 (6): 829-859
Dedoose Website. Retrieved July 5, 2021. https://www.dedoose.com/
Dreby,Joanna and Leah Schmalzbauer. 2013. “The Relational Contexts of Migration:
Mexican Women in New Destination Sites.” Sociological Forum 28 (1): p 1-26
Duffy, M. 2007. “Doing the dirty work.” Gender & Society 21 (3): 313-336
Feagin, Joe and Sean Elias. 2013. “Rethinking racial formation theory: a systemic
racism critique.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (6): p. 931-960
Feagin, Joe. 1991. “The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination
in Public Places.” American Sociological Review 56 (1): 101-115
Flores-González, Nilda. 2017. Citizens but not Americans: race and Belonging
among Latino Millennials. New York: New York University Press.
Garner, Steve and Saher Selod. 2015. “The Racialization of Muslims: Empirical
Studies of Islamophobia.” Critical Sociology 41 (1): p. 9-19
Gast, Melanie Jones. 2018. “’They Give Teachers a Hard Time’: Symbolic Violence
and Intersections of Race and Class in Interpretations of Teacher-student
Relations.” Sociological Perspectives 61 (2): p. 257-275
Gast, Melanie Jones, Dina G. Okamoto, and Emerald T. Nguyen. 2021. “Making
requests: Filipina/o and Latina/o immigrant claims-making and racialization.”
Ethnic and Racial Studies 44 (7): p 1211-1230
Gerson, Judith and Kathy Peiss. 1985. “Boundaries, negotiation, and consciousness:
reconceptualizing gender relations.” Social Problems 32: 317-31.
Gieryn, Thomas F. 2000. “A Space for Place in Sociology.” Annual Review of
Sociology 26: p. 463-496
Gilham, Bill. 2000. The Research Interview. New York, NY: Continuum.
Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 2011. “Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion Subordination,
and Resistance.” American Sociological Review 76 (1): p 1-24

153

Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2016. “A Critical and Comprehensive Sociological Theory of
Race and Racism.” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 2 (2): p. 129-141
Golash-Boza, T. 2018. Race & Racisms: A Critical Approach, Second Edition. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Herzog, Hanna and Taghreed Yahia-Younis. 2007. Men’s bargaining with patriarchy:
the case of primaries within Hamulas in Palestinian Arab Communities in Israel.”
Gender & Society 21: 579-602.
Hirschman, Charles and Douglas S. Massey. 2008. “Places and Peoples: The New
American Mosaic.” In (Ed) Douglas S. Massey. New Faces in New Places. (p. 122). New York, N.Y.: Russel Sage Foundation
Hopkins, Peter E. 2007. “Young Muslim Men’s Experiences of Local Landscapes
after 11 September 2001.” In (Eds) Cara Atchison, Peter Hopkins, and Mei-Po
Kwan Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging (p.
189-200). Burlington, V.T.: Alshgate Publishing Company.
Hopkins, Peter E., Mei-Po Kwan, and Cara Carmichael Aitchison. 2007.
“Introduction: Geographies of Muslim Identities.” In (Eds) Cara Atchison, Peter
Hopkins, and Mei-Po Kwan Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender,
and Belonging (p. 1-11). Burlington, V.T.: Alshgate Publishing Company.
Jaffe-Walter, Reva. 2016. Coercive Concern: Nationalism, Liberalism, and the
Schooling of Muslim Youth. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press.
Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1988. “Bargaining with patriarchy.” Gender & Society 2:274-90.
Kibria, Nazli. 2000. “Race, Ethnic Options, and Ethnic Binds: Identity Negotiations
of Second-Generation Chinese and Korean Americans.” Sociological Perspectives
43 (1): p. 77-95
Kishi, Katayoun. 2016. “Anti-Musim assaults reach 9/11 era levels, FBI data show”
Pew Research Center: Fact Tank
Lareau, Annette. 2002. “Invisible Inequality: Social Class and Childrearing in Black
Families and White Families.” American Sociological Review 67 (5): p 747-776
Lareau, Annette. 2015. “Cultural Knowledge and Social Inequality.” American
Sociological Review 80 (1): p. 1-27
Lean, Nathan. 2012. The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear
of Muslims. London, England: Pluto Press.

154

Lipka, Michael and Benjamin Wormald. 2016. “How religious is your state?” Pew
Research Center. Fact Tank: News in the Numbers. Retrieved Apr.18, 2019.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/how-religious-is-yourstate/?state=alabama
López, Gustavo, Anthony Cilluffo, and Eileen Patten. 2017. “Pakistanis in the U.S.
Fact Sheet.” Pew Research Center. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2019.
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/fact-sheet/asian-americans-pakistanis-in-the-u-s/
Love, Erik. 2013. “Beyond ‘Post-9/11.’” Contexts.org [Book Reviews and More]. 7072
Love, Erik. 2017. Islamophobia and Racism in America. New York, N.Y.: New York
University Press.
Marrow, Helen B. 2009 a. “New immigrant destinations and the American colour
line.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32 (6): p. 1037-1057
Marrow, Helen B. 2009 b. “Immigrant Bureaucratic Incorporation: The Dual Roles of
Professional Missions and Government Policies. “American Sociological Review
74: p. 756-776
Martin, Patricia Yencey. 2004. Gender as a social institution. Social Forces 82: 124973.
Massey, Douglas S. and Chiara Capoferro. 2008. “The Geographic Diversification of
American Immigration.” In (Ed) Douglas S. Massey. New Faces in New Places.
(p. 25-50). New York, N.Y.: Russel Sage Foundation
Massey, Douglas S. and Magaly Sanchez R. 2010. Brokered Boundaries: Creating
Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times. Russell Sage Foundation.
Mastnak, T. 2010. “Western Hostility Toward Muslims: A History of the Present.” In
A. Shryock (ed) Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and
Friend. (29-52) Bloomington, I.N: Indiana University Press.
Meer, N. 2008. “The Politics of Voluntary and Involuntary Identities: Are Muslims in
Britain an Ethnic, Racial or Religions Minority?” Patterns of Prejudice 42 (1): p.
61-82
Mendez, Jennifer Bickham and Natalia Deeb-Sossa. 2020. “Creating home, claiming
place: Latina immigrant mothers and the production of belonging.” Latino Studies
18 (2): p. 174-194
Mir, Sadiq. 2007. “’The Other within the Same’: Some Aspects of Scottish-Pakistani

155

Identity in Suburban Glasgow.” In (Eds) Cara Atchison, Peter Hopkins, and MeiPo Kwan Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging (p.
57-78). Burlington, V.T.: Alshgate Publishing Company.
Morning, Ann. 2001. “The racial self-identification of South Asians in the United
States.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27 (1): p. 61-79
Munoz, Carolina Bank. 2008. Transnational Tortillas: Race, Gender, and Shop-Floor
Politics in Mexico and the United States. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Nagel, Joane. 1994. “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity
and Culture.” Social Problems 41 (1): p 152-176
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 2015. Racial Formations: In the United States
3rd ed. New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Brown, Heather, Emily Guskin, and Amy Mitchell. 2012. “Arab-American
Population Growth.” Pew Research Center. Retrieved July 5, 2021
https://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arabamerican-population-growth/
Poon, OiYan, Dian Squire, Corinne Kodama, Ajani Byrd, Jason Chan, Lester
Manzano, Sara Furr, and Devita Bishundat. 2016. “A Critical Review of the
Model Minority Myth in Selected Literature on Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders in Higher Education.” Review of Educational Research 86 (2): p. 469502
Rana, Junaid. 2011. Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian
Diaspora. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Razack, S. H. 2008. Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and
Politics. Toronto, Ontario: Toronto Press.
Ridgeway, Cecilia and Shelley Correll. 2004. “Unpacking the gender system: a
theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations.” Gender & Society
18: 510-31
Rockquemore, Kerry Ann, David L. Brunsma, and Daniel J. Delgado. 2009. “Racing
to Theory or Rethorizing Race? Understanding the Struggle to Build a Multiracial
Identity Theory.” Journal of Social Issues 65 (1): p. 13-34
Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Vintage.
Saperstein, Aliya and Andrew M. Penner 2012. “Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the
United States.” American Journal of Sociology 118 (3): p 676-727
Selod, Saher. 2015. “Citizenship Denied: The Racialization of Muslim American

156

Men and Women post-9/11.” Critical Sociology 41 (1) p. 77-95
Selod, Saher. 2016. “Criminalization of Muslim American Men in the United States.”
In R. Furman, G. Lamphear, and D. Epps (eds) The Immigrant Other: Lived
Experiences in a Transnational World (62-74). New York, N.Y.: Columbia
University Press.
Selod, Saher. 2019. “Gendered racialization: Muslim American men and women’s
encounters with racialized surveillance.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 42 (4) p. 552569
Stone, Pamela and Meg Lovejoy. 2019. Opting Back in: What Really Happens When
Mothers Go Back to Work. Oakland, California: University of California Press
Stone, Pamela. 2007. Opting Out?: Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head
Home. Berkeley: University of California Press
Trump, Donald J. 2017. “Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into The United States.” Retrieved May 7, 2019
https://www.whitehouse.gov/
Werbner, Phina. 2005. “Islamophobia: Incitement to religious hatred – legislating for
a new fear?” Anthropology Today 21 (1): p 5-9
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. 1987. “Doing Gender.” Gender and Society. 1: 125-151.
Winant, Howard. 2000. “Race and Race Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology 26
(2000): p. 169-185
Wingfield, Adia Harvey. 2013. No More Invisible Man: Race and Gender in Men’s
Work. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Wu, Yuning. 2017. “Chinese Exclusion Act: United States [1882].” Britannica.
Retrieved Apr. 30, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-ExclusionAct
Yuval-Davis, Nira. 2006. “Belonging and the politics of belonging.” Patterns of
Prejudice 40 (3): p 197-214
Zhou, Min. 2012. “Asians in America: The Paradox of ‘the Model Minority’ and ‘The
Perpetual Foreigner.’” University of Saskatchewan: 43rd Annual Sorokin Lecture.
Retrieved April 30, 2018
http://artandscience.usask.ca/sociology/documents/43rd%20Annual%20Sorokin%
20Lecture.pdf.
Zopf, Bradley J. 2018. “A Different Kind of Brown: Arabs and Middle Easterners as
Anti-American-Muslims.” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 4 (2) 178-191
157

2009. “The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2009: Seeking Full
Inclusion.” Council on American-Islamic Relations. Retrieved May 7, 2019.
https://www.cair.com/
2015. United States Mosque Directory. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2019.
http://www.mosquesmasjids.com/
2018. Arab American Institute. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2019. https://www.aaiusa.org/
2019 Anti-Muslim. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved May 7, 2019.
https://www.splcenter.org/
2019. “U.S. Immigration Trends.” Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved May 7, 2019.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
2019. United States Census Bureau. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2019.
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts

158

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Interview Outline
I.

Introduction to Study:

Hello, and thank you so much for your willingness to participate in and interview for my
research project on Arab and South Asian American men’s identities. My primary
interest for this study is in the experiences, perceptions, and identities of Arab and South
Asian American men in [Metro-City] and [Townsburg], [State]. By participating in this
research study, you will engage in an interview that will last about 60 to 120 minutes and
that will be audio-recorded and transcribed with your permission. During this study I will
interview 40 to 60 Arab and South Asian American men with immigrant family origins in
[state] and ask them questions about…
First, this research asks for about 1 hour of your time to conduct an interview that will be
audio-recorded and transcribed. During this study I will interview around 20 participants,
asking them similar questions.
The records of this study will be kept private. There will be no information included that
will make it possible to identify you in any reports that are published. Individuals in this
study will be given a pseudonym to protect for confidentiality and research recordings
will be erased once they have been transcribed.
Finally, taking part in this study is voluntary. You may decline to answer a question you
do not wish to answer and you have the right to leave the study at any time. Please keep
your copy of the consent form and contact me if any questions or concerns arise.
I would like to be very respectful of your time. Do you have any questions before we
begin the study? … Thank you again. Let’s begin.
Demographics
A. Survey [Appendix B]
B. Tell me a little bit about yourself. Where do you work? How long have you
worked there (or attended X school)? What do you most often do when you’re
not working (or in school)?
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Identity
A. How would you describe yourself?
B. If you had to choose a community that you feel you are most connected to,
what is it? How would you characterize this connection/community? How did
you come to identify with this community? Are there any other communities
or groups that are important to you? How did you come to identify with that
community or group?
C. How would you describe the Arab/South Asian/Immigrant community in in
the U.S.? in X city? How connected are you to that community? What does
connection to that community look like? How did you come to be connected
to that community?
D. Do you know anyone from the [other community] Arab/South Asian
community in Metro-City / Townsburg, [state]? What is your perception of
that community? What is it like? Is it distinct? How is it different from the
[respondent] Arab/South Asian community in Metro-City / Townsburg?
E. Tell me about your family. Why did your parents, or grandparents come to the
U.S.? How does their immigrant status affect your life? What might your
experiences be like if you came from an immigrant family but lived outside of
the U.S. or in another part of the world?
F. Do you have any connections to friends and family members internationally?
What are these relationships like? Do you consider them to be close
relationships? How often do you see them or otherwise make contact with
them?
G. Who are your closest friends? How would you characterize them? Are they
also Arab/South Asian/Immigrant family origin/Muslim/men? Why do you
think that this might be? Where did you meet these friends? What do you do
together? How would you characterize this friendship?
Islamophobia
H. How do you think your X identity affects you in Metro-City / Townsburg? For
example, when you shop, eat out, walk down the street, or go to other public
places.
I. Have you ever had interactions with the police? What was the interaction?
What did you think about it?
J. How do you think your X identity affects you in the workplace?
K. How do you think co-workers perceive your racial or ethnic identity? Does
this affect how they treat you? How so?
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L. Have you ever experienced mistreatment that might have been due to how
others perceive your ethnic/immigrant/religious identity?
M. Do you know anyone who has experienced mistreatment that might have been
due to how others perceive their ethnic/immigrant/religious identity?
Place
N. Did you/your family live somewhere else prior to living in Metro-City /
Townsburg, [state]? Where did you/they live? Why did you/they move there?
When/Why did your family move to Metro-City / Townsburg, [state]?
O. What do you think about [state]? About Metro-City / Townsburg? Would you
describe your experiences in Metro-City / Townsburg as generally positive or
negative? Is there any reason you feel this way?
P. Do you know any Arab or South Asian Americans in [other site] Metro-City /
Townsburg, [state]? How do you know them? How frequently do you see
them or make contact with them? What do you think about [other site] MetroCity / Townsburg, [state]?
Q. Do you think that you will continue to live in Metro-City / Townsburg,
[state]? Why or why not? Where else would you like to live? Why?
R. Do you ever travel to other places in [state]? In the U.S.? Internationally?
How often would you say that you do this? Why do you do this? For example,
I have a friend who lives in Townsburg who frequently travels to [other cities]
to buy Halal meat in bulk. Or I have other friends with relatives in the UK,
who have traveled internationally to visit them.
Closing of Study:
Thank you so much for your willingness to take part in this study. That is all of the
questions that I had. Are there any points that you think that I might have missed out on?
Or any questions that I should consider asking respondents in the future? Are there any
questions that could be reworded or that you found to be particularly troubling?
Here’s my contact information again and please feel free to call me or email me if any
questions or concerns arise. Thank you so much, have a great day.
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Appendix B: Demographic Survey
Please complete the following brief demographic survey to the best of your ability.
1. How old are you?

___________________

2. Where were you born?

___________________

3. What is your family’s nationality of origin?

___________________

4. How would you racially categorize yourself?

___________________

5. Do you identify with any particular ethnicity? If so, What is it?

___________________

6. Do people ever mistake your racial or ethnic identity? If so, what
___________________
do they mistake you for?
7. What is your gender identity?

___________________

8. What is your religious identity?

___________________

9. Do you have any other family members that live in the United
States? If so, whom?
___________________
10. Do you have any other family members that live in the United
___________________
States? If so, whom?
11. Do you have family members that live outside of the United States?
If so, whom?
___________________
12. How long has your family lived in the United States?

___________________

13. What generation of your family are you that has lived in the US?
[e.g., first, second, third]
___________________
14. What do you/your family do for work?

___________________

15. What is your highest level of completed education?

___________________
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